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Introduction 
 
   Zbigniew Brzezinski was one of the most influential statesmen of the twentieth 
century yet he is under-recognised for his achievements in the historical record. 
Unlike Henry Kissinger, Brzezinski has not received a similar level of attention and 
has not had many works written about him. The purpose of this dissertation is to make 
the case that under his influence the Carter administration helped to end the Cold War. 
As Brzezinski was President Carter’s National Security Adviser, he played a leading 
role in the administration which, in effect, had a significant though yet not fully 
recognised part in bringing down the Soviet Union. 
   It may be said that Brzezinski was amongst the most far-sighted strategists of his 
generation, whose influence over US foreign policy had been substantial. The focus of 
this work more specifically is upon Brzezinski’s career in politics and the world of 
academia during the period 1948-1981, with a particular focus upon the Carter era. 
The central argument is that the Carter administration, under the guidance of 
Brzezinski, sowed the seeds for the decline of the Soviet Union and put in place 
important policies that would help end the global conflict. This is a matter which has 
not been given sufficient attention in the historical record. Recent literature is in fact 
beginning to corroborate this argument, such as Stuart E. Eizenstat’s Jimmy Carter, 
which argued that Carter and his administration deserve more credit than they have 
thus far received for their role in defeating the Soviets.1 As Madeleine Albright stated 
in the foreward to Eizenstat’s work, ‘…history’s verdict on Carter is still being 
debated.’2 This dissertation is therefore right upon the cusp of new research to prove 
the Carter administration played a significant and underappreciated role in 
neutralising the Soviet threat and ensuring the downfall of the Soviet Union.  
   There is a vacuum to be filled in relation to research on the end of the Cold War for, 
as Ian Jackson wrote, ‘There remains a dearth of declassified primary sources 
conducive to arriving at confident judgments about the factors leading to the demise 
of the cold war.’3 This dissertation postulates that the Carter administration and 
Brzezinski in particular contributed to ending the conflict by supporting dissidents as 
well as Western radio stations in Eastern Europe, by carrying out the normalization of 
                                                 
1 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Jimmy Carter: The White House Years (New York, 2018) p. xv 
2 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Jimmy Carter, pxvi 
3 Ian Jackson, ‘Economics and the Cold War’ in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde, The Oxford 
Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford, 2016) p. 59 
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relations between the United States and China, by taking advantage of the Soviet-
Afghan conflict and also through strategically upgrading the U.S. military. These 
were all important factors during the administration in tipping the scales against the 
Soviets and ushering in the end of the conflict. These factors are not given their due 
weight, it is argued, in the historiography on the conflict. The economic policies of the 
Reagan administration are attributed too much credit for, as Ian Jackson wrote: ‘The 
available evidence suggests that the Reagan administration’s campaign of economic 
warfare in the early 1980s had a minimal impact on the Soviet Union.’4 While the 
arms race did play an important role in economically bankrupting the Soviet Union, it 
is debatable whether it was the principal cause of the Soviet Union’s collapse. This 
thesis endeavours to demonstrate that pivotal events in the Cold War took place 
during the Carter era and were significantly shaped by Zbigniew Brzezinski. 
Furthermore that these events had an important effect upon bringing the conflict to a 
close.  
   In relation to the Soviet-Afghan War, Geoffrey Warner has written that ‘The cold 
war’s climactic Third World conflict, however, occurred in Afghanistan’5 and indeed 
in military terms, the defeat of the Soviets did in fact take place there, which was the 
result of a policy implemented by Brzezinski. Significantly, this dissertation seeks to 
prove that although the Soviets were not beaten militarily by the United States, the 
conflict in Afghanistan was a military defeat for the Soviets and was in fact one of the 
chief reasons why their empire collapsed.  
   Emphasising the military defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan as a factor in the 
collapse of the Soviet Bloc is important and is something that is not addressed 
sufficiently in the historiography. As David R. Stone has written: ‘Although the cold 
war fundamentally revolved around a potential East-West military clash in central 
Europe, military aspects have been strangely divorced from the mainstream of 
scholarship, echoing a divide between military and diplomatic historians across 
regions and periods.’6 The dissertation postulates that the Soviet-Afghan War was a 
chief cause in the breakdown of the Soviet Union and is supportive of the views of 
others who believe so. As John Prados wrote: ‘Indeed, some analysts maintain that the 
                                                 
4 Ian Jackson, ‘Economics and the Cold War’ in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde ed., The 
Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford, 2016) p. 63 
5 Geoffrey Warner, ‘Geopolitics and the Cold War,’ in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde ed., The 
Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, p. 78  
6 David R. Stone, ‘The Military,’ in in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde ed., The Oxford 
Handbook of the Cold War, p.341 
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proxy war in Afghanistan between Russian forces and CIA-backed tribal and religious 
rebels had a primary role in the Soviet Union’s demise.’7 This student would concur 
with such a statement. It is argued that military conflict in Afghanistan broke the 
resolve of Soviet armed forces and ensured they would not be advanced again to 
spread or defend communism. 
   It is also worth adding that it is thanks to Brzezinski that the U.S. began to launch 
covert operations inside the Soviet Union. Brzezinski therefore broke the code of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of the Communist Bloc and thereby brought the 
Cold War to the Soviet home ground.8 This is important as the fomenting of 
nationalism and in particular Islamic fundamentalism within the borders of the Soviet 
Union were important additional factors that led to the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
This was a policy that had been thought of before but was never actually 
implemented. As Dianne Kirby wrote: ‘In 1952 Kennan had warned that foreign 
interference, especially in the realm of religion, would arouse the suspicions and fear 
of the insecure Soviets.’9 This policy would have a significant effect on the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, as the fomenting of Islamic fundamentalism inside Afghanistan and 
Central Asia would help to fuel anti-Soviet sentiment and ensure the breaking away of 
these countries from the Soviet Union.  
   Nationalism played a key role in bringing about the implosion of the Soviet Union. 
Since the time he wrote his MA thesis Brzezinski had set out to foment nationalism 
within the Soviet Union in the hope that this would lead to the breakup of the 
Communist Bloc. The Soviet Union had sought to stifle nationalism in order to bolster 
internal cohesion however this policy backfired. As Duara Prasenjat has written: 
‘Ironically, it (the Soviet Union) ended up fostering national consciousness in places 
where it had been very weak or non-existent, often at the expense of identification 
with the Soviet Union which never succeeded in generating its own narrative or 
symbolism of nationhood.’10 From the beginning of the Cold War the U.S. had 
supported nationalism for the purpose of thwarting Soviet ambitions for establishing a 
                                                 
7 John Prados, ‘Cold War Intelligence History,’ in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde, The Oxford 
Handbook of the Cold War, p. 420 
8 Andreas Etges, ‘Western Europe,’ in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde ed., The Oxford 
Handbook of the Cold War, p. 169 
9 Diane Kirby, ‘The Religious Cold War,’ in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde ed., The Oxford 
Handbook of the Cold War, p. 547 
10 Duara Prasenjat, ‘The Cold War and the Imperialism of Nation States,’ in Richard H. Immerman & 
Petra Goedde ed., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, p. 93 
 11 
global empire. John Lewis Gaddis wrote of how nationalism was used as an 
instrument to contain Communism: ‘Nationalism, then, would prove the most durable 
of ideologies; it would be through the encouragement of nationalism, whether in areas 
threatened by communism or within the communist bloc itself, that the objectives of 
containment would be largely achieved.’11 However, whereas Kennan sought to 
utilise nationalism to contain the Soviet Union, Brzezinski took it a step further and 
sought to use nationalism to dismantle the Soviet bloc. 
   It is also important to note that the strategic upgrading of the U.S. military and the 
arms race for which the Reagan administration is usually given credit for and which 
helped end the Cold War, was in fact begun by the Carter administration. As Duara 
Prasenjat has written: ‘The Reagan administration, with its heightened ideological 
fervour – and emboldened by the neutralisation of China – ultimately raised military 
spending to such high levels that the Soviet Union could no longer match it and 
continue to supply the consumer needs of its population.’12 It is therefore worth 
reemphasising that it was Carter who began the policy of increased defence spending. 
David R. Stone pointed out that the military element is important in deciphering the 
Cold War’s end and that the military build-up was in fact begun by Carter. He wrote: 
‘The military side of the Cold War, though too often divorced from its international 
history, has played a major role on the debates on the Cold War’s end. A common 
triumphant narrative of Western victory stresses how the Reagan military build-up 
(begun in the final years of the Carter administration) forced the Soviets to spend 
themselves into bankruptcy.’13 
The ushering-in of the Second Cold War begun by Brzezinski and the Carter 
administration in the second half of the presidential term was the result of the collapse 
of détente and a return to traditional bipolar confrontation. The determination of the 
Reagan administration to bring the Cold War to an end owes its roots to the Carter 
administration and specifically to the Soviet-Afghan War, when tensions between the 
superpowers increased and both sides knuckled down for a renewed spat of 
confrontation to gain advantage over one another and ultimately, bring the conflict to 
                                                 
11 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy During the Cold War (Oxford, 2005) p. 46 
12 Duara Prasenjat, ‘The Cold War and the Imperialism of Nation States,’ in Richard H. Immerman & 
Petra Goedde, The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, p. 99 
13 David R. Stone, ‘The Military,’ in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde, The Oxford Handbook of 
the Cold War, p.355 
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a close. The US thus went from containment and a change of Soviet worldview to 
détente to seeking a preponderance of power over the USSR.14  
   Eizenstat made the point that the Carter administration is commonly written off as a 
failure, including its foreign policy and that this is a very debatable judgment. The 
Carter administration entered the White House with the aim of transforming the Cold 
War from an era of stalemate and détente to one of active engagement in the internal 
affairs of the Soviet bloc and the purposeful evolution of the Soviet system. As Daniel 
Sargent put it: ‘The Carter administration’s policy toward Eastern Europe aimed from 
the outset to encourage centripetal forces – an approach reflecting Brzezinski’s 
conviction that the East Bloc was politically fragile and prone to fragmentation.’15 
The Carter administration sought to pursue a dual track approach of both cooperation 
and confrontation. The period of détente came to an end under his rule and a second 
Cold War was ignited in the latter half of his presidency. That renewed phase of 
hostilities was fully exploited and brought to a conclusion under the Reagan and Bush 
administrations. However, as this thesis will argue, it was Carter, and in particular 
Brzezinski, who were responsible for accelerating the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
sowing the seeds of its decline, and ending the period of détente and also the high 
point of Soviet power and influence.  
   Brzezinski and Carter ended Soviet parity with the U.S. and revamped the American 
military in a phase of renewed hostility for the purpose of ending the conflict rather 
than settling for peaceful coexistence. They overcame the period of Soviet ascendancy 
when the Soviet Union sought to capitalise on the defeat of the U.S. in Vietnam 
through expanding its influence in the Third World by punishing such adventurism, 
bringing the process of SALT II to a halt, and stepping up U.S. countermeasures to 
ensure not only the containment but ultimately the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
itself. 
   There remains much research to be done on bringing to light just how important and 
influential the Carter administration was in bringing to an end the Cold War. As Dino 
Knudsen has written: ‘Thus there is still a dearth of research into international 
                                                 
14 Duara Prasenjat, ‘The Cold War and the Imperialism of Nation States,’ in Richard H. Immerman & 
Petra Goedde, The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, p. 108 
15 Daniel J. Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, p. 294 
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organizations, cooperation, and events in the 1970s, and the US foreign policy under 
Carter has far from been as thoroughly investigated as that of his predecessors.’16    
   The Carter administration is remembered for its failures, in particular the Iranian 
hostage crisis. However, there were a number of undeniable successes which helped 
tip the balance in the Cold War, in particular, the luring of the Soviets into 
Afghanistan, the normalization of diplomatic relations with China, the use of soft 
power in Eastern Europe, and the upgrading of the US defence posture, all of which, 
Brzezinski had a hand in. As Justin Vaisse wrote: 
 
This is all the more the case in that, as Carter’s national security adviser, he 
(Brzezinski) left his mark on essential developments in American diplomatic 
history. Some of these have been haunting the United States ever since (such as 
the Iranian revolution, the failure of the hostage rescue attempt in 1980, and the 
support of the Afghan mujahedeen) while others were controversial or 
incomplete (including progress on human rights policy and the SALT II 
agreements). Several, however, were undeniable successes, including the 
Torrijos-Carter treaties on the Panama Canal, the Camp David accords and peace 
treaties on the Panama Canal, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, and the 
normalization of diplomatic relations with China.17 
   
  Another premise of this dissertation is that the Soviet Union collapsed due to the 
influence of events happening outside the Soviet Bloc in addition to those happening 
within it. This is important as it reinforces the idea that the United States triumphed 
over the Soviet Union and that the latter did not just collapse due to internal pressures. 
Dianne Kirby wrote that: ‘The scholarly consensus is that the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc had more to with internal rather than external pressures.’18 This study seeks to 
challenge the consensus and argue that the influence of human rights, the 
normalization of relations with China, the Soviet-Afghan War, and the strategic 
upgrading of the US military were all external pressures that played an important role 
in dissolving of the Soviet Union. 
                                                 
16 Dino Knudsen, The Trilateral Commission and Global Governance: Informal Elite Diplomacy, 
1972-82, p. 19 
17 Justin Vaisse, Zbigniew Brzezinski: America’s Grand Strategist (Harvard, 2018) p. 11 
18 Dianne Kirby, ‘The Religious Cold War,’ in Richard H. Immerman & Petra Goedde, The Oxford 
Handbook of the Cold War, p. 555 
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   This dissertation also endeavours to demonstrate that Brzezinski was the single most 
influential person in the White House next to the president, Jimmy Carter. It makes 
the case that since the time of its inception, the Trilateral Commission has been 
engaged in policy formulation which, its members hoped, would then become the 
official governmental policy of Western nations. The thesis makes the claim that the 
normalization of US-Chinese relations was carried out in order to gain a strategic 
advantage over the Soviet Union through enlisting the Chinese on the side of the West 
in the midst of the Cold War. Furthermore, it shows that Brzezinski was the main man 
responsible for engineering this diplomatic and strategic coup, significantly building 
upon the earlier groundwork of Henry Kissinger and President Nixon to establish an 
informal military alliance with the United States and also substantially aiding China in 
its process of economic and social modernization. While credit is indeed due to Nixon 
and Kissinger for this policy, this study shows that Brzezinski took the alliance with 
China to another more effective level and this is often overlooked.  
   The thesis attributes to Brzezinski credit for receiving from the Chinese tangible 
support in containing their mutual adversary, the Soviet Union, particularly through 
gaining from the Chinese financial support for the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and 
also through having them oppose the Soviet-sponsored North Vietnamese. 
Significantly, Brzezinski’s influence in persuading the Japanese to sign the Peace and 
Friendship Treaty with China is also addressed. 
   This dissertation aims to show that the Carter administration significantly enhanced 
the war fighting ability of the United States. It makes the case that the aim of 
Brzezinski and of the Carter administration more generally was to reduce if not 
exclude Soviet influence from the Middle East. Brzezinski sought a domineering role 
for the U.S. in this third strategic front through the establishment of the Rapid 
Deployment Force and the acquisition of bases in the region. In relation to the Soviet-
Afghan war, this study provides evidence that Brzezinski was the main man 
responsible for devising a strategy to deal with Moscow’s military intervention.  
   Whilst attempting to establish that Brzezinski played a critical role in opposing the 
Soviet invasion, this study also gives due attention to the Soviet reasons for 
intervening in Afghanistan, providing primary source material which claims that the 
Soviets were merely propping up a legitimate communist government beset by an 
externally sponsored insurrection. Also, it analyses sources which suggest that the 
move was not designed to impinge upon the sovereignty of surrounding states nor was 
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it part of a broader design to gain geopolitical control over the Persian Gulf region. 
That it was not a design to advance southwards towards the Persian Gulf has now 
been conclusively proven. As Vladislav M. Zubok put it: ‘Fifteen years later, new 
evidence from the Kremlin’s archives revealed that the Soviet leadership had no 
aggressive plans to reach the Persian Gulf. Scholars have concluded that the Soviet 
leaders reacted above all to the developments in Afghanistan and the region around 
it.’19 
   This dissertation seeks to establish that Brzezinski was one of the main officials 
responsible for the worsening of US-Soviet relations in the latter half of the Carter 
presidency, and this is supported with considerable primary source material. 
Brzezinski was at the forefront of those who sought to take punitive action against the 
Soviet Union for its expansionist policies. He sought to prevail in the military 
competition with the Soviet Union and he was to a significant degree responsible for 
the strategic upgrading of US military doctrine and of the bolstering of US troops in 
Europe as well as the introduction of the MX missile, the Pershing II ICBM, 
Presidential Directive 59, and the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force for the 
Persian Gulf-Middle East region.        
   In prevailing upon the U.S. to act decisively and effectively to counter the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, Brzezinski was also demonstrating that the U.S. would no 
longer tolerate, as it had in 1956 and 1968, Soviet domination of countries hostile to 
Communism and to external control from Moscow. Brzezinski was thus ensuring 
Washington’s adherence to the Truman doctrine of opposition to Soviet subversion of 
free states. Brzezinski’s policy to fund Islamic fundamentalists was carried forward 
by the subsequent Reagan and Bush administrations and it would contribute 
significantly to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.  
   As previously stated, this dissertation seeks above all to establish that Brzezinski 
played a significant part in ending the Cold War. It shows that Brzezinski was the 
guiding light in many respects concerning the Carter administration’s handling of 
Soviet affairs. In this respect this study will demonstrate his leadership in a number of 
issues that were of considerable historical significance.  
   Brzezinski also devised a new US military strategy to place troops in the third 
strategic zone, namely the Middle East, which would have significant consequences 
                                                 
19 Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev 
(North Carolina, 2009) p. 228 
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for the US military up to the present day. That is to say, the Carter Doctrine which 
committed the United States to protect the freedom and integrity of Middle Eastern 
states and keep them from being dominated by external powers (a doctrine influenced 
by Brzezinski) and furthermore the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force, are 
shown throughout the thesis to have been largely attributed to Brzezinski.  
   It was at Brzezinski’s instigation that Carter decided to formulate a doctrine in the 
first place. Concerning the Carter administration more generally, the thesis attempts to 
prove definitively that the Carter administration was anything but weak in the area of 
foreign affairs and particularly strategic matters, with the exception of the Iranian 
hostage crisis which sealed the fate of the administration and ensured Carter would 
not be re-elected for a second term. The study shows that the Carter administration 
took waging the Cold War very seriously, and moreover that Brzezinski played a 
leading role in ending the period of détente and reigniting a period of increased 
military competition that would result in U.S. victory in 1990.  
   Brzezinski dedicated his life to bringing about the implosion of the Soviet Union. 
His career as an academic concurrent to his life in politics has been punctuated by a 
large number of best-sellers and landmark works, which have been instrumental in 
shaping policy discourse and in augmenting the fields of political science and its 
subfield geopolitics.  
   Up until the time of his death in May 2017, Brzezinski continued to exert 
considerable influence in world affairs, frequently appearing on news networks to 
advocate policies in line with his long-held views and strategic outlook. For most of 
his life a vigorous opponent of Russian expansionism, Brzezinski’s political 
philosophy was defined by a deeply-held distrust of Russian “imperialism” and he 
claimed to have the American interest in mind when delivering policy 
recommendations. 
   The Cold War lens through which he looked for most of his life to a certain extent 
defined his outlook on world affairs, as the spoils of the Cold War have not been 
completely absorbed by the West and its allies. NATO expansion eastwards to 
incorporate the former Soviet space continues. For Brzezinski, Russia’s weaker 
neighbours continued to be a focus of concern, demanding vigorous support from the 
United States in order to fully contain the Russian super-state.    
   The Cold War may have ended, but the military contest to decide the fate of Eurasia 
and which superpower will have the mainstay there is ongoing. Brzezinski’s energies 
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were for a substantial period of time directed at destroying the Soviet Union and 
securing greater unity and predominance for the West. As the world has moved from a 
bi-polar world toward a multi-polar one Brzezinski adjusted his geopolitical 
perspective, yet his view that the West would continue to provide ultimate leadership 
remained intact.  
   The United States and Europe remain the wealthiest regions of the world and the 
most modern, in spite of China’s rise and the dispersal of economic power from the 
West to the East. The US and EU continue to account for over half the world’s GDP 
and represent the high standard of living to which most of the world’s inhabitants 
aspire. In these circumstances, Brzezinski remained in the post-Cold war years a 
strong advocate of transatlantic unity and greater Western involvement in the running 
of world affairs. He believed that despite accommodating trends in the UN and other 
multinational organisations to placate China, India and others, the West will retain 
paramount and decisive world leadership.  
   Indeed, Brzezinski believed it is the United States in particular who must continue 
to provide over-arching leadership to the world community in the early years of the 
21st century. With its Cold War victory, the United States emerged as the sole global 
superpower, heralding in an era, according to Brzezinski, in which the United States 
was uniquely poised to shape a new global equilibrium or, as George H. W. Bush 
termed it, a ‘New World Order.’ However, the events of the last two decades have 
weakened that seemingly omnipotent position somewhat following America’s costly 
engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, with Obama’s election the US confronted 
a world in which many had lost faith in America as a force for good. The United 
States had been discredited by George W. Bush’s unilateralism and was further 
challenged by China’s market-authoritarian model which offered an alternative for 
many developing nations. In this context, Brzezinski argued in his latest work 
Strategic Vision, that the United States must redeem itself internationally and reclaim 
the mantle of global leadership, conveying to the rest of the world that its socio-
economic and political system, as well as its cultural values, are worthy of emulation 
on a global scale.  
   As a supporter of President Barrack Obama and a seasoned Democratic Party 
strategist, Brzezinski’s views were taken seriously by the Obama administration. On 
numerous occasions, Brzezinski was called into the ‘situation room’ in the White 
House to give advice on evolving crises and policy options, particularly concerning 
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ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. His influence can be seen in the clear 
congruence between Brzezinski’s own views as expressed in his writings and the 
actual conduct of US foreign policy. Indeed, Brzezinski joined Henry Kissinger and 
Brent Scowcroft as elder statesmen whose views carry immense authority, backed as 
they are by years of experience in a governmental capacity. Brzezinski’s writings 
appear to have guided the actions of later policymakers such as Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, both of whom may be 
considered his protégés.  
   Central to his writings over the last two decades, since the end of the Cold War, has 
been the notion that the United States should retain world leadership through 
predominance over the mega-continent of Eurasia. This would be achieved by 
preventing an emerging Sino-Russian alliance from expelling the United States from 
areas they claim as falling within their sphere of influence such as Central Asia. 
Brzezinski advocated strong engagement with the European Union, Japan, and other 
willing allies to safeguard America’s geo-strategic interests and its continued global 
hegemony. 
   American influence in Eurasia is guaranteed by American control of key linchpin 
states that are on the periphery of the continent or in geo-strategically significant 
locations, such as South Korea and Afghanistan. Occupation of these countries and 
military alliances with them help to secure the United States’ dominant position over 
the Eurasian continent, prevents it from being dominated by any others, and 
guarantees their close proximity to sources of oil and other valuable resources needed 
to fuel their domestic economy. As a long-time proponent of American intervention 
abroad, Brzezinski can then be seen in the line of many hard-nosed or hawkish U.S. 
policy makers such as Paul Nitze. Indeed, Brzezinski has supported almost every U.S. 
war since Vietnam, with the exception of the Iraq wars of 1990 and 2003. What 
Brzezinski considered most vital to US foreign policy is that the United States 
remained ensconced on the Eurasian heartland where over three quarters of the 
world’s population and resources are to be found. Such an ejection from that mega-
continent would spell the end for the United States as the world’s leading power. In 
this regard, Brzezinski may be seen in the line of Halford Mackinder and other 
geopolitical theorists who viewed dominance of the Eurasian landmass as the key to 
global supremacy. Indeed Brzezinski subscribed to Mackinder’s view that the Soviet 
Union had to be contained in its quest to dominate Eurasia. As Paul Kennedy has 
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written: ‘This growth of the Soviet Empire appeared to confirm the geopolitical 
predictions of Mackinder and others that a gigantic military power would control the 
resources of the Eurasian ‘Heartland’; and that the further expansion of that state into 
the periphery or ‘Rimland’ would need to be contested by the great maritime states if 
they were to preserve a global balance of power.’20  
The dissertation is organised into three chapters which deal with Brzezinski’s career 
up to and including the Carter administration. The first chapter deals with his 
formation as a scholar and his early works which specialise on the Soviet Union. The 
following chapter deals with the beginning of his political career during which time he 
worked for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This section analyses his works 
written during this period and how they formed the strategy he would implement 
whilst serving as National Security Adviser. Also, his role in founding the Trilateral 
Commission is examined. The final chapter deals with the Carter administration and 
looks at the three issues of human rights and Eastern Europe, the normalization of 
relations with the People’s Republic of China, and the Soviet-Afghan War. 
Brzezinski’s contribution to policymaking in these three areas is addressed and finally 
there is an assessment of the administration’s performance. 
   Overall, this study will reveal and demonstrate the influence of Brzezinski over the 
Carter administration during the years 1977-81 and it will analyse the impact he had 
upon ending the Cold War. 
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1) Early Years 
 
Formation as a scholar 
 
   The purpose of this chapter is to trace the development of Brzezinski’s ideas as 
expressed in his early works in order to analyse how they would later shape his 
approach to waging the Cold War and the policies he would implement whilst in 
government. Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski was born on March 28, 1928, the son of 
a Polish diplomat, Tadeusz. His family was of noble lineage, termed szlachta in 
Polish. At the age of ten his family decided to move to Montreal after his father 
obtained the position of Ambassador there. In 1948, Brzezinski completed his MA 
thesis at McGill University. In it he predicted that the Soviet Union would eventually 
break up along national lines. His views regarding this and the manner in which it 
would occur were formed early on. As he stated himself:  
 
Already at McGill, I reached the conviction that the weakness of the Soviet 
Union, its Achilles’ heel, was its multinational character. Once I grasped that in 
my M.A. thesis at McGill, I began to work on formulating a strategy, which in a 
piecemeal fashion would expose the weaknesses of the Soviet system, detach the 
countries of the Soviet bloc from the Soviet Union… and then eventually 
accomplish the dismantling of the Soviet Union itself.21  
 
   Brzezinski’s MA thesis would lay the groundwork for his subsequent onslaught 
against the Soviet Union and provide a roadmap for what he had to do to undermine 
Soviet Unity and bring about the implosion of the Communist bloc. Justin Vaisse 
described it thus: 
 
The text is actually a militant document. It suggests that while it might not be 
possible to defeat the Soviets today, it is possible to understand their system well 
enough to identify its weaknesses and increase the likelihood of its succumbing 
to them. His precise and rigorous study of the various nationalities within the 
USSR led to a nuanced conclusion: the Soviet Union has a growing problem of 
unity but can still deal with it. This in turn set up a political recommendation: the 
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West should set up a sort of inverse Comintern that would accentuate the 
dilemma of the nationalities and fuel the internal frictions that could cause the 
Soviet bloc and the Union itself to implode.22  
 
   Brzezinski had thus established by 1948 his strategy to bring about the downfall of 
the Soviet Union through fomenting nationalism and he would set out with vigour 
upon his mission from here on out. Nationalism and its exploitation however was not 
the only means Brzezinski sought to use to defeat the Soviets. In his subsequent 
writings he would disparage the totalitarian systems and highlight their inhumane 
practices. He would also become a strong supporter of American military power and 
its widespread use to curtail Soviet influence around the world and ultimately, destroy 
the Soviet Union itself. 
   Brzezinski was considered by a friend to have been hawkish at McGill. Indeed, 
since his youth he had harboured deeply anti-Soviet views and had been vehemently 
determined to liberate his home country Poland. His time at Harvard helped to 
assimilate Brzezinski into America. Justin Vaisse quotes Brzezinski as saying: ‘I 
became a scholar simply because Harvard gave me the opportunity to be a scholar, 
and I became serious about trying to be a decent scholar. But there was always 
something within me that drew me to action, influencing events, impacting. And the 
as I began to feel my oats, I began to crystalize my ambition, which was nothing less 
than formulating a coherent strategy for the United States, so that we could eventually 
dismantle the Soviet bloc.’23 Brzezinski was thus determined to defeat the Soviet 
Union and was not in favour of merely peaceful coexistence. He was in favour of 
mutual accommodation and cooperation but all the while he was atavistic about 
bringing the communist bloc down.   
   Brzezinski began working as an academic however he was subsequently drawn into 
the world of policymaking. He would however continue to teach while he was not 
working for the government in addition to writing a large number of important works 
on international affairs and in particular, the Soviet Union. He became a renowned 
specialist on the Soviet bloc and expounded upon the intricacies of Kremlin politics as 
well as that of the satellites. 
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Brzezinski described how he made the transition from academic to policymaker and 
how he was more attracted to the world of policymaking than that of working in a 
university. He stated: 
 
When I went to Harvard I didn’t have a clear notion that I wanted to be an 
academic. I wanted somehow to influence events, that I remember. But whether 
that be by joining the foreign service, or dealing with foreign affairs in some 
capacity, or being an academic, I hadn’t really thought that through. But then 
Harvard started getting me things. That kind of pushed me in one direction, that 
direction took off and then I began to be noticed, first as an academic, a 
promising one, I guess, and then as one with a policy orientation. And at Harvard 
I noticed that academia and policy intermingled, and that began to attract me 
more and more. So by the end of that decade and the beginning of the next one, 
by 1960, it was clear to me that I wanted to combine the two. And by the 70s, it 
was clear that I wanted the second more than the first.24 
 
   Brzezinski began as a specialist on the Soviet Union however by the 1960s he began 
to broaden his horizons and covered a wider array of topics. He wrote voluminously 
about all the major issues of the day and would later go on to become an expert on 
international affairs generally speaking with a particular focus on East-West relations 
and the development of the Western world. His goal was to consolidate the West and 
lead it to victory over the Soviet Union, all the while promoting a new world order. 
Justin Vaisse described this transition from Sovietologist to international analyst as 
follows:  
 
From the late Harvard years on, Brzezinski looked beyond the USSR toward 
Eastern Europe, but also toward the Third World. This tendency increased 
considerably during the 1960s, with articles and books that covered a much 
broader spectrum than before. His field of expertise was the starting point: Sino-
Soviet relations, Africa, transatlantic relations, and the hot topics of American 
foreign policy in Cuba, for example, and especially the war in Vietnam.25 
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   From Harvard Brzezinski would earn his PhD in political science. He would go on 
to run the Russian Research Institute in Harvard and would conduct seminars on the 
Soviet Union with a view to instilling in his students a strident anti-communism. 
Brzezinski was determined to liberate Poland and hasten communism’s collapse and 
would resort to any means to bring about this end. As Vaisse noted, Brzezinski was 
considered ‘a cynical operator who would stoop to anything in order to prevail.’26 
Brzezinski, Vaisses added, ‘went on to become an expert in the international politics 
that had deprived him of his birthplace.’27   
   It is worth noting that Brzezinski was an early example of the academic turned 
political adviser who did not gain influence due to his being a part of the 
establishment but rather was a foreigner who earned his position through academic 
merit. He, along with Henry Kissinger, were forerunners to the academic turned 
political adviser. They both matriculated through the university system and 
established contacts with the establishment, thus maneuvering their way into positions 
of power and influence. As Vaisse wrote: ‘Like Kissinger, Brzezinski was a pioneer, 
an early examplar of a now familiar model – that of the political strategist, the 
academic who becomes counsellor to the president.’28 Kissinger and Brzezinski were 
admired for being immigrants and making their way into the ranks of the WASP elite 
and many sought to follow in their footsteps. Between 1956 and 1960 Brzezinski 
gradually moved from academia into the world of politics.  
 Brzezinski would go on to advise on the Vietnam War, conflicts in the Middle East, 
Europe, and the USSR. One could also add that it was Eurasia which he was most 
concerned with; Latin America, Africa, and Oceania were considered by him to be 
peripheral and didn’t receive as much attention. He advised on the main issues of U.S. 
foreign policy and was a part of the Cold War universe wherein academic authorities 
like him were increasingly recruited by the government to give policy 
recommendations.  
   Brzezinski was not just an anti-Communist because of his Polish origins. He also 
felt that it was an inhumane political system and that American national security was 
fundamentally threatened by the spread of communism and therefore these reasons 
also made him ardently anti-Communist. Brzezinski was a proponent of George 
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Kennan’s concept of containment and would agree that ‘The idea was to prevent the 
Soviet Union from using the power and position it won as a result of that conflict to 
reshape the post-war international order.’29 He did not feel that communism was a 
monolith but felt that it was prone to fragmentation, however he understood only too 
well that Kremlin leaders were determined to bring about a world Communist society 
worldwide and fulfil the goals of Marx and Lenin. He was therefore a realist in this 
regard and felt that the only way to deal with this threat was to neutralise it through 
dismantling the communist bloc itself. Brzezinski differed from Kennan in that 
Kennan did not seek to liberate the Communist countries but rather contain them, 
whereas Brzezinski was determined to bring about their emancipation from 
Moscow.30 Brzezinski would bring his strong anti-Communist views to bear upon a 
significant number of U.S. administrations. As Justin Vaisse wrote: ‘Across the half-
century following Kennedy’s inauguration, Brzezinski advised, in one way or another, 
nine American presidents (the sole exception was George W. Bush), and dozens of 
other high-ranking American leaders. He worked actively for the presidential 
campaigns of Kennedy (1960), Johnson (1964), Humphrey (1968), Carter (1976), 
George H. W. Bush (1988), and Obama (2008).’31 
   While credit is indeed due to Kissinger, Reagan, Gorbachev and Bush senior, 
amongst many others for their important, if not seminal roles, in ending the Cold War, 
it may be argued that Brzezinski also played a significant and overlooked role in 
bringing about the demise of the Soviet Union. This thesis, that Brzezinski played a 
crucial role in bringing about the collapse of the Soviet Union was propounded in the 
MA thesis of this student in 2011 and has since been made persuasively by Andrzej 
Lubowski in his work Zbig: The Man Who Cracked the Kremlin, published in 2013. 
Lubowski wrote that: ‘Brzezinski did indeed play an underappreciated role in the 
unexpectedly rapid demise of the USSR. He saw the cracks in the façade of the Soviet 
system more clearly and forecast its ultimate downfall earlier than anyone else in the 
Washington establishment. When he found himself in the White House he architected 
the policies that contributed to the erosion and ultimate collapse of the Soviet 
Union.’32 
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   A most fervent Cold Warrior, Brzezinski would utilise every means available to him 
to achieve this end. Not only was he deeply driven by his sense of mission, but the 
fact that he had conceived of an effective strategy to exploit the weaknesses of the 
Soviet Union through encouraging nationalism within the camp, promoting political, 
economic, and cultural independence from Moscow, as well as meeting Soviet 
challenges anywhere in the world through stepping up US military preparedness and 
resolve, would make him an adversary not to be taken lightly. Indeed, armed with 
such a knowledge of the workings of the Soviet bloc and a blueprint to ensure its 
collapse it is easy to understand why, as Lubowski points out, ‘the Kremlin saw 
Brzezinski as its most dangerous adversary.’33    
   Brzezinski had a nuanced understanding of the Cold War conflict and grasped that 
the Soviet Union was a challenger to the United States in the military sphere alone. 
Paul Kennedy has written that at the outset of the Cold War: ‘Only the United States 
and the USSR counted, so it seemed; and of the two, the American ‘superpower’ was 
vastly superior.’34 This is true, and this knowledge helped to encourage Brzezinski in 
his mission to dismantle the Soviet bloc, seeing it as an inherently weaker socio-
political system to that of the United States.  Brzezinski felt that the U.S. need only 
outdo the Soviets militarily in order to bring about their defeat and that politically, 
socially, and culturally, the U.S. was unchallengeable and would not be rivalled by 
them. 
   Brzezinski, like most Cold warriors, was in favour of altering the balance of power 
so as to ensure U.S. dominance. He believed it necessary to not only contain the 
Soviet Union but to enlarge the West as much as possible and bring as many of the 
major powers as possible onto its side. This was in line with the recommendations put 
forward by George Kennan. As Paul Kennedy put it:  
 
The most crucial component of any long-term containment policy would 
therefore be massive programme of US economic aid, to permit the rebuilding of 
the shattered industries, farms, and cities of Europe and Japan; for that would not 
only make the latter far less likely to be tempted by Communist doctrines of 
class struggle and revolution, it would also help to readjust the power balances in 
America’s favour. If, to use Kennan’s very plausible geopolitical argument, there 
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were only ‘five centres of industrial and military power in the world which are 
important to us from the standpoint of national security’ – the United States 
itself, its rival the USSR, Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, and Japan 
– then it followed that by keeping the three last-named areas in the western camp 
and by building up their strength, there would be a resultant ‘correlation of 
forces’ which would ensure that the Soviet Union was permanently inferior.35 
 
   As Brzezinski’s influence grew so did his notoriety. He has been subjected to much 
vitriol on the internet. Many saw him as an arch conspirator working assiduously to 
enslave mankind and bring about a draconian new world order. Justin Vaisse 
commented on this: ‘Perhaps it is no surprise that conspiracy theorists came to portray 
him as a shadowy operator, pulling strings from backstage.’36 Indeed, his role in the 
Trilateral Commission would seem to validate such claims to some extent as he did 
work behind the scenes to influence the shaping of world events. 
   In his early writings, after he earned his PhD degree from Harvard, Brzezinski 
stressed policy recommendations which would help countries to secede from the 
Soviet Union in a peaceful fashion. He taught at Harvard as a Sovietologist at the 
Russian Research Institute, of which he was director, and contributed substantially to 
advancing a more realistic and sophisticated understanding of the Soviet system. His 
nuanced understanding of the Soviet system, Russian history, and his overall strategic 
approach to waging the Cold War distinguished him as someone with the requisite 
skills and knowledge necessary to make an actual difference in how the Cold War was 
conducted.37  
   Brzezinski was seen as an inspirational lecturer and his lectures were known for 
their strident anti-communism. Justin Vaisse referred to Brzezinski’s vehement 
opposition to the Soviet Bloc while lecturing at Columbia, and stated that he: 
‘threatened students with a billy club to teach what a totalitarian regime was like in 
the 1950s.’38  
   Prior to analysing Brzezinski’s ideas for bringing about the dissolution of the Soviet 
bloc as well as his service in government, it is necessary to begin with an analysis of 
his early works, beginning with The Permanent Purge. 
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The Permanent Purge 
 
   Written in 1956, when Brzezinski was twenty-eight years of age, The Permanent 
Purge is his first published work. It is based upon his doctoral dissertation which he 
completed at Harvard entitled The Role of the Purge in the Totalitarian State. 
Brzezinski made the case that the purge, i.e. the forced removal or elimination of 
Soviet citizens from their occupations and/or the Communist Party, was an essential 
component of the totalitarian system which served the purpose of ridding the system 
of disloyal or suspect individuals. Such people were thought to weaken the party or 
even sabotage it through lack of commitment to Communist principles, their veiled 
hostility to the party, and their careerist predisposition which placed their own 
ambition above the interests of the party. Brzezinski first outlined the differences 
between the totalitarian system and the constitutional, democratic political systems of 
the West, and then charted the historical record of purges in the Soviet Union from the 
time of its foundation until shortly after the death of Stalin and the rise of Khrushchev 
to political leadership. 
   Brzezinski asserted that totalitarianism was a unique political system, distinguished 
from the absolutisms of the past by its near complete domination of society and its 
efforts to remould the individual. As Peter Baehr put it: ‘(Totalitarianism’s) chief 
objectives are to rule unimpeded by legal restraint, civic pluralism, and party 
competition, and to refashion human nature itself.’39 The totalitarian system, 
Brzezinski pointed out, pervades almost every aspect of society including the media, 
education, recreational activities as well as the family and religion. The explicit goals 
and official ideology of the totalitarian regime brooked no room for deviation and all 
citizens had to be either convinced or coerced into conforming to the socio-political, 
economic, and cultural agenda of the party. In defining the inherent “totality” of 
totalitarian regimes, the way in which they operate and how this represents a novel 
form of government, Brzezinski proffered the following definition: 
 
The complete mobilization of all human and material resources and the dogmatic 
insistence on the pulverization of all opposition for the sake of ideologically 
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proclaimed goals of social reconstruction have produced this total social impact 
which makes totalitarianism a truly unique type of political system.40 
 
   While totalitarianism is a unique political system, it bears resemblance to the 
authoritarian governments of the past. Many such governments, in the West and in 
Asia, were dominated by one person and exercised near-complete control over 
society. They were also ruled by decree rather than law and the masses were expected 
to remain loyal to the ruler. China is one example of a country that was ruled by a 
single person who exercised a domineering influence over society and controlled the 
majority of the state’s resources. Catholic monarchies during the early modern period 
such as Philip II’s Spain also had a near complete monopoly over the means of 
communication. Thus totalitarian governments, while definitely unique as Brzezinski 
pointed out, do nonetheless bear a resemblance to dictatorships that have come before. 
   Brzezinski noted that totalitarian regimes assume the trappings of a semi-religious 
movement, expecting complete faith in the party leadership on the part of the people 
who live under them. This is why religion sits uneasy with the totalitarian regime and 
why the Soviet Union effectively repressed the Orthodox Church in Russia and the 
satellite states: no other organisation could be allowed to operate which claimed a 
higher moral authority than that of the state and which held an alternative source of 
loyalty from the people, in effect competing for influence with the state. The 
totalitarian regime was to be the sole source of the officially declared truth and would 
act promptly in the course of establishing its power to eliminate or marginalise any 
other organisation that effectively held sway over the masses.41 
   Totalitarian systems of government, as seen in their fascist emanations in Italy and 
Germany, though more fully developed and long-lived in the Soviet Union, attempt to 
completely mould the individual into their ideal conception of what a citizen should 
be, how he or she should think and act. The Soviet Union more specifically utilised all 
available technology, scientific expertise, and the coercive power of the armed forces 
to direct the conduct of the Soviet populations and to regulate their activities, social 
habits and most importantly, their political behaviour.42 
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   Unlike democracies in the Western world, no formal opposition to the political 
establishment in power is to be tolerated. Complete obedience to a one-party state is 
demanded on the part of the citizens and any who do not support the party or worse 
still (from the point of view of the totalitarian leaders) actively oppose it are to be 
regarded as a threat to the integrity of the system and are to be eliminated forthwith.  
   Limitations to the arbitrary exercise of political power, as enshrined in practically 
all constitutions of the western world, do not apply in the case of totalitarian regimes, 
which rather apply the law in a discriminate manner to the advantage of party officials 
and nomenklatura but to the detriment of ordinary citizens, who receive no guarantee 
to the right of habeas corpus or impartial judicial procedures. The totalitarian system 
in effect ‘enthrones its power through the degradation and purposeful abuse of legal 
restraints.’43 Brzezinski abhorred the Soviet system and its abuse of power and the 
rule of law. The vehemence with which he fought the Soviet Union when in office can 
be clearly detected in his writings through the manner in which he disparaged Soviet 
contempt for the rule of law and provided an exposition of the system’s uglier aspects. 
He believed the communist political system to be totally inhumane and detrimental to 
human welfare.   
   Brzezinski advanced significantly the understanding of totalitarian regimes through 
defining how they operate and with what goals in mind. He wrote with a moral 
compass, elucidating the nature of the totalitarian regime whilst disparaging it and 
exposing it as a political system that is utterly reprehensible. He offered the following 
definition to encapsulate the dictatorial nature of totalitarianism: 
 
Totalitarianism can, therefore, be defined as a system where technologically 
advanced instruments of political power are wielded without restraint by 
centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total 
social revolution, on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions 
proclaimed by the leadership, in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the 
entire population.44 
    
     ‘Coerced unanimity of the entire population’ is a misnomer, as many in the Soviet 
Union were supportive of communism and were only too glad to serve its leaders and 
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carry out its ideological agenda. It is true however that a large percentage of the 
population was forced into obedience though it would be wrong to say the entire 
population. 
   The Soviet Union was arguably the most brutal and, in terms of human cost, the 
most lethal dictatorship this world has ever seen. Joseph Stalin sentenced to death 
more of his own people than any other leader in history and he is remembered as the 
biggest mass murderer of all time. Stalin, being a dictator, had complete control over 
all decision-making processes, and the people Stalin sentenced to death were, for the 
most part, guilty of no crime. Hannah Arendt pointed out the absurdity of this when 
she stated:  
 
The gigantic criminality of the Stalin regime which, after all, did not consist 
merely in the slander and murder of a few hundred or thousand prominent 
political and literary figures, whom one may “rehabilitate” posthumously, but in 
the extermination of literally untold millions of people whom no one, not even 
Stalin, could have suspected of “counter-revolutionary” activities.45  
 
Arendt thus corroborated Brzezinski’s view that Stalin was a ruthless tyrant 
responsible for mass murder and that, furthermore, this killing was unjustified as these 
people were not in fact counter-revolutionaries. Therefore, both authors are right to 
decry the excesses of the Stalinist regime and its wanton destruction of life. 
   It is interesting to note that during the process of Dekulakisation, in which wealthy 
peasant landowners had their property confiscated by the state, peasants who opposed 
this were labelled counter-revolutionary suspects. This was then used as a justification 
for increased repression. The Soviet Union thus sent millions of such citizens to their 
death for the purpose of implementing socialism and viewed their deaths as necessary 
to carry out this end and also as mere statistics. Orlando Figes observed how the 
destruction of the kulaks did irreparable damage to the Soviet economy. He wrote: 
 
The destruction of the ‘kulaks’ was a catastrophe for the Soviet economy. It 
deprived the collective farms of the best and hardest working peasants, because 
these are what the ‘kulaks’ actually were, ultimately leading to the terminal 
decline of the Soviet agricultural sector. But Stalin’s war against the ‘kulaks’ had 
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little to do with economic considerations – and everything to do with eliminating 
the defenders of the peasant way of life.46 
 
   During the Soviet Union’s grim and bloody existence, a reign of terror was carried 
out in order to eliminate all sources of opposition to the regime. The element of terror 
in a totalitarian state and, particularly in the Soviet Union, Brzezinski wrote ‘becomes 
a mass phenomenon, and broad categories of people, ideologically defined as socially 
unfit for membership in the new society, are marked for extinction.’47 The Soviet 
Union as a totalitarian state was thus comparable to the Nazis as they chose to 
eliminate from their society anyone with dissimilar political views or who did not act 
in accordance with the dictates of the leader. Brzezinski is thus correct in arguing that 
the Soviet Union tolerated no opposition to the political leadership or the ideology. 
   In order to survive and indeed thrive in such a system, it is of the utmost importance 
to evince loyalty to the party, the leader and the ideology of the state. However, this 
alone does not guarantee advancement in such a society, and given the eschewal of 
the democratic process, the only means left open is stiff competition for positions of 
power amongst determined and ruthless aspirants who habitually build cliques around 
their own person and actively seek to remove their rivals from power so as to clear the 
way for themselves. Factionalism as well as individual vying for influence comes to 
characterize the totalitarian system.48 Hannah Arendt mentioned how the purge leaves 
room for a new generation to succeed the previous one. She wrote:  
 
If we consider the career conditions in present Russian society, the similarity to 
such methods is striking. Not only do almost all higher officials owe their 
positions to purges that removed their predecessors, but promotions in all walks 
of life are accelerated in this way. About every ten years, a nation-wide purge 
makes room for the new generation, freshly graduated and hungry for jobs.49 
 
   The Purges were carried out primarily in order to remove suspect individuals 
however they also served the purpose of clearing the way for the next generation so 
they could move into vacated posts. Orlando Figes commented on this. He wrote:  
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A staggering 18 per cent of the Party’s 3.2 million members were expelled in the 
purge. Most were relatively new recruits, who had joined the Bolsheviks since 
1929, when controls on enrolment were relaxed, resulting, it was feared, in the 
influx of ‘careerists’ whose loyalty could not be trusted. It is striking that the 
leadership remained so insecure fifteen years after coming to power. That 
insecurity was rooted in the problem – faced by many revolutionary movements 
– that once it found itself in power the Party could not trust its own members and 
needed constantly to test their loyalty.50 
 
Stalin was ruthless in his determination to wipe out anyone who held oppositional 
political views and even resorted to purging his own party members and indeed his 
generals in his effort to institute complete ideological conformity. Orlando Figes 
wrote furthermore that:  
 
Between 1928 and 1932, 150,000 workers were given higher education on this 
affirmative-action progamme; over a million left the factory for administrative 
jobs. They became the mainstay of the Stalinist regime. They believed in Stalin’s 
vision of progress because they could see improvements in their lives from it. 
Through their loyalty to the leader they rose through the Party’s ranks. Their 
ascent was quickened by the purges of the thirties, when bosses were removed, 
allowing those below to move into their jobs.51 
 
   Again distinguishing totalitarian systems of government from democracies is the 
fact that leaders in such systems often owe their positions to brute force (their 
usurpation of power) or advancement through the party and are not elected by the 
people, nor are they representative of them or indeed accountable to them. Communist 
party members tended to form an elite, with special privileges, and were to be 
considered as being essentially above the people. Their relative detachment from the 
people means that they were often out of touch with the masses and inevitably became 
suspicious of them. This leads to the perception of threats to the regime because the 
regime is alienated from the people and the gulf in living standards between that elite 
and the rest of the population naturally inclines communist leaders to seek desperately 
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to retain their positions of power and influence by, in effect, resorting to purging both 
the party and society at large of people who may appear to endanger their status and 
position. Such threats to the regime are inevitably blown out of proportion, the 
consequence being that often innocent and non-subversive individuals suffer a cruel 
fate owing largely to the extreme paranoia of their non-elected leaders.52 Vladislav M. 
Zubok highlighted the danger of being labelled a disloyal individual. He stated: 
‘During the 1930s, indiscriminate state terror had constantly blurred boundaries 
between good and evil – an individual could be a “Soviet man or woman” today and 
an “enemy of the people” tomorrow.’53 
  The purpose of the secret police, the NKVD, later renamed the KGB, was to ensure 
that internal threats to the Soviet government were swiftly neutralised. It served a vital 
role in maintaining the Communist leadership in power. As Brzezinski put it, the 
secret police:  
 
is the most effective instrument of the totalitarian regime. It not only ensures the 
leader’s safety or position but is also the chief weapon of internal combat. Its 
raison d’etre is to protect the existing regime. Consequently the actual value of 
the secret police to the regime is measured in terms of the dangers, real or 
imagined, that it succeeds in eliminating. The greater the alleged threats to the 
power of the dictatorship, the greater the role the secret police 
assumes….Absence of enemies does not mean that the regime has none, but that 
the secret police has failed to uncover them.54 
 
   While the secret police did arrest and imprison many innocent individuals, it is true 
that they also targeted genuine enemies of the Soviet Union, foreign spies as well as 
domestic saboteurs. They played a necessary role, one could argue, in safeguarding 
the achievements of the revolution and ensuring that communism was implemented 
without capitalist infiltration or ruination of their socialist agenda. 
   Brzezinski argued that the purge is ‘inherent in the totalitarian system’.55 This is 
borne out in reality as totalitarian regimes usurp authority as in the case of the Soviet 
Union, or overturn the democratic system, as in the case of Nazi Germany and are not 
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to be considered representative of the people’s will but are rather elite movements 
which claim to have the people’s best interests in mind but which concentrate 
authority into a small clique and then seek at all costs to hold onto it. They then 
proceed to root out domestic opposition which they at once fear as it represents an 
existential threat to their dictatorial authority.  
   The purge is thus the logical solution of the totalitarian systems of government to 
the inevitable opposition that arises to a political establishment that lacks legitimacy 
and genuine support in the eyes of the populace. This process of elimination turns out 
to be a perpetual one because as the dictatorship grows in power it effectively 
generates internal enemies amongst those, workers, farmers, clergy, journalists, 
intellectuals, whose power and influence in society has been circumscribed. For 
example, in the Soviet Union the collectivization of farms created enemies amongst 
farmers whose land was now owned by the state. The censorship of the press and 
strict control of education offended the prerogative of journalists and intellectuals to 
express their views without interference from the authorities. Thus the more a 
totalitarian government intrudes upon a society’s liberties and privileges to in effect 
expand and consolidate its own power, the more enemies it will naturally generate. 
The purge then becomes a vital mechanism for the regime in order to survive and 
furthermore to dissuade would-be opponents from voicing their opinions or taking 
any action against the government.  
   Brzezinski stated: ‘the element of internal combat within totalitarianism finds 
expression in a permanent purge. Totalitarianism is the system of the permanent 
purge.’56 The purge served to strengthen the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU), thus strengthening the unity of the party as all seditious elements are 
removed. The purge is thus seen as necessary to maintain the totalitarian regime in 
power.57 One could argue that once domestic enemies are removed the purge is no 
longer necessary. However, Brzezinski is right in asserting that communism 
inherently generated enemies with each generation due to its repressive policies and 
lack of toleration for opposing views therefore the purge became a permanent feature 
of Soviet society. 
   Concerning intellectuals, totalitarian regimes, in particular the Soviet Union, found 
it vital to enforce complete obedience to the regime on the part of intellectuals 
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because of their likelihood of criticising the regime for its shortcomings or brutal 
tactics and furthermore because the views of academics carry an authority of their 
own which would likely influence the masses and threaten the regime.      
   Citizens in the Soviet Union were also encouraged to denounce their neighbours, 
friends, and even family if they were not performing well in work, if they harboured 
grievances against the regime or, more seriously, if they were plotting to undermine it 
in any way. Owing to the moral degradation of some people, denunciations also 
became a way of getting ahead in life, particularly in work-life if one sought to reach 
a higher position. As Brzezinski put it: ‘denunciation became a useful vehicle of 
promotion.’58 Orlando Figes further commented on this. He wrote:  
 
The terror thus spread down through the Party’s ranks, Soviet institutions and 
society itself, as colleagues, friends, and relatives, came under suspicion too. The 
more senior a Party member was, the more likely he was to be arrested. Juniors 
in the ranks were often ready to denounce superiors to help themselves and 
perhaps replace them in their posts. They were encouraged to report on them.59 
 
   Those who were denounced by their fellow citizens or fell foul of the authorities 
would often be imprisoned or sent to forced labour camps, if not actually killed. In a 
year and a half, roughly 850,000 ordinary members of the communist party in the 
Soviet Union were purged.60 The purge demoralized Soviet citizens and significantly 
weakened Soviet industry by removing skilled technicians. The purge as a tactic of 
cleansing the Communist Party and Soviet society was so widely used that Brzezinski 
goes so far as to state that ‘the Soviet regime almost purged itself to death.’61 The 
purge served above all to strengthen Stalin’s control over the Soviet Union and as a 
mechanism for promoting loyalty ensured that only individuals who were determined 
“Stalinists” could rise to positions of authority.62 
   Purges continued in the post-war years, though the public did not take part and far 
less people were affected than had been the case during the 1930s. The Soviets were 
now more cautious, fearful of a backlash if they purged too many, and instead of 
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sending citizens to labour camps or to their deaths many were simply transferred, 
demoted, or both. The purge, however, as a technique of removing undesirable 
members from the party or citizens from Soviet society would outlive Stalin himself.63 
In The Permanent Purge Brzezinski even argued that the purge was an indispensable 
part of the totalitarian regime. He observed: 
 
Totalitarianism needs the purge. Disloyal and potentially deviant individuals or 
groups must be unmasked and their followers liquidated.64 
 
   One could argue that the totalitarian government could have merely marginalised 
such groups rather than send them to their death. Brzezinski is right however that as 
totalitarianism tolerates no political opposition it is therefore necessary that all those 
with alternative views be removed from positions of authority. 
   In Brzezinski’s first work the role of the purge in the Soviet Union is extensively 
treated and new insights are brought forth. In particular, Brzezinski maintained that 
the purge is not an irrational aberration as many in the West claimed it was but was a 
calculated and rational way of removing dissenters and ensuring internal cohesion of 
the communist party and society. Brzezinski thus offered a more nuanced and realistic 
understanding of the role of the purge in the Soviet Union. Indeed, he affirmed, as 
Hannah Arendt had previously pointed out, that the purge was a permanent institution 
of the Soviet Union and was not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future.65 
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Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 
 
   Written in 1956 jointly with Brzezinski’s mentor at Harvard, Carl J. Friedrich, 
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy is a landmark work analysing the nature of 
totalitarian regimes, how they operate, and also whether or not they are likely to 
endure in the future. Emerging out of a seminar the two authors gave at Harvard in the 
early 1950s, the book made a substantial contribution to the literature in the field and, 
along with Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, is to be considered a 
classic work of scholarship on totalitarian regimes. Indeed, Hannah Arendt and 
Friedrich and Brzezinski were the first pioneers of post-World War II analyses of 
totalitarianism. Michael J. Hogan recalls that it ‘came to sweep the board in Western 
ideological discourse in the 1950s...’66 The authors stated at the outset that the 
purpose of the book was ‘to delineate, on the basis of fairly generally known and 
acknowledged factual data, the general model of totalitarian dictatorship and of the 
society which it has created.’67 
   Friedrich and Brzezinski observed that the Soviet Union was an altogether novel 
form of autocratic government, surpassing all previous autocracies in its total control 
of the economy and society, its disregard for legal or constitutional restraints, its 
contempt for the status quo, brutality towards its own citizens and determination to 
industrialise and modernise regardless of the human costs. Although bearing some 
resemblance to authoritarian governments that preceded it, totalitarian political 
systems were nonetheless a novelty. Historically, autocracies have been the most 
prevalent form of government; political power has been concentrated in the hands of a 
small number of elites and the majority of the people have been coerced into 
submission, having little say in the exercise of power or the direction in which politics 
was moving. In the example of the Soviet Union, the claim of the communist party to 
be the sole interpreters of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism created the illusion that 
they were appointed as if by providence to lead the masses and exercise ultimate 
control over political affairs.  
   Similarly, Lenin, Hitler, and Mussolini all believed the political parties they 
controlled possessed unique insights into the inner meaning of their contemporary era, 
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that they had a more sophisticated understanding of the problems they faced and most 
importantly, that they alone had the visionary qualities necessary to lead their fellow 
citizens to a higher form of society, indeed a utopia as they saw it.  
   Communism and Fascism both claimed that they were working in the interests of 
the nation-state, though like the absolutisms and autocracies of the past, they were in 
essence elite movements more concerned with gaining power and resources for 
themselves and their coterie than with seeking to uplift the citizens over whom they 
ruled; this being the case regardless of their official statements and doctrine. This is 
borne out in the case of the Soviet Union by the special treatment and privileges party 
members received, whereas everyone else was forced to queue for hours for basic 
necessities and live in a state of relative deprivation. Totalitarianism, like autocracies 
before them, therefore claim to act as the guardians of the collective good but 
invariably prioritise the interests of the wealthy and well educated elite few over the 
less well educated and relatively poorer many and consequently degenerate into 
another exploitative form of government. 
   Scholars of pluralism maintain that the totalitarian governments had popular support 
and that political power was not entirely centralised. This author would agree with 
Brzezinski and Friedrich however that the Nazis and communists usurped power and 
that they were more loved by the masses out of fear than a genuine devotion to the 
movement and its leaders. Although no doubt many were fond of the totalitarian 
governments in the Soviet Union and Germany, it is clear that behind their mask of 
benevolence lay an insidious form of government that was totally inhumane and 
ultimately detrimental to the interests of the people it represented, as evidenced by the 
large numbers of its own citizens that perished and also the fact that such totalitarian 
regimes generated external enemies due to their megalomaniacal aspirations. They 
were therefore an illegitimate form of government; a government imposed upon a 
people rather than one that was representative of the will of the people.  
   Totalitarianism is therefore a modern form of autocracy. A crucial difference 
however between the two is that totalitarianism draws heavily upon the benefits of the 
industrial revolution and modern technology to solidify its hold over society. In the 
case of the Soviet Union, controlling all the means of production gave it complete 
mastery of the economy and through retaining a monopoly over communications this 
allowed the communist regime in power to determine to a large extent what 
information was received by the people. This near complete domination of the 
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totalitarian government over society through control of the economy and technology 
means that, as Friedrich and Brzezinski pointed out, ‘totalitarian dictatorship, in a 
sense, is the adaptation of autocracy to twentieth-century industrial society.’68 
   Like autocracies, totalitarian regimes are not accountable to the people they claim to 
represent. Through suppression of published literature and laws forbidding criticism 
of the regime, which they label as seditious, the totalitarian regimes are reminiscent of 
early modern European governments, such as Spain during the inquisition, which 
sought to control the beliefs of their citizens in addition to regulating their daily 
activities. 
  Friedrich and Brzezinski argued that fascism and communism were neither totally 
alike nor totally different but were similar enough to both be categorised as 
totalitarian, distinct from constitutional governments in the West and autocracies of 
the past. The authors put forth a working definition of totalitarianism and argued that 
it comprises six main components: 
 
The basic features or traits that we suggest as generally recognized to be 
common to totalitarian dictatorships are six in number. The “syndrome,” or 
pattern of interrelated traits, of the totalitarian dictatorship consists of an 
ideology, a single party typically led by one man, a terroristic police, a 
communications monopoly, a weapons monopoly, and a centrally directed 
economy.69 
 
   Peter Baehr has added other traits to totalitarian regimes which include the 
following: the shuffling of governmental offices to ensure collegial rivalry; economic-
bureaucratic collectivism; a culture of martial solidarity; elimination of designated 
“enemies of the people”; mobilization of the entire population; and, finally, the use of 
the concentration camp.70 
   The political party of a totalitarian state, be it Communist, Nazi, or Fascist, differs 
substantially from those found in the democratic West. Under the Soviet political 
system, membership of the party is only permitted if one proves that they are totally 
loyal to the ideology, the party, and above all the dictator in power, whereas in the 
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constitutional democratic West such complete devotion to the movement is not a 
prerequisite to joining a political party, though members do usually have to tow the 
party line. The crucial difference is that the political party in democratic states is open 
to participation by any individual on the basis of their adherence to what the party 
stands for, whereas in the totalitarian state the party resembles more of an exclusive 
brotherhood, highly selective in its admission of members and demanding a far 
greater degree of loyalty and active support. Furthermore, in the totalitarian state the 
party representing the movement as a whole actually becomes superior to the 
government itself, as was the case with the communist party in the Soviet Union.71 
   Friedrich and Brzezinski pointed out that as totalitarian states sought to convert the 
entire nation under their authority to their particular ideology and worldview, there is 
therefore no part of society which extends beyond their reach. However, it must be 
pointed out that critics of totalitarianism have noted that such governments were never 
total and failed in their quest to control all aspects of society. This was the view of 
David Riesman and Hannah Arendt.72  
   Particularly important is their penetration of the traditionally sacrosanct unit of the 
family, which they try to render into a tool for indoctrinating the youth of the country 
and preparing them for a future devoted to serving the totalitarian state. Outside of 
family life, totalitarian movements institute youth training programs, such as the 
Hitler Youth, in order to imbue in children and adolescents of the country the virtues 
they consider to be important to their cause along with what they consider essential 
training, usually with a heavy emphasis upon physical activity. As the authors put it: 
‘All Fascists stress the training of youth outside family and school for the tough life of 
warriors and conquerors who are continually on the march and must be ready to 
endure all the hardships of such an existence.’73 
  Totalitarian states, the authors wrote, were not likely to be overthrown from within 
because of the fact that they controlled all of the means of production, had a 
monopoly over the armed forces and a terroristic network of police ready to neutralise 
all actual or potential dissidents. They were also unlikely to be dissolved when a new 
successor ascends to power because of the entrenched interests of party members who 
had a personal interest in the perpetuation of the system. The party thus ‘remains, with 
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its cadres and its hierarchy.’74 The Soviet Union therefore endured for most of the 
twentieth century as a totalitarian political system because of the entrenched interests 
of the CPSU and their determination to retain power at all costs. They were embattled 
by the West and adhered to Marxist-Leninist teaching. They felt the world proletarian 
revolution would liberate them from their capitalist encirclement and eventually lead 
them to victory over the forces of imperialism, thus the Soviet system perpetuated 
itself and totalitarianism held sway over the masses of the communist bloc until the 
end of the Cold War. 
   Concerning totalitarian ideology, the authors observed that they tend to be ‘typically 
utopian in nature,’75 and in their effort to destroy the old order and replace it with a 
new one they see violence as a necessary means of realising their ideological 
objectives. To coalesce the subjects under their rule and unify them in the pursuit of a 
shared utopia, both internal “enemies of the people” and external enemies are seen as 
being essential. The portrayal of the external enemy tends to be a misrepresentation or 
at least a caricature of the individual or group in question. As Friedrich and Brzezinski 
pointed out:  
 
For the Nazis it was the fat rich Jew or the Jewish Bolshevik; for the Fascists it 
was at first the radical agitator, later the corrupt and weak, degenerate bourgeois; 
for the Soviets, it is the war-mongering, atom-bomb-wielding American 
Wallstreeter; for the Chinese Communists, it is the Yankee imperialist and the 
Western colonial exploiters.76  
 
   Hannah Arendt was also of the view that the totalitarian governments felt they were 
beset by an external conspiracy against their home country. She wrote that: ‘Contrary 
to all expectations, important concessions and greatly heightened international 
prestige did not help to reintegrate the totalitarian countries into the comity of nations 
or induce them to abandon their lying complaint that the whole world had solidly 
lined up against them.’77 Russia has been a xenophobic country in many respects. 
Traditionally threatened, or at least felt to have been, by the many neighbours along 
its vast borders, the Russians have held a hostile view of the outside world. During the 
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Cold War, the Russians believed they were beset by a capitalist conspiracy which 
sought to deprive them of their national sovereignty and surround them with military 
bases. They felt the capitalists were trying to take hold of their country and privatise 
their industries in order to accrue wealth at the expense of the people and thus they 
were determined to defend their egalitarian society against the capitalist West. 
   Concerning the image of their enemy: through propaganda the stereotyped image of 
the enemy is ingrained in the minds of the people and they are induced to fear and 
loath them. This in turn serves to solidify their loyalty to the totalitarian leadership as 
they band together through their shared hostility toward a common foe. The fear of a 
common enemy is a potent device for securing loyalty and cohesion amongst the 
populace and was extensively made use of by the totalitarian political leaderships. 
   The totalitarian party also ensures that its perception of domestic and international 
politics, indeed of reality itself, becomes the official one of the state.78 The role of 
myth is also significant within the ideology of a totalitarian state. Totalitarian myths 
are unique because ‘they are pseudo-scientific. The communist myth rests upon the 
notion that its view of history is beyond criticism, while the Nazi myth claims 
biological superiority for a particular race.’79 These myths, ascribed the status of truth 
by the party members, lend the totalitarian movement a sense of credibility that 
enhances their power and legitimacy. 
   The authors make the point that the roots of totalitarian ideologies are to be found in 
the western philosophical tradition. They point to thinkers such as Hegel and his 
dialectical theory as underpinning the Marxist conception of how history progresses. 
They cite Hobbes and his belief in the anarchic state of nature as a justification for 
authoritarian leadership. However, they also rightly observe that totalitarian leaders 
have perverted the philosophical traditions of such thinkers by utilising their ideas to 
justify inhumane acts against their fellow citizens, which was not, they claim, the 
original intention of Hegel or Hobbes. They write that: ‘…totalitarian ideology is 
rooted in the totality of Western thought, and more especially its political thought.’80 
   One tenet of Marxism-Leninism was the idea Lenin developed that violence was 
necessary in order to overthrow the capitalist system. The concept of the revolutionary 
struggle that must be waged in order to bring about communism on a global scale 
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forms a central part of communist ideology. Indeed the authors point out that common 
to all totalitarian systems is the idea that they must export their ideology abroad; that 
they have pretensions for universalising their socio-political system and also for 
elevating their nation state to the position of regional, if not global, hegemony. For 
Mussolini’s fascists this concerned the ambition to turn the Mediterranean into an 
Italian lake and in thus doing so re-establish the greatness of the Roman Empire. For 
the Nazis it was summed up by the phrase ‘today Germany, tomorrow the world.’ 
When the Soviet Union failed to export communism abroad, particularly to Germany, 
Stalin, against the wishes of Trotsky, initiated the policy of socialism in one country, 
meaning that the Russians would concentrate on consolidating the communist victory 
at home. However, it still remained their policy to encourage whenever possible 
communist takeovers around the world, only the policy of building communism at 
home was seen as more important than uniting the workers of the world to overthrow 
capitalism completely. An important point to be gauged from this in relation to 
Brzezinski’s later policy making is that he understood that the Soviets were 
determined to universalise their socio-political system and he therefore took the threat 
of communism very seriously and understood furthermore that the notion of peaceful 
coexistence was only an illusion; the communists were adamant that their ideology 
would engulf the globe and that communism would become the standard political 
system throughout the world.  
   The authors point out the many ways in which totalitarian dictatorships were 
inhumane and barbaric. For instance, in the case of the Soviet Union, they point to the 
fact that citizens living under that system had been deprived of legal rights, that the 
constitution of 1918 stated: ‘no one has any rights and all power must be concentrated 
in the hands of the victorious proletariat, that is to say, its leaders.’81 It is ironic that 
the communist party claim to represent the proletariat when they are nothing but the 
leadership of an elite movement, intent upon subjugating the masses and 
implementing another form of exploitative government.  
   Telling Soviet citizens the truth is also not their concern; questionable or 
disreputable practices are downplayed or omitted while, for example, the economic 
achievements of the country are embellished. They also note that under totalitarian 
dictatorships, the citizens are fed a constant stream of propaganda each day. Such is 
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their daily dose of brainwashing, designed to ensure complete obedience and 
conformity to prescribed ways of thinking and behaving. The authors wrote that: ‘This 
singular success of totalitarian propaganda is the result of constant repetition.’82 The 
Soviet leadership stifled any criticism of the regime from being aired on television, 
the radio, or appearing in the print media. The citizens were also discouraged from 
thinking for themselves and forming their own opinions of the brutal system they 
lived under. This was carried out chiefly in the institutions of education. Friedrich and 
Brzezinski wrote that the totalitarians ‘transform a large part of the educational 
process itself into a school for their particular ideology.’83 History books were 
rewritten to glorify the nation and vilify its so-called enemies or to assert the 
superiority of one race over others. 
   Hannah Arendt reaffirmed that the role of propaganda in the totalitarian state was to 
indoctrinate the citizenry and stifle freedom of opinion. In addition to this it was to 
ensconce the leadership in power and lend it a false sense of legitimacy. She wrote of 
how the totalitarian party amalgamated with the government and instituted its 
propaganda campaign:  
 
The goal of one party systems is not only to seize the government administration 
but, by filling all offices with party members, to achieve a complete 
amalgamation of state and party, so that after the seizure of power the party 
becomes a kind of propaganda organization for the government. This system is 
“total” only in a negative sense, namely, in that the ruling party will tolerate no 
other parties, no opposition, and no freedom of political opinion.84 
 
  There is thus no chance that civic society will develop where there is no freedom of 
opinion. Brzezinski would no doubt have drawn from this stifling of individual 
expression the conviction that freedom of opinion is to be supported in the Soviet 
Union and this would most likely have impelled him subsequently to support Radio 
Free Europe in order to entice communist citizens to subscribe to Western values, 
freedom of speech in particular.  
   The essential difference between the educational system in the West and that of a 
totalitarian society is that in the West there is emphasis upon the student arriving at 
                                                 
82 Friedrich & Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 144 
83 Friedrich & Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 148 
84 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 556 
 45 
his or her own understanding of a particular subject whereas in totalitarian societies 
the emphasis is upon moulding all students into the same mind-set and shared set of 
beliefs. Diversity of viewpoints is trumped by the strict imposition of intellectual 
conformity.85 Totalitarian regimes thus politicise education. As the authors wrote: 
‘The teacher becomes the long-range indoctrinator, the instiller of an ideology that is 
intended to subjugate the students intellectually and to commit them for the rest of 
their lives to a doctrinal orthodoxy.’86 
   However, while totalitarian regimes are comparatively much worse than Western 
liberal-democratic governments, Abbott Gleason made the point that the West was 
still guilty of giving aid to regimes with woeful human rights records, an issue that 
will be discussed in greater detail later. As Peter Baehr put it: ‘Starkly dividing the 
world into liberal-democratic white-hats and communist black-hats, Abbott Gleason 
remarks, conveniently omitted the extent to which Western governments supported 
military regimes with bleak and bloody human-rights records.’87 Thus the West is not 
to be exonerated from supporting mass murder, a charge which it levels against 
totalitarianism and uses to justify delegitimizing such regimes. 
   Friedrich and Brzezinski point out that totalitarian regimes in fact become more 
violent as their position in power is secured, as they are then able to eliminate their 
enemies without fear of reprisals. Whereas on their way into power they felt the need 
to make concessions to the opposition, once the reins of power are firmly in their 
hands they begin to carry out a systematic purge of disloyal elements within their 
ranks, suppress all political opposition, and terrorise the population so as to induce 
within them the fear of rebelling.88 Hannah Arendt corroborated this point when she 
observed that: ‘Stalin’s insane suspiciousness – concealed the most characteristic 
aspect of totalitarian terror, that it let loose when all organised opposition has died 
down and the totalitarian ruler knows he no longer needs to be afraid.’89 
    
   When the totalitarian leadership feels it is no longer threatened by political 
opposition, it unleashes a reign of terror upon so-called “enemies of the people.” 
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Arendt, Friedrich, and Brzezinski are thus right in observing that the totalitarian state 
engages in a killing spree once it feels it can do so with impunity. 
   Through the use of propaganda they seek to mobilise as much of the population as 
possible behind them in their attempt to eliminate all designated subversive 
individuals.90 The list of enemies the totalitarians pursue includes spies, saboteurs, 
traitors, and citizens of foreign countries deemed hostile to the totalitarian state. For 
the Nazis in particular, the designated enemy was the “international, capitalist, Jewish 
conspiracy.”91 For the Soviets:  
 
The entire capitalist order, with its countless satellites, is said to be the enemy of 
the Soviet Union. In the international plane, it supposedly organizes successive 
systems of capitalist encirclements and plots, ringing the Soviet Union with air 
bases and military establishments, planning war and destruction.92 
 
   Concerning the rights of workers, the authors point out the irony that in a state 
which claims to be the vanguard of the workers, trade unions were outlawed and 
workers forbidden to strike.93 The Soviet Union’s success in industrialising was to a 
considerable extent based upon slave labour, including the millions who were 
deported to gulags in Siberia to work in appalling conditions.94 Although economic 
exploitation is hardly non-existent in the Western world, it pales by comparison with 
the situation in the Soviet Union. The authors stated: 
 
The contrast between an unemployed man in the West, eking out a meagre 
existence on the basis of his unemployment-insurance payments, and an inmate 
of a Soviet labour camp, systematically starved and brutalised, shows the full 
measure of difference between democracy and totalitarianism.95 
 
   Friedrich and Brzezinski address the reasons why people turn toward totalitarianism 
in the first place, noting the failure of liberal-democratic governments to provide 
employment to their citizens or significantly grow the economy in the context of the 
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burden of massive reparations, as was the case with Weimar Germany following the 
First World War. The people, frustrated with the failure of democratic regimes to 
improve their situation turn to totalitarian political parties, whose hard line toward 
foreign powers, for example Hitler’s promise to annul German reparations and begin 
rearmament, they believe to provide the solution to their economic woes. However 
the authors observed that the situation is only exacerbated by the totalitarian regime’s 
relentless pursuit of warmongering.96 
   Regardless of the efforts of totalitarian regimes to stifle all opposition to their 
dictatorial rule, there nonetheless remain what the authors call “islands of 
separateness,” groups of people such as the family, churches, universities, artists and 
writers who nonetheless manage to voice their disapproval of the quenching of human 
freedom and at times, offer active resistance to the regime itself.97 Friedrich and 
Brzezinski outline in detail however why it is that such individuals find it so onerous 
to pose a serious challenge to the totalitarian state in which they live. As they put it, 
quite bleakly: 
 
It is extremely difficult to mount an effective opposition to a totalitarian 
dictatorship precisely because it is totalitarian. No organizations are allowed 
unless they bear the stamp of official approval and are effectively coordinated 
with the ruling party. Nor do the means exist by which an enterprising person 
might gather others for effective cooperation. The regime’s total control of all the 
means of mass communication, as well as post, telephone, and telegraph; its 
complete monopoly of all weapons (except insofar as the military can manage to 
establish some measure of independence); finally, its all-engulfing secret-police 
surveillance, which utilizes every available contraption of modern technology, 
such as hidden recording devices, as well as the older methods of agents-
provocateurs and the like – these and related features of totalitarianism make any 
attempt to organise large numbers of people for effective opposition well-nigh 
hopeless.98 
 
   The totalitarian political system thus sought to isolate and neutralise all forms of 
resistance and in effect quell the citizenry’s ability to rebel. Brzezinski was right to 
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argue that opposition to totalitarian regimes is unlikely of succeeding in their 
overthrow but whether it is well-nigh hopeless is a point of contention, as resistance 
movements did in fact spring up in totalitarian societies which managed to evade 
being quashed and, as in the case of the Soviet Union, did in fact contribute to the 
system’s collapse at the Cold War’s end, albeit with external support.  
   Hannah Arendt commented on the stifling nature of totalitarian regimes and put this 
succinctly when she wrote: ‘We know that the iron band of total terror leaves no 
space for such private life and that the self-coercion of totalitarian logic destroys 
man’s capacity for experience and thought just as certainly as his capacity for 
action.’99 The totalitarian governments aimed to crush their citizen’s efforts at 
rebellion and this no doubt impelled Brzezinski to seek the liberation of the Soviet 
Union’s citizens, in particular his native Poland, as to live under such a system he 
would have no doubt realised was insufferable and totally unacceptable. 
   The “island of separateness” which the authors cite as being the most effective in its 
resistance to totalitarian domination is that of the church, which continued to provide 
an outlet for community gathering, strengthening of the faith in God, and hope for a 
better future free of political domination and economic exploitation. They mention 
that the Russian Orthodox Church, in spite of being officially proscribed by the 
Soviet government, nonetheless managed to survive underground and remain critical 
of the totalitarian state. In the Central Asian Republics, the authors noted how the 
Muslim faith was never completely suppressed and retained the following of almost 
all citizens within those countries.100 The authors explain why it is that 
institutionalised religion posed such a grave threat to totalitarian dictatorship. They 
wrote: 
 
In conclusion, we can say that the Christian churches have shown themselves to 
be a real bulwark against the claim to total power of the totalitarian dictatorship, 
perhaps more real than any others. Whether Protestant or Catholic, the genuine 
Christian cannot accept totalitarianism. For Christianity claims the whole man 
and the last word with regard to man’s values and man’s destiny. This claim the 
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totalitarians cannot accept. They may temporarily seek to compromise, but if 
they accepted this claim they would cease to be totalitarians.101 
 
   The authors were correct in pointing out that institutionalised religion posed an 
enormous threat to totalitarian regimes, owing to the fact that morality and indeed the 
promotion of peace are central to religious teaching and sit uncomfortably with the 
totalitarian agenda. Brzezinski would later support the Muslim faith in Central Asia as 
a means to undermine the Soviet Union and this would have an important effect upon 
the downfall of communism, as will be shown. 
   Friedrich and Brzezinski’s Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy is truly a 
landmark work in the field and provided an excellent analysis of how totalitarian 
regimes, in particular fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and communist Russia, operate. It 
is not without moralistic overtones, as it disparages the inhumane practices of these 
regimes and speaks out against their barbaric use of the armed forces to subjugate 
their own citizens, making the army a mere branch of the totalitarian party rather than 
solely the defender of the nation-state. They noted how totalitarian leaders disrespect 
western diplomatic protocol and use visits to foreign countries as an opportunity to 
proselytise and attempt to win others over to their own cause. The work admirably 
makes clear that totalitarian dictatorships are not political systems to be envied by 
those fortunate enough not to live under them. It marks Friedrich, as well as 
Brzezinski, as leaders in the field of political science devoted not only to expounding 
the operations of such regimes but more importantly, to condemning them and putting 
forth a historically objective assessment that portrays their faults as well as their 
strengths, thus providing the student not living under a totalitarian government with a 
realistic account of the lives of those who do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101 Friedrich & Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 314 
 50 
Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics 
 
   In 1962 Brzezinski published Ideology and Power In Soviet Politics. In it, he 
analysed Soviet ideology, the Russian historical experience (particularly during the 
tsarist period immediately preceding the October revolution), the operation of the 
Soviet political system, its foreign policy, and finally the prospects for change within 
the communist bloc. Each of the five essays that comprise the work was previously 
published as an article in an academic journal. Brzezinski wrote that: ‘The close 
interaction of ideology and power in both internal and external politics is the theme 
that links the essays together.’102  
   At the outset Brzezinski stated that the Soviets were fundamentally driven by 
ideology and that power and ideology are inextricably intertwined in communist 
countries. By comparison, western statesmen, he argued, tended to be more pragmatic 
and did not adhere to an officially prescribed dogma but rather allowed their societies 
to develop spontaneously. The Soviets, by contrast, sought to direct the entire 
evolution of their societies and ideology therefore played a greater role in their socio-
political development. This point is contentious. While western statesmen are not 
driven by ideology to the same degree as totalitarian leaders, democracy and 
capitalism are powerful ideological doctrines that motivate them and are central to 
their political agenda in their own countries and to their proselytising mission 
throughout the world. 
   Making the point that totalitarian regimes are not likely to be overthrown due to 
internal resistance, Brzezinski also noted that totalitarian regimes are not going to be 
easily defeated by external aggression.103 While totalitarian regimes were militarily 
powerful enough to resist external subjugation for a time, in the end both Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union were defeated due to the impact of foreign powers 
and, in the case of the Soviet Union, also internal pressures.  
   Brzezinski, while noting that the Soviet Union, like dictatorships in the past, 
displayed all the coercive qualities used to keep the population in check and maintain 
the ascendancy of the ruling class, in this case the communist party, he made the 
distinction that the Soviet Union was constantly striving to alter the status quo in line 
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with its ideological objectives.104 He furthermore pointed out that this drive to 
transform Russian society into pure communism accelerates as the regime stabilises 
itself in power. The more power the communists acquire over the political system and 
socio-economic structure of the country their wherewithal to bring about a declared 
classless and egalitarian society increases. However, the more communist leaders 
attempt to refashion society according to their ideological dictates, the more internal 
enemies they generate and the more external pressure is brought to bear on them. 
Thus their attempt to impose totalitarianism throughout their societies and to export it 
to the rest of the world generates stiff resistance from those who will not submit to 
tyranny and have their political freedom quenched.  
   Brzezinski described totalitarianism as ‘a forward-oriented phenomenon,’105 due to 
its stated objective of building a utopia or perfect society in the near future. To carry 
out this total transformation of society, Brzezinski wrote that ideology is the key to 
understanding the orientation of political objectives and, furthermore, that 
ideologization of the masses is seen as a prerequisite to imbuing the people with the 
same outlook and enthusiasm as the communist party itself. He wrote: ‘…ideology is 
not merely a historical guide. It becomes a daily dose of perpetual indoctrination.’106 
   Brzezinski correctly pointed out that, although totalitarianism and dictatorship more 
generally, can and have arisen in agrarian societies, as in the case of Russia or the 
Asiatic dictatorships of the past, they may come to power in industrially advanced 
areas, as happened in Nazi Germany. Therefore, industrialisation of a country does 
not preclude such a country from falling prey to totalitarian dictatorship.107 Also, in 
spite of the fact that totalitarian regimes are oppressive of human freedoms and may 
appear as an aberration in political systems, Brzezinski maintained that rationality and 
totalitarianism are not necessarily incompatible.108 A totalitarian regime can still 
modernise and maintain law and order. That being said, it is evident that in the most 
civilised and prosperous regions of the world, Western Europe and North America, 
totalitarian governments did not by and large come into being largely owing to the 
institutionalisation of democracy, the growth of a civic society and middle class that 
could keep the political elite in check, and the codification in law of basic rights such 
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as freedom of speech and assembly that ensure popular participation in government 
on the part of citizens.  
   Brzezinski noted the continuities in the Soviet Union from the tsarist era whereby 
one man continued to rule from the top and the system of government remained 
autocratic, despite the claims of the CPSU to be a “dictatorship of the proletariat.”109 
However, the advent of Communism in Russia did reverse libertarian trends in the 
late tsarist era, such as the move toward an independent judiciary, the emancipation of 
the serfs (somewhat reversed by the forced labour camps and general economic 
exploitation of the workers) and the moves towards representation in government that 
the tsars were bringing about, reversed by the dictatorship of the Communist party, 
claiming to represent the “proletariat” but in effect denying them any say in the 
governance of their country.110 
   Foreshadowing one of the arguments later put forth in Between Two Ages, that the 
technocratic leadership of modern governments will inevitably resort to manipulating 
the emotions and controlling the reason of the masses,111 Brzezinski stated that: ‘All 
modern societies involve mass manipulation, especially since the masses have now 
become economically and politically important.’112 Coming from someone who was 
ostensibly in favour of the democratic West and opposed to the totalitarian east, the 
idea that contemporary politics involves mass manipulation sounds rather 
contradictory. One would rather assume that a well-informed citizenry would be 
capable of making up their own mind on all the major political issues of the day.  
   For the first time mentioned throughout his works, Brzezinski also made another 
argument that the contemporary era is the era of the mass political awakening. He 
stated: 
 
Regimes of this (authoritarian) sort could endure as long as the majority of the 
population remained politically neutral and passive. A variety of well-known 
factors undermined this neutrality and passivity. Rapid social-economic changes 
brought about by the machine age, increased literacy, and the rise of nationalism 
have contributed to the politicizing of the masses and have made the politics of 
mass consciousness a feature of our age. Practically all contemporary leaders 
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have to appeal to popular sentiments and organize various forms of mass action 
in order to wield power effectively.113 
 
   Brzezinski made the assertion, validated by the historical record, that during times 
of war or economic downturn, societies are more susceptible to demagogy and the rise 
of dictatorial leaders, as they turn to drastic solutions to seemingly insoluble 
problems, seeing in the tough and often bellicose rhetoric of such leaders the 
necessary response to their troubles.114 
   The importance of the Soviet people relinquishing their ideology is mentioned when 
Brzezinski wrote: ‘To abandon these efforts to ideologize society, even if this process 
is highly ritualised and may no longer involve general individual commitment, would 
signal the first real step in the direction of the transformation of the system.’115 This 
notion would become central to Brzezinski’s later policy of “peaceful engagement.” 
That is to say, Brzezinski realised that soft power could be used to bring about the 
dissolution of Soviet ideology and its replacement with Western values.  
   Brzezinski also outlined the core beliefs of the communist ideology. These include: 
the class struggle; the inevitable triumph of socialism; public or state ownership of 
land (and means of production); all power should be vested in the Communist party 
(or dictatorship of the proletariat); revolutionary struggle and Lenin’s concept of the 
violent seizure of power as being necessary to overthrow the capitalist system in a 
given country; and consciousness rather than spontaneity (the future society must be 
planned and actively brought about rather than allowed to develop spontaneously).116 
   Brzezinski towards the end of this work put forth the argument which was to 
influence his approach toward the Soviet Union fifteen years later as National 
Security Adviser, that Communism represented an existential threat to humanity due 
to the fact that Communist leaders were determined to bring about a global 
communist dictatorship and thus would never settle for peace between themselves and 
the West. Such a belief necessitated a tough response to meet Communist aggression 
anywhere in the world with resolute force and ultimately, opt for a policy of defeating 
communism rather than settling for “peaceful coexistence”. He stated: 
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Soviet insistence that ultimate peace depends on the total victory of a particular 
social system led by a particular political party injects into international affairs 
an element of a fundamental struggle for survival not conducive to conflict 
resolution.117 
 
   Brzezinski’s Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics sets forth the argument central to 
his conception of the Soviet Union and how to respond to its expansive policies: the 
idea that the Soviet Union represented a serious threat to humanity and must be 
ultimately destroyed. He thus saw the competition as a zero-sum game. Brzezinski 
also wrote that to realistically bring about the implosion of the Soviet Union the West 
must encourage the detachment of Soviet bloc countries from Moscow’s control; 
promoting change within the communist bloc in addition to maintaining conventional 
and nuclear forces capable of defeating the Soviets in an all-out war. He stated: 
 
the West can, however, strive to create favourable conditions for the further 
growth of the diversity that has developed within the Communist camp… we 
should encourage some of our allies to exploit the more traditional bonds of 
friendship that have existed between them and some of the nations presently 
within the Communist camp. We should continue to address ourselves directly to 
the Communist-controlled peoples, thereby encouraging domestic pressures for 
change.118 
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2) A Budding Political Minor Player 
 
Peaceful Engagement 
 
   One of Brzezinski’s early notions for splitting up the Soviet Union was the concept 
of peaceful engagement, designed specifically to encourage pressures for change 
inside the Communist Bloc, including greater autonomy for the Soviet Republics and 
involving the use of soft power to entice them to identify with the West. This had its 
precedent in Kennan’s strategy to sow disunity in the communist bloc however it was 
stepped up dramatically by Brzezinski and the Carter administration. John Lewis 
Gaddis wrote that: ‘Despite indications that the Russian were tightening their control 
there, the administration devoted much time and thought during 1949 to ways of 
encouraging further dissidence in the satellites, ranging from Voice of America 
broadcasts and human rights campaigns in the United Nations to economic pressures 
and covert action.’119 Brzezinski knew that the Soviet Union relied upon conformity 
and the suppression of indigenous cultures in order to provide cohesion and that a 
recipe for political change in Eastern Europe would necessarily involve stressing the 
differences between Russian culture and those of its satellites, thereby encouraging 
the Soviet Republics to press ahead with their own nation-building and cultural 
autonomy. The U.S. policy of encouraging dissent goes back to encouraging Tito’s 
separation from the Soviet Union.120 
   Brzezinski was an innovator with regards to U.S. engagement with Eastern Europe. 
He foresaw that the use of soft power could be effective in dis-entangling the Eastern 
European nations from the Soviet Union and rather than pursue a policy of 
containment which would in effect maintain the status quo, Brzezinski sought to 
transcend the current situation and hasten the liberation of Eastern Europe, not 
through armed force but through persuasion and the enticement of Western values. He 
knew that military conflict was not an option therefore he resorted to the use of soft 
power to bring about the region’s liberation. John Lewis Gaddis spoke of how 
military engagement would have the effect of uniting the satellites behind Russia. He 
wrote: ‘Accordingly, NSC-68 stressed the importance of doing nothing in war or 
peace that might “irrevocably unite the Russian people behind the regime that 
                                                 
119 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 66 
120 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 100 
 56 
enslaves them.’121 The United States therefore could not utilise its military forces to 
liberate Eastern Europe as to do so would unite the regimes behind Moscow and could 
lead to nuclear war. Therefore, the policy of using soft power was the only option 
available to it and this is what Brzezinski exploited to bring about the region’s 
liberation. 
Justin Vaisse succinctly described how Brzezinski policy was innovative and how it 
differed from previous U.S. policies toward the region. He stated: 
 
With these satellites, achieving neutrality was not enough: it should be a matter 
of reducing tensions and gradually increasing economic and cultural exchanges, 
to begin to influence the Eastern European societies and in the long run 
encourage their independence from Moscow. Brzezinski’s proposed path 
diverged dramatically from Dulles’s supposed policy of liberation, Kennan’s 
excessively passive and static policy of containment, and Kissinger’s policy of 
mutual accommodation to achieve a détente based on acceptance of the status 
quo.122 
 
   Brzezinski’s policy of peaceful engagement was thus innovative and would turn out 
to be highly effective. Liberating the region from within through fomenting 
nationalism and promoting Western values would prove to be one of the factors that 
brought about the Soviet Union’s collapse. The promotion of dissident activity was 
stepped up dramatically by Brzezinski when he came into office and would over the 
following decade prove to be a major catalyst in the region’s liberation. 
   Brzezinski’s approach to emancipating Eastern Europe was thus nuanced. He 
grasped that direct military confrontation would only harden the bloc’s resolve and 
lead to increased unity amongst the Eastern Europeans and Russia. He comprehended 
that soft power could be more effective and pragmatic than military engagement in 
weaning away the Soviet republics from Moscow’s control. Thus it was necessary to 
engage Eastern Europe in such a way as to not increase opposition to the West and 
promote solidarity amongst the communist nations; to draw them towards the West in 
a manner that would win their admiration for the Western socio-political system while 
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avoiding military conflict and Moscow’s cracking down on Western efforts to forcibly 
dismantle the Soviet bloc.  
   In a speech delivered before the Foreign Policy Association in Washington, D.C., on 
December 20, 1978, Brzezinski stated: ‘While seeking U.S.-Soviet détente, we have 
also attempted to foster greater U.S. ties with Eastern Europe. We do not believe that 
our relations with Eastern Europe should be subordinate to our relationship with 
Moscow.’123 Brzezinski believed it ought to be the U.S. policy to directly reach out to 
the communist nations themselves and not have to communicate to them through 
Russia. Brzezinski’s described his strategy to bring about the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union as such: 
 
I became convinced that America intelligently pursuing a foreign policy 
designed to dismantle the Soviet Union by exploiting its internal weaknesses 
might actually work, and I started developing that as a concept, first as a scholar 
and then as a sort of budding political minor player.124 
 
   Brzezinski’s strategy was to foment nationalism within the Soviet Union and in 
doing so encourage the breaking away of the Soviet Republic from Moscow’s control, 
first through their partial detachment then their complete liberation. Soft power was to 
be the chief weapon in carrying this out.  
   Justin Vaisse goes into considerable detail to describe what the policy of peaceful 
engagement entailed. It is worth noting that the policy was an alternative means of 
waging the Cold War and a solution to the impasse of containment that seemed to just 
freeze the status quo and prolong the existence of the Soviet Union. He stated:  
 
   The policy of peaceful engagement was based on an analysis of the weaknesses 
of the Soviet regime, which was incapable of responding to the aspirations of the 
populace in terms of economic progress of political liberties. Peaceful 
engagement meant embracing Eastern Europe as closely as possible in order to 
transform it gradually and tug it away from Moscow’s orbits. Since the West was 
not ready to commit fully to a strategy of support for uprisings, it needed to stop 
claiming that it had such a strategy, that it envisaged a possible victory in those 
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terms. Instead it should pursue the same objectives – increasing diversity within 
the Soviet bloc and loosening the ties between Eastern Europe and Moscow – 
through a different and more effective policy. Thus America and the Western 
European countries should significantly increase their economic exchanges with 
Eastern Europe rather than leaving the region in relative stagnation on the 
assumption that doing so could lead to discontent and regime change (the politics 
of “the worse the better”). On the contrary, economic development of the region, 
binding it to the West, would encourage the desire for independence. More 
generally, Western Europeans should make their Eastern counterparts political 
and cultural partners rather than adversaries, while multiplying educational, 
scientific, intellectual, and artistic exchanges among civil societies in order to 
expose populations to their power of attraction.125   
 
 Brzezinski’s policy of peaceful engagement was subsequently adopted by the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations.126 Brzezinski prepared speeches for Kennedy 
during his campaign, in which Kennedy proposed that restrictions to economic aid to 
Soviet countries, such as Poland, be lifted, so as to strengthen economic links between 
these countries and the United States and in doing so promote their economic 
independence from Moscow. On October 1, 1960, ‘Kennedy gave a speech in 
Chicago, outlining a program of “peaceful engagement” with the satellites, Poland in 
particular, as a more effective way to counter the USSR than the politics of liberation 
pursued by the Republicans. Here Brzezinski’s positions are clearly recognizable.’127 
   Subsequently, Brzezinski met with President Johnson in the White House and his 
ideas were expressed in numerous speeches.128 Indeed, in 1966, while working on the 
State Department’s Policy Planning Council, Brzezinski was described in Newsweek 
as ‘a brilliant 38-year old political scientist’ who had already become ‘one of the 
architects of U.S. foreign policy.’129 Vaisse described Brzezinski’s meteoric rise to the 
role of policymaker as thus: ‘It was because he published a number of articles in 
Foreign Affairs, the council’s journal, that Brzezinski began to be known beyond 
academic circles. And it was through his connections in the CFR rather than through 
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his contacts at Harvard or Columbia that he was invited to serve on President Lyndon 
Johnson’s Policy Planning Council from 1966 to early 1968.’130 Brzezinski, indeed, 
wrote copious amounts of articles for academic journals, the Council on Foreign 
Relations’ Foreign Affairs in particular, which were read by policymakers and 
academics and significantly influenced not just policymaking but political discourse.  
Brzezinski had a notable impact upon President Johnson’s “bridge-building” speech 
which marked a departure from previous Cold War policy. The U.S. would now 
engage the Eastern Europeans and attempt to reconcile them with the West. This 
policy was revolutionary for its time, as it sought to reduce tension between the two 
blocs and win the hearts and minds of the Eastern Europeans through the sheer power 
of attraction.  Justin Vaisse described the significance of Brzezinski’s peaceful 
engagement as adopted by the Johnson administration. He wrote:  
 
But Brzezinski’s main accomplishment came about a few months after he joined 
the PPS in the summer of 1966; his influence was perceptible in the speech 
Johnson gave on October 7, 1966, to the National Conference of Editorial 
Writers. The talk is sometimes identified as “East-West Discourse,” or the 
“bridge-building speech,” or even, tellingly, the “peaceful engagement” speech. 
In it, Johnson discussed US relations with Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and 
the USSR, and introduced two noteworthy developments in American policy: 
German reunification was no longer a prerequisite for easing the tensions with 
the East; on the contrary, it would be a result of reduced tension. America was 
shifting from a policy of coexistence to a peaceful engagement; this would entail 
a massive increase in exchanges, especially with Eastern Europe. In short, 
Johnson adopted two ideas that Brzezinski had been defending since 1961. It is 
true that the administration had already taken steps in that direction. For 
example, in a speech delivered in May 1964, Johnson had brought up the need to 
“build bridges” with the East in order to wear away the Iron Curtain, and the idea 
of no longer making German reunification a prerequisite had gained support 
within the administration, even if it had not been expressed officially for fear of 
offending Bonn. But the October 7 speech marked a real political turning 
point.131 
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   This speech in fact used the term “peaceful engagement.” To quote President 
Johnson: “We must improve the East-West environment in order to achieve the 
unification of Germany in the context of a larger, peaceful, and prosperous Europe. 
Our task is to achieve a reconciliation with the East – a shift from the narrow concept 
of coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement.’132 
   The policy of peaceful engagement was a pragmatic way of cultivating change 
within the Soviet Union. Brzezinski’s later colleague at Johns Hopkins University 
Charles Gati described how innovative the policy was. He stated:  
 
the policy signified a strong opposition to Communist rule, combined with 
economic enticements and educational exchanges, activities aimed at cultivating 
intellectuals eager for renewing contacts with the West, and even favours 
extended to communist regimes that showed signs of either domestic 
liberalization or a modicum of foreign policy detachment from Moscow. The 
goal was thus limited in scope: liberalization rather than liberty, diversity rather 
than democracy, partial detachment from the Soviet Union rather than complete 
separation, and support wherever possible for nationalist aspirations. Brzezinski 
offered a realistic, evolutionary alternative to empty political rhetoric.133 
 
   Brzezinski did not view the Communist bloc as a monolithic and coherent whole, as 
it was traditionally regarded by the U.S. establishment. His policy of peaceful 
engagement, articulated in many articles written during the 1960’s, therefore sought to 
exploit this weakness of the Soviet Union by drawing the Eastern European states 
back into the Western orbit through sheer economic incentive and cultural 
identification. Brzezinski believed that it was only natural that the East European 
states would evolve that way politically and that Russia would inevitably follow suit 
given that the Western political and economic system was so demonstrably superior to 
that of the Eastern one. His views were taken on board by the Johnson administration. 
As Patrick Vaughan wrote:  
 
Brzezinski’s concept of “peaceful engagement” was expanded in his 1965 work 
Alternative to Partition that recommended the United States take the lead in a 
significant multinational campaign, similar to the Marshall Plan, designed to 
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bridge the political and economic divisions that still divided Europe. 
Brzezinski’s work led to an appointment to the State Department during which 
he wrote President Johnson’s famous “bridge building” speech which 
represented the most ambitious U.S. approach toward Eastern Europe in the Cold 
War era.134  
 
   However, Brzezinski’s approach was subsequently turned down by Congress for 
being too soft on Communism, as it offered economic aid to the East European states 
at a time when conservative opinion in the United States was against any such 
overture. Concerning the reluctance of the U.S. to grant economic aid to Communist 
countries: ‘…American taxpayers would not want to give money to ostensibly neutral 
but actually hostile regimes…’135 
  The policy of peaceful engagement nonetheless was revolutionary for its time, and 
soft power would go on to play a vital role in the erosion of Soviet power, as the Cold 
War ended in part because of peaceful movements for reform rather than direct 
military collision between the two superpowers. In the end, Western political values 
would play an important if difficult to quantify role in encouraging the Soviet 
republics to break away from the Soviet Union, as indeed they did try to adopt the 
Western socio-political system along with its respect for human rights and 
furthermore they sought to move into the Western orbit. Brzezinski was a pioneer in 
the use of soft power as an alternative to military confrontation and this, in the end, 
would prove to be more deadly than nuclear weapons in inflicting damage upon the 
Soviet Union. 
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Alternative to Partition 
 
   In this work, published in 1965, Brzezinski offered forth a roadmap for overcoming 
the division of Europe into two camps. He analysed the historical background of how 
Europe came to be dominated by the superpowers in the aftermath of World War II, 
with a particular emphasis upon the division of Germany and its capital city, Berlin. 
This is significant as this issue was the dominant one at the outset of the Cold War. As 
Paul Kennedy put it: ‘In the beginning, the Cold War was centred upon remaking the 
boundaries of Europe. Underneath, therefore, it was still to do with the ‘German 
problem’, since the resolution of that issue would in turn determine the amount of 
influence which the victorious powers of 1945 would exert over Europe.’136 His 
intention in writing the book was also to formulate a new set of policies for the U.S. 
government in relation to Europe in order to deal jointly with ending the partition. 
Brzezinski differed from George Kennan’s policy of military disengagement from 
Europe and argued that military engagement was necessary in order to safeguard 
America’s interests. 
   His work is thus titled Alternative to Partition as Brzezinski believed the status quo 
could be changed and the continent reunited in the near future in a manner that is 
satisfactory to the citizens of the countries concerned and also, that is in their security 
interests as well as those of the superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
   Brzezinski believed that the time was ripe for dismantling the iron curtain when 
writing this work. He argued that the key to solving the partition of Europe was first 
and foremost ending the division of Germany.137 In order to bring about a reunited 
Germany, Brzezinski felt the United States had to take the initiative, as the Soviet 
Union had a vested interest in keeping Germany weak and divided in order to prevent 
Germany from again becoming a threat to the Soviet Union and from dominating 
central Europe.138 The memories of Nazi Germany were a reminder that the Soviet 
Union could not tolerate a strong Central European power which might again threaten 
its security. 
   Brzezinski noted how Marshall Plan aid played a significant role in solidifying the 
division of Europe after the war. The countries that accepted such aid became 
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economically tied to the United States, allowing U.S. goods into their markets as part 
of the condition to being given funds to rebuild their economies, whereas the 
countries under Soviet control were ordered by Stalin to firmly reject such aid. As 
Molotov reported to Stalin in 1948: ‘The Americans “are eager to use this opportunity 
to break into the internal economies of European countries and especially to redirect 
the flow of European trade in their own interest.’139 Economic domination of Europe 
was an objective of the U.S. that was advanced through the Marshall Plan and the 
Soviets were right in stating that the Americans sought to profit from European 
markets. The whole idea was to establish markets as outlets for American goods in 
return for granting the Europeans funds to rebuild their economies and this could be 
seen as an effort to dominate the European economies. The Marshall Plan contributed 
significantly to the demarcation of Europe into capitalist and communist spheres of 
influence. As Brzezinski stated, the rejection of Marshall plan aid ‘by the Soviet 
Union and, under Soviet duress, by the other East European nations provided the 
foundations on which the Iron Curtain was erected and from which were launched the 
contrasting European policies of the two great powers.’140 
   Brzezinski also went on to mention that the formation of NATO was designed as a 
security alliance to protect its member states from Soviet aggression and was not 
intended to be a permanent alliance but rather one that would be dissolved once the 
Soviet threat had disappeared.141 One could argue however that NATO serves the 
purpose of protecting Western countries from external aggression and that the alliance 
is useful in providing for the security of Western states and not just for containing the 
Soviet Union. The purpose of NATO, as one American diplomat put it, was to keep 
the Germans down, the Americans in, and the Russians out. The Soviet Union then in 
response to the formation of NATO created the Warsaw Pact. However, Brzezinski 
noted that while Western Europe was integrating to a greater degree with the 
formation of the European Community, following the death of Stalin the monolithic 
unity of the communist bloc was giving way to increased relativization and 
diversification. 
   The Soviet Bloc countries were deciding upon pursuing their own roads to 
Communism, with national considerations and circumstances in mind, rather than 
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taking direct orders from Moscow. They were also seeking to establish economic ties 
with the West in order to further develop their economies. This disunity in Eastern 
Europe is something Brzezinski sought to exploit to further fragment the Soviet Union 
and bring about its eventual collapse and this would tie in with his policy of peaceful 
engagement. 
   Brzezinski pointed out this particular vulnerability of the Soviet Union, arguing that 
anti-Russian feelings among the Soviet bloc countries were stronger than anti-
Americanism amongst Eastern Europeans, and ought therefore to be capitalised 
upon.142 Brzezinski was acutely aware of the growing strength of nationalism within 
the Soviet bloc countries and how this would work to the detriment of unity amongst 
communist states, each of which being desirous of pursuing its own national interests 
rather than giving priority to the supranational aims espoused by Moscow. For 
example, in the economic sphere member states sought to become relatively self-
sufficient and to prioritise the industrialisation of their own economies rather than 
specialising in one particular sector, such as the production of steel, as Moscow 
wished. The increasingly strong nationalist sentiment was apparently not something 
Moscow had anticipated.143 
   Brzezinski also wrote that the Sino-Soviet dispute had given the Eastern European 
nations greater leverage vis-à-vis the Russians, who were consequently more 
dependent upon them than before for their continued support and therefore 
increasingly willing to grant them a modicum of political and economic 
independence. The ‘scope for manoeuver and self-assertion by the East Europeans,’ 
Brzezinski wrote, ‘has been greatly enlarged.’144 Moscow, by allowing the satellite 
states more autonomy in exchange for their continued loyalty, was in effect sowing 
the seeds for the demise of the Communist Bloc, for relativization of it was bound 
inevitably to lead to increased demands for freedom from Soviet interference in 
domestic politics and foreign policy.  
   This was a development Brzezinski no doubt applauded, as it served to 
fundamentally weaken the bonds holding the Communist Bloc together and, as had 
been argued in his MA thesis in 1948, indicated that nationalism would be the death 
knell of the Soviet Union rather than armed conflict between the superpowers, it 
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would collapse through implosion rather than by military defeat. This in fact turned 
out to be the way in which the Soviet Union did in fact crumble and Brzezinski was 
right in correctly foreseeing how seriously the spectre of nationalism would threaten 
the unity of the Soviet Bloc. Brzezinski described in detail the significance of 
Communist internationalism being supplanted by the national interests of the 
countries comprising the Soviet Bloc: 
 
The pattern of change means the revival of the supremacy of states and the 
reappearance of state to state relations; it means the collapse of the old 
communist dream of one united communist state. The Soviet leadership failed to 
capitalise on a historical opportunity to impose an international solution in the 
late forties when it could have done so; its bumptious and precipitous policies, its 
reliance on ideological excommunication and economic sanctions (as toward 
Albania) merely stimulated nationalist reactions. What Stalin felt he need not do 
or perhaps even could not do, namely, to forge the people’s democracies into a 
single coordinated political and economic system, his successors certainly will 
not be able to do. Stalin did not create stable foundations for an enduring empire; 
Khrushchev did not develop the style of international leadership. East Europe is 
where the dream of communist internationalism lies buried.145 
 
   This post-Stalin relativization of the Communist Bloc is important as it meant the 
Soviet Union lost its cohesion and unity. The fact that Soviet republics were allowed 
to go their own way from the time of Khrushchev onwards meant that they would 
inevitably do so and in all likelihood gravitate toward the West. Such relativization 
provided fertile ground for Brzezinski’s policy of peaceful engagement as it meant the 
Eastern Europeans were receptive to Western ideas and influence and had a modicum 
of independence so that they could go their own way politically. They were free to 
industrialise and borrow technology from the West, increase trade, and promote 
artistic and scientific exchanges that would help serve to modernise their countries, as 
well as engage in cultural exchanges with the West that would help solidify the bonds 
between East and West. This was important as, for example, in the post-Stalin years, 
the Eastern Europeans were exposed to, for example, American jazz music and 
                                                 
145 Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, p. 28 
 66 
movies and this would help inculcate a fondness for the West which was sure to, in 
the long run, overcome the hostility between the two blocs.    
   Brzezinski did make the qualification however that while nationalism was on the 
rise in the Soviet Bloc, subordination to Moscow continued to be the reality, and this 
was forcefully demonstrated during the Hungarian and Czechoslovak uprisings in 
1956 and 1968, respectively. Brzezinski argued that the Cold War would continue due 
to the fact that the U.S. and USSR both have a universalising mission and desire to 
see their socio-political systems become the norm around the world. Also the fact that 
both superpowers possessed the world’s pre-eminent military forces meant that 
tensions among them were likely to remain high. He argued however that Europe 
need not continue to be an area of great-power conflict, that a solution would be 
possible whereby Soviet-American tensions on the European continent could be 
defused through encouraging the eventual reunification of the continent in a manner 
that did not jeopardise the security interests of either of the superpowers or the 
European nations themselves. Conflict around the world, through proxy wars and the 
sponsoring of political parties loyal to either side would most likely continue he 
argued, but the opportunity for rendering the European continent a region of relative 
peace was currently at hand.146 
   Brzezinski pointed out that East-West trade is more important to Eastern Europe 
than to Western Europe because of the fact that the latter largely exported industrial 
goods to the former whereas Eastern Europe largely exported non-industrial goods to 
Western Europe. This dependency on the West for manufactured goods, machinery 
and high technology meant that: ‘The communist elites would like to lift the Iron 
Curtain in economics while leaving it down in cultural-social affairs.’147 Brzezinski 
advocated that the West should make economic assistance and the granting of credits 
to the East dependent upon the East revising its social and cultural policies towards 
the West i.e. allow for a greater movement of people and ideas across the Iron 
Curtain. 
   Brzezinski described why the Soviets felt that the contest between the East and 
West was centred upon Europe. He stated: 
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To the Soviets, Europe is still the “central front” in the confrontation with the 
West. This basic assumption has guided Soviet policy since World War II. It has 
been systematized and amplified in the course of the Sino-Soviet debate during 
which the Chinese advanced the counterproposition that the underdeveloped 
world, especially the “national liberation” struggle, has become the arena for the 
historically decisive showdown with “U.S. imperialism.” The Soviet position 
stressed instead the primacy of the direct competition between the developed 
parts of the two global systems. In the Soviet view the eventual economic 
supremacy of the communist world, and hence its increased military power, will 
jointly – albeit peacefully – effect a qualitative turn in world history. Thus, while 
the battles in the Third World are important, they are peripheral to the direct 
confrontation on the central front. Europe, the western parts supported by the 
United States, the eastern part linked to the Soviet Union, is where history will 
be shaped.148 
 
   This quote is important as Europe was the grand arena where the Cold War was 
initially fought. The Second World War had been the struggle between European 
powers for mastery of the continent. The division of Europe after the war meant that 
neither the East led by Russia nor the West led by America had triumphed over the 
continent. It made sense that when one power triumphed over the other in the 
European strategic zone, the conflict would brought to a close. Europe was the most 
prosperous region of the world for five hundred years prior to World War II and it 
made sense that to have this region as an ally would significantly tip the balance of 
power in your favour.  
   However, the Cold War would in 1950 move to the next strategic front, East Asia, 
with the Korean War and stalemate would prevail in Europe. During the Carter 
administration, the third strategic front on the Eurasian continent, the Middle East, 
would become the centre of contention between the two superpowers. However, as 
Europe was the wealthiest of the three strategic zones, it was imperative to have the 
mainstay there for if the industrialised democracies of Europe fell into either hands 
that would bring about victory for either side. 
   The Soviets, Brzezinski observed, sought to weaken the American-European 
relationship, and undermine European political and economic unity. A united Europe 
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tied to the United States posed a greater challenge to the Soviets and was more likely 
to triumph over the Communist world thus the Soviet Union sought to keep Europe 
fragmented and American involvement there to a minimum. This is why the Soviets 
believed it to be necessary to keep Germany divided and weak. 149 
   Brzezinski made the point that should the West fail to promote European 
unification, a fragmented Europe made up of small nation-states would have less 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the Soviets and would inevitably be dominated by them. 
Brzezinski thus argued that the US-USSR confrontation in Europe must be 
transformed into cooperation and that the onus for bringing about such a 
transformation essentially lay with America.150 Brzezinski argued this was in 
America’s interest as well, as it would revive admiration for America amongst 
Europeans, making America more relevant to them, strengthening the alliance and 
working towards the general promotion of international stability and world order.151 
Brzezinski also pointed out that as America had no territorial designs on Europe, it 
would therefore be in a position to play the role of honest broker and sponsor a 
settlement that is in the interests of the Europeans themselves.152 
   Brzezinski proposed that “three cardinal assumptions” should underpin U.S. efforts 
to promote European reunification. Firstly, Western military forces would have to be 
preserved at their current strength and Western interests be protected. Secondly, that 
Russia and Eastern Europe together must negotiate any settlement with the West. In 
this regard Brzezinski noted that Russia would not tolerate East European states 
defecting to the West, leaving CEMA or the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and that the 
Communist elites in these countries were not likely to do so even in spite of economic 
incentives and popular pressures for them to join the West. Brzezinski mentioned here 
for the first time that the ideal solution would be not only the incorporation of Eastern 
Europe into a greater Europe but would also include the Soviet Union as well. 
Brzezinski thus proposed that Russia also be eventually granted entry into the West.153 
He argued that as the countries of Eastern Europe have more experience with 
democracy and historically share a stronger cultural affinity with the West, their 
                                                 
149 Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, p. 85 
150 Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, p. 132 
151 Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, p. 133 
152 Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, p. 134 
153 Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, p. 136 
 69 
integration should proceed more quickly than that of Russia,154 a prediction that 
turned out to be true, given Eastern Europe’s integration into the EU and Russia’s 
continued absence from it. Thirdly, Brzezinski stated that Germany would only be 
reunited as a result of a qualitative change in the relationship between the countries of 
the West and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.155 With these assumptions in 
mind, he then recommended five policy goals for the U.S. 
   Firstly, Brzezinski argued that the U.S. must persuade the Eastern Europeans, 
especially the Czechs and the Poles that their security would be increased if Germany 
were reunited. He also argued that the U.S. should encourage better relations between 
West Germany and Eastern Europe as a means of drawing that half of the continent 
closer to the West. This was an important recommendation as Germany was naturally, 
owing to its economic clout, the leader of Europe, and therefore good relations 
between Germany and Eastern Europe was a prerequisite to stability on the continent. 
It was imperative for both the U.S. and Russia that a resurgent dictatorship did not 
arise in Germany which would again seek to dominate the continent. As Germany was 
the most powerful European state, both the U.S. and Russia had to ensure the security 
of Germany’s weaker neighbours and prevent them from being politically dominated 
by that country. 
   Secondly, Brzezinski proposed the U.S. should promote a German-Polish 
reconciliation, as this would bring to an end the animosity over their borders that 
were redrawn after the Second World War, Poland being given compensation with 
German territory in exchange for loss of part of its territory in the east to the Soviet 
Union. Brzezinski argued that the U.S. must encourage the Germans to make clear to 
the Poles that they have no territorial designs upon Poland and therefore do not seek 
to redraw the borders between the two countries.156 This is important as promoting 
peace between these two countries was crucial to east-west relations and peace in 
Europe, Poland being the most significant state in Eastern Europe and Germany being 
the former European hegemon. 
   Thirdly, Brzezinski stated that the U.S. should try to ‘lessen the Russian obsession 
with Germany.’157 This referred to the Soviet fear of a resurgent Germany and also to 
the fact that Russia sought to exact concessions from the West through tightening its 
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control over East Germany, particularly Berlin, as was the case during the blockade of 
that city in 1948-9 when Stalin closed down all roads and railways after the French, 
British, and Americans integrated their respective zones of the city into one 
administrative unit, which the Soviets viewed as a threat. The Soviets always viewed 
the status of Berlin as an extremely sensitive issue and felt they could induce the West 
into granting concessions by tightening their grip over their half of the city. 
Brzezinski was seeking here that the Americans convince the Soviets not to be so 
obsessed with the potential threat of Germany or with using East Germany and Berlin 
in particular as leverage with which to exact concessions from the West. 
   Fourthly, he argued, consistent with his policy of peaceful engagement that the 
improvements in economic ties between the two halves of Europe should gradually 
lead to increased cultural and social contacts. Brzezinski hoped such contacts would 
stimulate admiration amongst Eastern Europeans for Western values, such as freedom 
of speech, and furthermore smooth over relations between the two blocs. Finally, 
Brzezinski proposed that the U.S. should seek to cultivate multilateral ties between 
Western and Eastern Europe, rather than merely bilateral agreements between the 
respective nations of each half. In this regard, Brzezinski had in mind a ‘joint all-
European economic development plan,’ which would ‘be designed to cut across the 
present European partition, to narrow existing disparities in European living 
standards, to reduce the economic and political significance of existing frontiers, and 
to promote East-West trade and human contacts by the development of an all-
European system of communications.’158 
   In Alternative to Partition, Brzezinski thus set forth an ambitious agenda and set of 
policy goals to realistically bring about the reunification of Europe. He had in mind 
ending both the division of Germany and the dismantling of the iron curtain, as well 
as stimulating political, economic, social, and cultural contacts between the two 
halves and he believed that America was in a position to spearhead such a process. 
Thus he ended his work stating: ‘America could set itself no nobler or more timely 
task than seeking to end the partition of Europe.’159 
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The Soviet Bloc 
 
   Brzezinski was aware that, following Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet Union 
underwent a period of diversification and as a result there was greater autonomy for 
the Soviet satellites. This process of the U.S. bringing about diversification had been 
inherent in the policy of containment advocated by Kennan since the late 1940s; to 
encourage diversity and bring about the internal erosion of the communist bloc. As 
John Lewis Gaddis wrote: ‘The third step in his strategy was to bring about such a 
change: to effect a shift in the thinking of Kremlin leaders away from their own 
version of universalism – the conviction that security required restructuring the 
outside world along Soviet lines – to particularism – to toleration and even the 
encouragement of diversity.’160 Brzezinski was a proponent of diversifying the 
communist bloc and decentralising authority from Moscow unto the Soviet republics. 
In The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, a work that became a classic in its field,161 
Brzezinski wrote about how this new era of diversification meant the end of 
monolithic rule in the Soviet Union. He stated: 
 
In the long run inherent in this relationship was the gradual diffusion of Soviet 
authority. No matter how often the Chinese proclaimed Soviet leadership or 
insisted on the obedience of others to Moscow, the very presence in the camp of 
a power which was de facto independent and which pursued its own domestic 
policies was a denial of the monolithic and hierarchical character of the 
international Communist system. No empire or church has ever maintained itself 
with two capitals. Moscow and Peking had to ponder the fate of Rome and 
Byzantium.162 
 
   The end of monolithic rule in the Soviet Union following Stalin’s death brought to 
an end the grand dream of Communist party members to establish a Moscow-led 
communist empire. Brzezinski wrote, furthermore, that: ‘In effect, the Stalinist unity 
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of ideology and power was dissipated within less than four years of his death.’163 
Moscow was losing its grip on the satellite states as they were becoming ever more 
independent and free from domination by the centre. This provided ample scope for 
Western engagement with the Soviet satellites and meant that they could be weaned 
away from the Soviet Union given that Moscow had lost its control over them. Thus 
the prospects for liberating the Soviet satellites were enhanced. The post-Stalin years 
led to the loss of ideological control as Communist unity dissipated and the satellites 
pursued their own roads to socialism. As Zubok wrote: ‘It has now been established 
beyond a doubt that Stalin was determined to keep Eastern Europe in the Soviet 
Union’s grip at any cost.’164  
   The satellites also sought economic independence from Moscow, who had 
coordinated their economic policies to ensure they specialised in a given sector and 
that, like colonial empires of the past, Russia benefitted from the influx of raw 
materials and manufactured commodities, enriching itself in the process. Though to 
qualify this, the Russians did develop the industries of their satellites, such as 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany. However, the satellites felt the relationship 
between them and Russia was exploitative and sought to develop their own industries, 
diversify, and pursue autarky. They also sought increased contact with the West for 
the purpose of importing high-technology. It seems that ostensibly, the Soviet 
satellites sought to be more like the West in terms of economic advancement though 
politically they were devoted to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and believed in 
the dictatorship of the Communist party.  
   Artemi Kalinowski and Etiennes Peyret have questioned whether the Soviet Union 
really suppressed the satellite states, however it seems beyond a reasonable doubt that 
they did. Stalin manoeuvred loyal supporters of his into power following the Second 
World War and the satellites were forced to have their foreign and economic policies 
coordinated by Moscow to ensure they were in line with the policies of the CPSU. 
Although they were given a modicum of independence following Stalin’s death, they 
still had to take their orders from Moscow and follow the agenda of the Kremlin 
leaders. Failure to do so would result in military intervention, as had been the case in 
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, when the communist parties there 
attempted to introduce political reforms that were not approved of by Russia. 
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   Vaisse noted that Brzezinski was aware of the effect of de-Stalinization upon the 
satellites and that he wrote an article ‘Shifts in the Satellites’ in which he addressed 
how they were to adjust their own political systems so as to reverse the legacy of 
Stalin. The significance of this is that by the time of the death of Stalin the regimes 
were no longer under the monolithic control of Stalin but were undergoing a period of 
relativization and increased nationalism which Brzezinski could exploit.165 
Furthermore, Brzezinski suggested that pluralism might be the future of the political 
systems in the eastern bloc following de-Stalinization.166 
   The period following the death of Stalin is characterised by a shift in Soviet 
thinking; a transition from the notion that war between the two blocs was inevitable to 
the notion that a period of “peaceful coexistence” was at hand. As Zubok wrote: ‘The 
Stalinist thesis of the inevitability of a period of wars gave way to a new thesis: “long-
term peaceful coexistence” and non-military competition between the capitalist and 
Communist systems.’167 This was spearheaded by Nikita Khrushchev who believed 
the thesis that war between capitalism and communism was flawed and that both sides 
could live in relative harmony.  
   Furthermore, although “peaceful coexistence” became the dominant approach to 
East-West diplomacy it was still the avowed mission of the Soviets to champion 
Communism worldwide and the U.S. was naturally regarded as a threat to this 
objective. Therefore, the Soviet Union competed for the support of post-colonial 
states and sought out military bases around the globe to further their aims. Zubok 
made the point that: ‘Soviet politics after Stalin’s death favoured revolutionary-
imperial discourse – it was politically suicidal to be seen as soft on Western 
imperialism. The members of the collective leadership competed among themselves to 
win support among the party and state elites, offering strategies of strengthening or 
expanding Soviet power and international influence.’168 Thus, while “peaceful 
coexistence” was the avowed policy of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin had grand 
designs to take over the world and this involved strengthening the communist bloc, 
infiltration and communist subversion in the West, and expanding its influence in the 
Third World. 
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   Although Brzezinski applauded the relativization of the Communist Bloc, he was 
still aware that the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of 
China was to see Communism triumph throughout the world. As Andrianopoulos has 
pointed out: 
 
Brzezinski’s belief that Moscow and Peking were committed to creating a world-
wide Communist society did not change as a result of, what he called, the 
relativization of ideology emanating from changes in the Soviet Bloc, and 
particularly from the Sino-Soviet schism.169 
   
 Brzezinski was also aware that a change in generations would have significant 
implications for the unity of the Soviet Bloc. He was cognizant of the fact that the 
post-Stalin generation of Soviet leaders would seek greater autonomy from the Soviet 
Union and would not be as easily controlled as were their predecessors.170 
   Another important fact about the post-Stalin period is that this gave birth to the 
dissident movement. From the time of Khrushchev’s speech denouncing Stalin Soviet 
citizens began to become more receptive to Western culture and there was a softening 
in relations between the two blocs. People began to feel they also had the right to 
denounce their leaders and become more openly critical of the totalitarian societies 
they lived in. As Zubok wrote: ‘Recently, Jeremi Suri has argued that de-Stalinisation 
during the 1960s led to the dissident movement which, in turn, together with the 
movements in Central Europe, began to challenge the fundamentals of the Soviet 
regime.’171 This was something the Carter administration would capitalise upon after 
coming into office and would attempt to fuel so as to do utmost damage to communist 
governments.  
   Brzezinski thus realised that the diversity now accepted as the norm was something 
to be exploited. The ideological rigidity of the Stalinist era had disappeared and the 
Marxist/Leninist doctrine had been adapted to suit the specific conditions of Soviet 
nation states. Brzezinski wrote about how Marxist/Leninist doctrine was evolving 
during this time. He stated: 
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Inherent in both the changes in relations among Communist states and in the 
Communist ideological conceptions governing these relations was the increasing 
relativization of the doctrine. Formerly absolute and rigid principles were 
becoming relative and flexible. With each party increasingly able to insist that its 
Marxism-Leninism was correct, and with the politically expedient principle of 
agreeing to disagree gaining broader acceptance in relations among Communist 
states, the doctrine was becoming diluted and less coherent.172 
 
   Brzezinski understood that the relativization of Soviet doctrine meant that the Soviet 
bloc was beginning to fragment ideologically. He grasped that ‘in the history of ideas, 
relativization of a hitherto absolute ideology is often the first stage in the erosion of 
the vitality of the ideology.’173 Brzezinski thus saw an opportunity to be exploited: 
namely, the growing diversity in the Soviet bloc and the desire of many of its member 
states to go their own way toward socialism. Brzezinski knew that their desire to be 
free from dictatorial rule from Moscow was the first step in their greater identification 
with the Western system. That is to say, Brzezinski understood that the Soviet bloc 
was not going to last as a monolithic system and that eventually, although the 
Communist states professed their desire to remain socialist, he knew that the 
superiority of the western socio-political system would eventually entice them to 
identify themselves with the West. He also knew that the loosening of ideological 
orthodoxy meant that communist citizens would most likely become more receptive to 
Western ideas and values. 
   In an article entitled ‘Peaceful Engagement: A Plan for Europe’s Future’ written in 
1965, Brzezinski outlined his views as to how Eastern Europe might gravitate towards 
the West. He stated that ‘the more desirable sequence of change would begin with the 
internal liberalisation of the East European societies and lead toward their gradual 
evolution into a Greater Europe jointly with the Soviet Union.’174 
   What Brzezinski had in mind was that Eastern Europe could be gradually weaned 
away from the Soviet Bloc through economic incentive and cultural contact, leading 
eventually to political accommodation with the West.175 Brzezinski thus saw in the 
idea of inciting the East Europeans toward the West a more practical alternative to 
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stiff military competition and alliance formation. He favoured a carrot and stick 
approach to bringing about the seduction of East European countries into the Western 
orbit. He stated that:  
 
Whenever a country increases the scope of its external independence from Soviet 
control, or liberalises appreciably its domestic system, it should be rewarded. 
And similarly whenever an opposite trend develops, the West should be prepared 
to discontinue its assistance, withdraw special privileges (such as the U.S. “most-
favoured-nation" clause, a matter of vital importance to the East Europeans), and 
should not hesitate to indicate the real reasons involved.176 
 
   Robert Mark Spaulding wrote about what the U.S. policy was toward the 
Communist Bloc with regard to trade. He stated: ‘Because the Soviets valued trade 
with the West and because Western economies were generally not dependent on trade 
with the Soviets, Western governments found trade useful in devising the broad range 
of incentives and disincentives they applied across the East-West divide. By 
facilitating or impeding trade Western governments incentivised some behaviours, 
punished others, and signalled communist governments about the overall state of 
relations.’177 This carrot and stick approach was a useful means of directing the 
evolution of the Soviet Union on the part of the United States. The U.S. was in a 
position to coordinate their development as they were dependent upon the West for 
economic aid, thus Brzezinski was right in advocating a policy of using economic 
leverage to liberalise the Soviet Union and promote a convergence with the West.  
   Brzezinski therefore sought to separate the countries of Eastern Europe from the 
Soviet Bloc through gradual means and in an incremental fashion, beginning with 
cultural contacts, student exchanges, grants and aid given with stipulations for 
liberalisation and increased economic interdependence. As he put it:  
 
As direct Soviet control wanes, as East European nationalism (even under 
Communist leadership) reasserts itself, as the East-West dichotomy becomes less 
sharp, it should be an explicit goal of U.S. and Western policy to promote 
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multilateral political and economic relations, lest East Europe—and even all of 
Europe--become Balkanised.178 
 
   Brzezinski was in many ways a visionary for predicting the way in which Eastern 
Europe was likely to develop in its relations with the West. He knew that just as 
economic union preceded political union in the development of the founding states of 
the European Union, so a similar process would have to occur concerning the 
integration of Eastern Europe into the West.179  
   Brzezinski sought out any means to overcome the division between Western and 
Eastern Europe. He also argued for increased emigration of Eastern Europeans into 
the West to work in countries like France and Germany which demanded labour and 
argued that this would not only help to smooth over relations between the two blocs 
but would in time have ‘a profound effect on the East’ as labourers brought back 
stories of the opulence of Western society and inculcated the values of the West 
before spreading them throughout their own societies. Brzezinski clearly foresaw that 
Eastern and Western Europe would become integrated in the near future and he 
worked assiduously to bring this about, seeking out ways to enhance the cooperation 
of the two blocs and thus bind them together. Such an economic union would 
eventually lead to political union and have important ramifications for security 
between the two blocs. As Brzezinski put it:  
 
As long as the West is militarily strong and clear about its goals, we need not 
fear to extend to the Communist world a sincere offer of economic co-operation 
designed neither to strengthen nor to weaken those who have made themselves 
our adversaries, but to bind us all together so that we cannot consider warring 
against each other.180  
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The Fragile Blossom 
 
   The next work to be examined is The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan, 
which was written following Brzezinski’s return from a six month trip to Japan in 
early 1971 and its purpose was ‘to assess the role of this crucial Asian nation in an 
unstable world context.’181 Brzezinski’s stay in Japan helped to coalesce his view that 
closer ties between the developed nations was essential. He was broadening his 
horizons studying this pivotal Asian nation and becoming an international affairs 
expert for the purpose of studying its relationship to the United States and the rest of 
the world and, more importantly, for further integrating Japan into the West. 
   Brzezinski’s report of Japan analysed political, economic, security, and cultural 
matters and offered advice on how the U.S. should move forward in its relations with 
this highly significant East Asian country. First of all, Brzezinski described Japanese 
society in 1971 and referred to the fact that Japan had become a newly industrialised 
country with a capitalist system superimposed upon what was essentially a feudal 
society, after Japan’s state-led industrialisation that began following the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868.182 
   By this time, the Japanese had become the most technologically advanced of the 
Asian nations and Brzezinski went into considerable detail depicting their national 
character and the values that had helped them to excel in all spheres of life and in 
effect to catch up with the West. The Japanese evinced: ‘great discipline, extraordinary 
loyalty to one’s firm or business, and a very high rate of personal savings.’183 The 
Japanese have long been one of the most outstanding and indeed, highly competitive, 
nations of this world. Since the end of the Second World War they have adapted much 
of American culture as well as the American political system to their own country. The 
Americanization of Japan, however, has not come without criticism from a minority of 
Japanese, who feared the decline of indigenous Japanese culture as their own society 
became increasingly westernized. For example, Yukio Mishima, a Japanese political 
and literary figure, was opposed to “Americanized” Japan with, as Brzezinski pointed 
out ‘all its vulgarities, growing hedonism, lack of purpose, and crass concentration on 
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the material.’184 A significant number of Japanese sympathised with him, and also 
opposed “Americanization” of Japanese society.185  
   The three broad issues of Japanese politics in the post-war era, which the Liberal 
Democratic Party, the party that had been in power the longest in Japan, has had to 
grapple with were: economic recovery, alliance with the United States, and 
institutionalization of democracy. In terms of economic recovery, the Japanese 
success story is well known; the country has caught up with and overtaken many 
Western countries in terms of its GDP and manufacturing output. The Japanese, as 
Brzezinski mentioned: 
 
lead the world in shipbuilding, in electronic production (radios, cameras, and 
transistorized television sets), motorcycles, and a variety of other fields; they are 
second to the United States in such areas as computers, rayon, aluminium, steel, 
and so forth – and some Japanese have become almost intoxicated by it.186 
 
   Japan is in many ways the “Britain of the East,” the industrial power-house of East 
Asia, but with one exception. The Japanese do not possess sufficient quantities of raw 
materials and therefore rely for their industrial expansion upon imported steel and 
fuel. For this reason, Japan has a considerable stake in the American led free trade 
regime as it depends upon access to raw materials from all over the world, particularly 
oil from the Middle East. Japan thus has a stake in ensuring that trade in raw materials 
is not disrupted along the oceanic trade routes that link the Middle East with East 
Asia, especially the Straits of Malacca.  
   Currently, Japan’s most important trading partner is China, followed by the United 
States who, for most of the twentieth century, was the number one destination of 
Japanese exports and the source of most of Japan’s imports. The fate of the Japanese 
economy still remains closely intertwined with that of the United States. However, the 
economic relationship between the two countries has not been an entirely smooth one. 
Writing in 1971, Brzezinski noted presciently that ‘the textile crisis with the United 
States was an augury of things to follow; an automobile crisis could be next.’187 
Indeed, an automobile crisis did follow, whereby the saturation of Japanese 
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automobiles in the American market led to a backlash among Americans because of 
losses suffered by American automobile manufacturers. Brzezinski also accurately 
predicted that Japanese economic growth would slow down considerably in the years 
ahead, particularly from 1971 onwards. However, although Japanese economic 
growth did slow down, the country did continue to punch above its weight relative to 
the other industrialised nations.  
   In terms of its international standing, Japan in the 1970s was beginning to emerge 
from under the military umbrella of the United States and pursue a more assertive 
foreign policy. Brzezinski saw greater involvement in the United Nations as a fitting 
role for the Japanese, particularly with regard to peace-keeping.188 Indeed, only in 
very recent years, Japan has become actively involved in United Nations peace-
keeping operations overseas. It has provided aid to the troubled areas of the Middle 
East and continues to play a minor role outside of East Asia in seeking to uphold 
peace and international law. 
   In light of the fact that Japan had recovered from the devastation wrought by the 
Second World War and boomed economically, many Japanese felt that their country’s 
economic might should be matched with concomitant political power and Japanese 
influence abroad, especially in East Asia. Furthermore, as many in the U.S. advocated 
that the country scale down its military commitments overseas, the government there 
has been under pressure to rethink its pledge to defend Japan from external 
aggression and, in the event that the U.S. can no longer be relied upon to provide for 
Japan’s security, many in Japan felt that the Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF) 
should move in to fill the vacuum.189 
   Japan also found itself in a vulnerable position from a geopolitical perspective, 
being surrounded by China, Russia, and the United States who, in 1971, were three of 
the world’s most powerful states and who, in 2016, continue to exercise considerable 
influence over East Asian affairs.190 The Japanese sought to cultivate political 
relations with countries other than the United States and to expand their access to 
foreign markets and raw materials. A suitable role for Japan in Asia would be to act 
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as the leader of economic development throughout the region and to spearhead 
initiatives to promote economic growth amongst the less developed Asian nations.191 
   It is important to note that Japanese leadership of Asia does not necessarily mean 
Japanese domination. What Brzezinski had in mind in The Fragile Blossom was for 
Japan to become the preeminent Asian nation seeking to further integrate and develop 
the region without provoking a backlash of hostility from other Asian nations who had 
suffered mistreatment under the Japanese empire prior to the end of World War II. 
   Brzezinski also espoused the idea that Japan further integrate itself with the Western 
world or more precisely, America and Europe. He noted that this was the natural 
inclination of Japanese businessmen.192 This was in line with his concept that the three 
capitalist regions of the world must integrate and provide leadership for the global 
community. He thus came away from his trip to Japan convinced of the need to draw 
Japan further into the West so as to promote solidarity and joint cooperation amongst 
the industrial democracies. 
   Brzezinski made the point that Japan saw China as a prospective partner in Asia. 
Added to this, the sheer size of the Chinese market makes China a highly attractive 
trading partner to the Japanese, who would not only seek to export their goods to the 
Chinese but also avail of Chinese raw materials, cheap labour, and lastly seek to 
invest in the Chinese economy.193 
   Brzezinski warned that the U.S. should not cease to provide a security umbrella to 
the Japanese as to do so would encourage tendencies towards a more nationalist and 
militarist Japan. He also warned that should Japan revive its military capabilities it 
would not necessarily enhance its security as it could provoke a regional coalition 
amongst the country’s neighbours which, Brzezinski argued ‘would almost offset any 
additional element of national security thereby gained.’194 
   Brzezinski mentioned how the Nixon entente with China caused the Japanese to 
doubt the commitment of the United States to an alliance with their country, 
particularly as Nixon made this move without consulting the Japanese beforehand. 
The Japanese felt the United States was prioritising China over Japan and that the 
loyalty of the United States to Japan was in question. The “Nixon shocks” thus came 
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as a surprise to the Japanese and did damage to bilateral relations between the two 
countries. 
   Japan’s economic relationship to the United States is and has been heavily biased 
toward the Japanese, who import raw materials from the U.S. while exporting 
manufactured goods. Brzezinski was of the view that Japan should open its markets to 
more manufactured goods from the United States. At the time of writing, the 
economic relationship favoured the Japanese who reaped more profit from sales to the 
U.S. than that country did from sales to Japan. The Japanese flooded the U.S. market 
with goods such as cameras, radios, and televisions, which were of such good quality 
and at such a low price that they were able to seize a sizable share of the American 
market. 
  Brzezinski wrote of the general transformation of Japan that was taking place. He 
stated: 
 
Socially, Japan is moving from traditionalism to modernity; politically, from a 
representative democratic system, superimposed on a rather feudal pattern of 
authority and cliquism, to a more direct populist relationship between the leader 
and the masses, with more stress on personalist politics; in values, from a single-
faceted concentration on a common goal, reinforced by self-denying discipline, 
to a more complex and even conflicting set of objectives, involving both greater 
emphasis on national pride and on social good; internationally, from a posture of 
dependence to self-assertiveness.195 
 
   Brzezinski argued for a greater understanding amongst Americans of Japan and of 
the United States’ relationship to it, as it was the most important bilateral relationship 
in Asia. He also recommended diplomatic exchanges between the heads of state from 
both countries.196 While Brzezinski did acknowledge that Japan was an economic 
giant, being the second largest economy of the world at the time of writing, he 
observed that it was a political dwarf; Japan ‘is not a superpower and it is doubtful 
that it can become one.’197 However, Brzezinski believed Japan should be given a seat 
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on the UN Security Council and said it deserved one more so than France or 
Britain.198 
   Brzezinski made the point that to promote for the Japanese a role as leader of Asia 
would in effect increase Sino-Japanese rivalry. He did however state that the U.S., 
Japan, and China should work together to address the economic and social problems 
of the region as well as their common security concerns.199 It is interesting to note in 
this regard, that when Brzezinski was National Security Adviser he replaced the 
Nixon US-China-Russia triangle with a US-China-Japan one, to the exclusion of the 
Russians. 
   Brzezinski, writing of the importance of Japan to the capitalist world stated: ‘The 
emergence of the Common Market highlights the fact that, increasingly, the three 
economic pillars of possible global stability and cooperation are the United States, 
Japan, and Western Europe.’200 This was one of the main reasons for establishing the 
Trilateral Commission, as will be discussed in the next section. Indeed, Brzezinski 
proceeded to outline in detail the role such an organization of the capitalist countries 
could play in international affairs. He wrote:  
 
A wide cooperative framework, involving a gradual process of shaping a 
community of the developed nations, would put Japan in the front rank of a 
global effort to provide for more orderly and satisfactory international political 
and economic relations. Such a community of the developed nations would not 
be just a rich man’s club; indeed, one of its key purposes would be to undertake a 
more rational and cooperative effort to help the less developed countries. It 
would not – or should not – be meant to be a new anti-Communist alliance; 
indeed, by reducing the temptations in Moscow or Peking to play on national 
rivalries and by deliberately inviting Communist states into those areas of 
cooperation for which they are suited, either by the level of their development or 
by the particular location, the community of the developed nations would help to 
terminate gradually the ideological global civil war. For the American-Japanese 
relationship, a wider framework would have the added advantage of 
simultaneously encouraging the internationalization of Japan without that 
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internationalization being tantamount to Americanization. The latter is 
understandably resented; the former is needed.201 
 
   Brzezinski’s The Fragile Blossom offers an excellent analysis of Japan’s domestic 
and foreign policies, its role on the international stage and a vision of the direction in 
which he believed the country should be heading. He noted that Japan was to be 
counted among the capitalist nations at the forefront of the emerging ‘technetronic 
revolution,’ that its massive wealth placed upon the country a great responsibility to 
do more for the poorer nations of the world and finally that Japan was important to 
the U.S. as an ally, particularly because it is a democracy in a region in which 
democratic government has yet to fully take hold and develop.   
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Between Two Ages & The Trilateral Commission 
 
   The enlargement of the West is something Brzezinski had been a firm proponent of 
for most of his life. Indeed, Brzezinski wrote voluminously about the need for the 
capitalist world to integrate further and enlarge the scope of its influence. Brzezinski 
went from being a Sovietologist to gaining a more sophisticated understanding of the 
international system. He ‘…continued to publish, but he extended his realm of 
expertise to international affairs in general (Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the 
Technetronic Era, 1970), in order to become a more complete, more “universal” 
expert.’202 In 1973, along with David Rockefeller, Brzezinski would establish the 
Trilateral Commission. How this came about was the result of David Rockefeller 
having read Brzezinski’s work Between Two Ages. Rockefeller would then go on to 
propose the establishment of the Trilateral Commission at a Bilderberg meeting in the 
Netherlands.203 Justin Vaisse correctly pointed out that Brzezinski was the founder of 
the Trilateral Commission and that he came up with the idea. He stated: ‘Official 
historiography designates David Rockefeller as the creator of the Trilateral 
Commission, and it often leaves the impression that Rockefeller recruited Brzezinski 
for this enterprise. In reality, it was the other way around. Upon his return from Japan, 
in the second half of 1971, Brzezinski came up with the idea of a committee that 
would bring together American, European, and Japanese elites…’204  
   It was Brzezinski’s idea to promote the increased integration of the Western world 
for the sake of greater unity and also to transcend Cold War bipolarity and implement 
the globalist agenda. Dino Knudsen corroborated this when he stated: ‘In 1970, 
Brzezinski published an article in Foreign Affairs in which he stated: ‘A council 
representing the United States, Western Europe and Japan, with regular meetings of 
the heads of governments as well as some small standing machinery, would be a good 
start.’205 This was an important initiative not just in the context of the Cold War. 
These three regions were the wealthiest of the world and were in a position to steward 
global affairs and exert considerable influence. In the context of the Cold War, the 
establishment of the Trilateral Commission was an important initiative. George 
Kennan made the point that it was important not to let the industrialised regions of the 
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world fall into hostile hands. This was a policy adhered to by Brzezinski with regards 
to the setting up of the Trilateral Commission.206 Kennan had argued that so long as 
the U.S. secured the alliance of three of the five major industrialised regions (Britain, 
central Europe, and Japan), then the USSR would permanently be at a disadvantage. 
Credit for the establishment of the Trilateral Commission must chiefly go to 
Brzezinski for: ‘…it was Brzezinski rather than Rockefeller who played the leading 
role in outlining the Commission, particularly with regard to its theoretical 
foundations.’207 The agenda of the Trilateral Commission from the outset was to 
integrate the Western world and assert domination over the rest. One could also argue 
that secretly it was pursuing the establishment of a world government, which is what 
many believed it was in fact doing. As Dino Knudsen wrote: ‘The small group of men 
agreed to form what would become the TriCom, involving highly influential people in 
business, politics, and academia from North America, Western Europe, and Japan. 
Soon many saw the TriCom as constituting an embryonic or even shadow world 
government.’208 The agenda of the globalists is to bring about a world government or 
at least a global confederacy and the Trilateral Commission was designed as a useful 
facilitator to this end. Its purpose was to coordinate the political affairs of the three 
regions and also their interaction with the Second and Third Worlds. The Commission 
was designed with the specific purpose of advancing policy recommendations so as to 
mould the policies of Western governments and bring them in line with the agenda of 
the globalists. 
   It is worth pointing out that Brzezinski was the academic behind the Commission 
whereas Rockefeller was the funder. As Dino Knudsen stated: ‘It was the convergence 
of ideas from Brzezinski, the thinker, and from Rockefeller, the patron, that enabled 
the TriCom vision to be realised and it was these two men who became the architects 
of the Commission.’209 David Rockefeller’s endorsement and funding of the 
Commission is significant, as he was one of the heavy weight oil tycoons and the 
CEO of Chase Manhattan bank, whom many considered the financial kingpin of New 
York. With his backing, the Commission was sure to have considerable influence over 
not just America but world affairs generally speaking. 
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   The Trilateral Commission was innovative for its time. While elite gatherings of the 
West such as the Bilderberg group, had taken place before, the Trilateral Commission 
was the first such gathering to include Japan and therefore all of the capitalist world. 
It was geared toward giving policy recommendations, not unlike the Bilderberg group, 
however, it would manoeuver its members into power from the time of the Carter 
administration onwards and play a role in politics more significant than arguably any 
other private organisation.  
   As a method, the organisation was unique in trying to coalesce the views of the 
Western elite in order to bring their influence to bear on the governmental policies of 
their respective regions. It’s meetings as well as its policy recommendations would 
have a substantial impact upon the governments of the West, who would attempt to 
implement the Trilateralist agenda in their own countries and exercise influence in 
accordance with its recommendations throughout the rest of the world. As a method 
for gathering the elite from the West and having them shape political policy the 
organisation was very innovative and effective. It would go on to spur the formation 
of the G7 gathering of political elites from the great powers which would play an 
important role in solving major global issues, particularly concerning nuclear 
proliferation, climate change, and the global economy.   
   Concerning the theoretical foundations of the Trilateral Commission, In Between 
Two Ages, Brzezinski argued that there was a revolution occurring in the advanced 
sectors of the world heralding in a post-industrial age, which Brzezinski referred to as 
the ‘technetronic era.’ He described it thus:  
 
The transformation that is now taking place, especially in America, is already 
creating a society increasingly unlike its industrial predecessor. The post-
industrial society is becoming a “technetronic” society: a society that is shaped 
culturally, psychologically, socially, and economically by the impact of 
technology and electronics – particularly in the area of computers and 
communications.210  
 
   Brzezinski believed that the technetronic revolution, spearheaded by America, 
would eventually lead to an international consortium of the most developed nation-
states. Concerning the shift from the industrial to the postindustrial age: ‘The problem 
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was that that age had not fully arrived, and the crisis of modern societies could be 
explained by the in-between situation, the passage from one to the other, which was 
quite far along in the United States, less so in Europe and Japan, and even slower to 
reach the Soviet Union.’211 The Soviet Union was not leading the transition into the 
technetronic era as it was still largely an industrial society. It depended upon the West 
for high technology and did not have a large segment of its population employed in 
the services sector. Brzezinski understood that the U.S. above all was implementing 
the technetronic era that the elites presuppose is the new world order; a modern 
technotopia presided over by the global elite. As Andrianopoulos puts it: 
‘Brzezinski’s belief in America’s positive role in the world and the emergence of a 
global consciousness for the first time due to the impact of the technetronic revolution 
made him more optimistic than Kissinger about the eventual establishment of a 
community of the developed states and the creation of a new world order.’212 
   The speed of this technetronic revolution was already being seen to undermine 
traditional notions of sovereignty as nation-states became increasingly integrated 
economically owing to their shared dependence on technology and electronics, as 
seen, for example, in the areas of communications and the media.  
   Brzezinski envisioned the world as moving from sovereign nation states to an 
integrated international system governed by a body such as the United Nations. He 
believed the anarchic system of realpolitik was being replaced by a more cooperative 
system which would protect the interests of nation states under the auspices of some 
supranational organisation. ‘Today,’ Brzezinski wrote, ‘the old framework of 
international politics – with their spheres of influence, military alliances between 
nation-states, the fiction of sovereignty… is clearly no longer compatible with 
reality.’213 Here he was referring to the fact that transnational actors have gained such 
a preponderant influence that they are now in effect diminishing the role of the nation 
state. As Dino Knudsen succinctly put it: ‘Many reached the conclusion that the 
advanced capitalist economies were now so interdependent – due to world economic 
integration, including liberalisation of trade and lower transportation costs – that the 
nature of international relations had been altered and nation states were no longer self-
governing entities. The management of this interdependency became the raison d’etre 
                                                 
211 Vaisse, Zbigniew Brzezinski, p. 159 
212 Andrianopoulos, Kissinger and Brzezinski p.74 
213 Brzezinski, Between Two Ages, p.104 
 89 
of the TriCom.’214 The erosion of a state’s sovereignty in the modern world has 
resulted in a backlash against globalization however and many people from around 
the world are promoting their sovereign rights against the infringement of the 
globalists and multi-national corporations. 
   The influence of transnational actors has become so great, international banking 
cartels in particular, that no nation is immune from what transpires outside its borders. 
The global recession of 2008 is evidence of this. Foreign events now have a tangible 
impact upon a nation’s domestic affairs and as such the state has had to involve itself 
more so in international affairs in order to safeguard its domestic interests. As Daniel 
J. Sargent wrote:  
 
It was too soon to tell how this worldwide information grid would affect world 
politics, but Zbigniew Brzezinski, a political scientist, predicted the collapse of 
distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs. “Moral immunity to foreign 
events,” he argued, could not “be maintained” amid “the electronic infusion of 
global events into the home.” This was, in effect, Benenson’s gambit: that 
transnational opinion might be able to restrain the powers of sovereign 
governments.215  
 
   Thus the influence of foreign media corporations could sway the opinions of 
citizens, the international economy can directly affect a country’s domestic economy, 
and military alliances directly impinge upon a nation’s security; the point being that 
no nation is immune to international affairs and that each country has to adapt its 
foreign policy to the growing influence of external actors so as to ensure their 
interaction with their own country is beneficent and in their country’s interest. 
   The Trilateral Commission reflected a growing trend in international politics. The 
rise of transnational organisations and the influence they brought to bear upon 
governments. As globalization gathers pace, multinational corporations become so 
powerful that the financial clout they come to exercise can dwarf even that of 
governments. Thus they are capable of exercising a domineering influence over 
governments due to the power of money in the modern world. The multinational 
corporations have an internationalist agenda and are in favour of free trade; they are 
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opposed to protectionism and seek access to the markets and resources of the world 
without government interference. Thus nationalists with the goal of protecting a 
state’s resources from foreign exploitation or who seek to develop their own national 
industries and shield them from foreign competition are seen as a threat to the 
transnational elite, particularly of the West, and are considered by the Trilateral 
Commission to be an impediment to their agenda. Dino Knudsen captured the rise of 
this elite and what it was that was standing in their way: 
 
According to Brzezinski, politics was suffering from being constrained within 
the nation state. He described how the transnational aristocracy of earlier 
centuries had faded away, how Universalist ideologies and movements – the 
Christian Church, socialism, and communism – had become nationalised, and 
how a new transnational elite composed of international businessmen, scholars, 
professionals, and public officials was emerging. Before long, Brzezinski wrote, 
these elites would become “highly internationalist or globalist in spirit or 
outlook” and may easily come into conflict with the “politically activated 
masses” that were inclined to oppose cosmopolitanism with nativism.216 
 
   Dino Knudsen thus touched upon something of considerable significance. The 
backlash against globalization which takes the form of nativism or nationalism to be 
more precise. The meetings of the Trilateral Commission arouse controversy on the 
internet and there is always a crowd of anti-globalist protesters outside of them. The 
globalist agenda has a significant number of political opponents and does not march 
unimpeded toward a new world order but rather has to deal with a sizable activist 
opposition which seeks to halt their agenda and maintain the sovereign independence 
of their nation states. It is the goal of the elite to coax the general public into the 
globalist agenda and this is not subscribed to by a significant minority of people. The 
Trilateral Commission faces a serious challenge from nationalism in seeking to 
implement its globalist agenda and many nations will no doubt attempt to assert their 
sovereign rights to independence and freedom from being governed by some 
supranational authority or having their economies dominated by multinational 
corporations. The poor of the world understand that globalization further increases the 
gap between them and the rich and that they stand to lose from the Trilateral agenda. 
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They will thus look to their national governments to shield them from the influence of 
the transnational elite and in effect manage their economies in the interest of the 
people rather than foreign corporations. 
   The technetronic revolution had already made a single capitalist bloc out of the 
nations of Western Europe, Japan and the United States. What Brzezinski 
recommended in this book was that these three regions of the world, which comprise 
the most advanced and prosperous parts of the capitalist world, should take the lead in 
managing global affairs, stewarding the global economy and directing the evolution of 
the less developed regions of the world.217 Their growing interdependence so much as 
mandated this. Indeed, as Daniel Sargent argued: ‘The perforated sovereignty and 
diminished autonomy, Brzezinski argued, made it imprudent to conduct foreign policy 
as though the international system still comprised autonomous nation-states. His 
analysis echoed the conclusions of globalists like Lester Brown. Unlike them, 
Brzezinski focused on the implications for foreign policy. The industrialised countries 
would do best, Brzezinski concluded, if they coordinated their domestic policies and 
worked to manage interdependence.’218  
   Rockefeller and Brzezinski felt that, as far as the U.S. was concerned, ‘an era of 
overbearing American dominance was over.’219 They felt the U.S. would have to 
share power with the rest of the world in a multi-polar system, though one still led by 
the United States. As Sargent put it:  
 
The challenge for the United States, still primus inter pares among nation states, 
was to orchestrate an international order in which “the entire international 
community,” North, South, East, and West could participate. Doing this required 
embracing interdependence. First came the enhancement and deepening of “our 
collaboration with our friends in the industrial world.” This would facilitate a 
second objective, which was to expand opportunities “for the new emerging 
states to enhance, through self-reliance, their own internal progress.” In a third 
purpose, the Carter administration would involve the Communist countries in its 
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world order concept. “We shall seek cooperation with the communist countries, 
while striving to reduce areas of conflict.220  
 
   The Trilateral Commission was thus concerned with the First, Second, and Third 
Worlds and one could argue therefore that its scope was global and sought to reach 
into all regions of the world and exert political influence thereupon. As the Trilateral 
Commission was founded in the United States and funded by David Rockefeller: 
‘Many perceived the TriCom a US enterprise or even a US hegemonic tool.’221 This is 
somewhat justified. There are more multinational firms in the United States than in 
any other country and the U.S. is by far the wealthiest country in the world. Thus it is 
only natural that the U.S. should, and should be seen to, dominate the Trilateral 
Commission and its agenda. Many would argue that this organization comprised of 
private individuals is exercising an unwarranted interference in the affairs of Western 
governments, who should be more accountable to their people rather than to the 
intellectual and financial elite of their population who attend these meetings i.e. the 
top one per cent.  
   Brzezinski believed that the nations of the West should relinquish some of their 
sovereignty for the sake of creating a larger community which would be economically 
integrated and eventually led by representatives of the most influential sectors of the 
economy, banking, the media, politics and the military. The role of the multi-national 
corporation and private banks was to be enhanced as the power of the traditional 
nation-state would diminish. ‘International banks and multinational corporations’ 
Brzezinski wrote, ‘are acting and planning in terms that are far in advance of the 
political concepts of the nation-state.’222 Furthermore, Sargent wrote that: ‘Reflecting 
on the dynamics of his era, political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski discerned novel 
patterns. “Nation-states are losing their centrality,” he wrote in 1974, “amidst a shift 
from traditional international politics to a new global process.” The sensation of 
disjuncture in world affairs prompted some to contemplate the remaking of 
international order.’223 
   Many in the transatlantic elite felt that untamed nationalism led to international 
rivalry and no doubt Brzezinski was also of this view. Indeed, he would entitle one of 
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his books written after the end of the Cold War Out of Control in reference to the fact 
that the bipolar world had provided stability and the ensuing multipolar one could be 
chaotic. In forming the Trilateral Commission Brzezinski sought to consolidate the 
West and ensure that there was little or no division among its ranks. As Dino Knudsen 
wrote: ‘To promote this agenda and contain the global tendencies towards 
fragmentation and chaos that he had identified, Brzezinski proposed to form a 
community. It should be “less ambitious than a world government” but “more 
attainable.”224 In referring to the fact that this community of Western nations should 
be more attainable than a world government Brzezinski is more than likely referring 
to something he mentions in his subsequent writings; namely, the establishment of a 
global federation. This would no doubt be commendable if there were equal 
representation among the nations of the world and political power was decentralised 
and representative of the will of the people. However, the global community 
envisioned by the Trilateral Commission is one dominated by transnational elites and 
is not responsive to the popular will, by and large. It is akin to a guardianship more so 
than a democratic global community. Indeed the Trilateral Commission published a 
report entitled ‘The crisis of democracy’ in which its authors argued there was too 
much democracy and that power needed to be centralised. This would no doubt be 
resented by the rest of the public, who wish to see power decentralised so that they 
attain a greater level of influence over governmental policy. Dino Knudsen referred to 
the elite nature of the Trilateral Commission and their exclusive meetings when he 
wrote: ‘Later works in sociology have taken Pijl’s thesis one step further and argued 
that connected to globalization processes we are witnessing the emergence of a 
transnational bourgeoisie, a global ruling class, which becomes politically visible at 
elite gatherings.’225    
   The results of Brzezinski’s Between Two Ages were far reaching. In 1973, the 
Trilateral Commission was established by Brzezinski and David Rockefeller to fulfil 
the goals set out in this book. Their membership would comprise individuals from the 
most influential areas of society. The inauguration of the technetronic society would 
have serious ramifications for democracy and civil liberties, however. As Brzezinski 
stated:  
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Another threat, less overt but no less basic, confronts liberal democracy. More 
directly linked to the impact of technology, it involves the gradual appearance of 
a more controlled and directed society. Such a society would be dominated by an 
elite whose claim to political power would rest on allegedly superior scientific 
know-how. Unhindered by the restraints of traditional liberal values, this elite 
would not hesitate to achieve its political ends by using the latest modern 
techniques for influencing public behaviour and keeping society under close 
surveillance and control.226 
 
   While the Trilateral nations would apparently cede some of their sovereignty to 
have it vested into a private organisation such as the Trilateral Commission, the 
results within their societies would be an increasingly Orwellian and arguably 
totalitarian state, with an elite management of the economy that is increasingly subject 
to the influence of transnational organisations. Brzezinski described also how the 
masses are to be controlled in such a society: 
 
In the technetronic society the trend seems to be toward aggregating the 
individual support of millions of unorganised citizens, who are easily within the 
reach of magnetic and attractive personalities, and effectively exploiting the 
latest communication techniques to manipulate emotions and control reason.227  
 
   The kind of society described in Between Two Ages appears as a technocratic 
dictatorship, where scientific know-how is exploited by elites to keep the masses in 
check and to suppress rebellion through harnessing the latest technologies of 
surveillance and control.228 The book is slightly bizarre as it envisions altering human 
nature to refashion the individual into a so-called ‘modern man.’ It is also a work of 
futurology, envisioning the evolution of Western society into a post-industrial 
technotopia. For someone who spent his life battling totalitarianism there are strange 
elements of support for totalitarian government within the work, such as manipulating 
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emotions and controlling reason and controlling the masses to keep them in 
obedience. 
   The Trilateral Commission has received a lot of criticism since its inception owing 
to the fact that it is a private organisation which seems to exert an inordinate amount 
of influence over the policies of democratically elected governments in the Western 
World. Many have claimed it was established for the sole purpose of bringing about a 
world-government, but Brzezinski dismisses such opinions as fantastical and far-
fetched. He stated: ‘Contrary to the current myth, the Trilateral Commission is not a 
conspiracy designed to dominate the world but genuinely strives to engage 
Americans, Western Europeans, and Japanese in a common endeavour to shape a 
more cooperative world. Many of its sessions and papers are dedicated to such themes 
as aid for the developing countries, arrangements for the fairer exploitation of the 
oceans, or programs to delay or halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons.’229  
   In 1973, Brzezinski became the executive director of the North American branch of 
the commission. This branch would retain a predominant influence over the 
commission as a whole and would spearhead the TriCom’s mission of bringing about 
a new world order. As Daniel Sargent wrote:  
 
Americans would nonetheless exercise a guiding influence on the commission 
through Brzezinski, whom the group appointed to be the executive director. “For 
the first time in the history of mankind,” Brzezinski explained in a 1973 
statement of the commission’s purpose, “a global political process is surfacing, a 
process that is still quite shapeless.” The Trilateral Commission would strive to 
give it form by cultivating “among concerned Americans, Japanese, and 
Europeans the habit of working together.” The ultimate goal would be would be 
“to arrive at agreed and workable trilateral policies designed not only to enhance 
closer trilateral cooperation but also to progress toward a more just global 
community.230 
 
   Conspiracy theorists view the Trilateral Commission as an organisation comprised 
of the elite of the West that is determined to bring about a totalitarian world 
government. They see it as being a sinister and megalomaniacal enterprise and oppose 
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it vehemently on the internet, decrying what they regard as its usurpation of 
democracy, its secrecy, and excessive interference and meddling in Western 
government’s affairs. Dino Knudsen provided a portrayal of how the Trilateral 
Commission came to earn criticism from conspiracy theorists. He wrote: 
 
Because of its elite character and the fact that its meetings took place behind 
closed doors, the TriCom provoked fierce reactions and controversy since its 
inception. As a consequence, the public view of the TriCom stems largely from 
myths about its activities. Conspiracy theories about the Commission have been 
published in their volumes and in many languages. Today, they are rampant, 
partly due to the Internet. However, the TriCom’s shadowy image resulted not 
only from conspiracy theories but also from sensational media coverage. When 
Carter assumed the US Presidency and included a large number of 
Commissioners in his administration, magazines such as Penthouse and Saturday 
Night accused the TriCom of usurping US democracy, including portraying 
Brzezinski as an American Mao Zedong.231 
 
   In an interview with Brian Lamb on C-Span conducted in 1989, Brzezinski was 
asked to address the belief held by a significant number of Americans that the 
Trilateral Commission is a conspiracy of elites designed to bring about a world 
government. Brian Lamb put the question to Brzezinski thus: ‘you mentioned 
something earlier that you’ve done that comes up right in the spot that you’re sitting 
many times by our callers across the country and that is a suspicion that there is a 
conspiracy through the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations. 
You ran the Trilateral Commission for how long?’ Brzezinski then responded by 
saying: ‘About three years I think. Something like that. Three years. Not only did I 
run it I helped to found and organise it with David Rockefeller so if any of our 
viewers are conspiratorially minded here is one of the conspirators.’ In saying ‘here is 
one of the conspirators,’ while it being ironically humorous, Brzezinski seemed to 
some to be admitting that there is a conspiracy through these two organisations.  
   Brian Lamb then queried Brzezinski on the size of the organization: ‘Lets talk about 
if for just a moment. How big is it? How many people physically belong to the 
Trilateral Commission?’ To which Brzezinski responded:  
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   When we first started it and let me repeat again so the viewers will know what 
we’re talking about – it’s a North American, Western European, and Japanese 
organization to promote closer contacts between these three regions of the world 
and the Commission is composed of private citizens not government officials 
who are leaders in the different sectors of society. So when we first started we 
sought a commission of about sixty people and initially when I was first helping 
to organise it we had a hard time recruiting those sixty people because it was a 
brand new idea which the two of us had thought of, Rockefeller and I. Now we 
have 360 people with an enormous waiting list. It’s been an eminently successful 
operation obviously filling a major need for a community of dialogue and 
cooperation between these three regions. We are incidently the ones who 
proposed originally the holding of the annual summit meeting between the 
industrial democracies… that was an idea that originated with us in the Trilateral 
Commission.232 
 
   Brian Lamb then asked Brzezinski how one becomes a member of the Trilateral 
Commission, to which Brzezinski replied: ‘You become a member by invitation 
issued by the respective executive committees of the Commission. The Commission is 
360 members. The smaller executive committee – the executive committee has its 
own regional sort of identity so if you want to become a member of the American one 
the North American executive committee has to invite you. I say North American 
because this is both a Canadian and U.S. activity.’ Finally, addressing the views held 
by many of his callers that this is a sinister organization Brian Lamb queried 
Brzezinski: ‘Is there any reason for the audience to think that this is a bad 
organization, that it conspires to… and I want to make sure I represent what they 
say… that this group really guides the foreign policy of this country?’ Brzezinski then 
responded and in doing so laid bare his own feelings concerning those who 
disapprove of the organization. He stated: 
 
Well you know I can tell you even better what this group represents… what 
people think this group represents, people who are conspiratorially-minded 
because I encounter that all the time when I speak around the country and the 
kooks that pop up with this theory come either from the extreme loony left wing 
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or the loony right wing perspective. If it’s a loony right-winger, he will stand up 
and say you are a conspiracy of people who want to impose one world 
government and deprive us of our sovereignty and if it’s an extremely loony left-
winger he will stand up and say you’re a conspiracy of rich capitalists who want 
to control the world for the sake of global profits…………. The answer is the 
Commission operates openly, there’s nothing secret about it. It is a group of 
influential people, we don’t hide that, on the contrary we deliberately want 
influential people from the three regions who try to deal with the problems the 
three regions encounter, by discussion, by promotional studies, by advocacy…. 
We have advocated over the years debt relief for the poor countries of the world, 
we have advocated a variety of aid programs for the Third World, we have 
advocated closer cooperation in science between our industrial democracies. We 
are by and large in favour of a free trade arrangement, we are against 
protectionism and tariffs. We have currently a major study going on in East-West 
relations produced by authors from the three regions. I think we perform a useful 
educational function and if any viewer who is watching me wants to explore this 
so-called conspiracy all he has to do is to write to the office of the Commission 
and it will give him whatever papers he wants. There is nothing secret about 
it.233 
 
Dino Knudsen alluded to the fact that many in the public felt the Trilateral 
Commission was in effect trying to hijack the government of the United States.  He 
stated: ‘There were also politically motivated attacks on the Commission adding to 
this picture, such as when the staunchly conservative Barry Goldwater in the late 
1970s pronounced the TriCom to be concerned with “seizing control of the political 
government of the United States.” Later, Reagan’s election campaign echoed some of 
these allegations and did much harm to the TriCom’s public image. Leftist critiques in 
general argued that the TriCom was a capitalist instrument while the rightists argued 
that it constituted a secret world government. In reality, it was the absence of a 
sovereign authority – a world government or a global federation – that spurred the 
formation of the TriCom and made it possible and relevant for it to operate.’234 These 
allegations would appear to be true as the Trilateral Commission is concerned with 
moulding the policies of Western governments and having them act in the interests of 
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the elite. Whether it sought to hijack the government of the United States or not is 
debatable. However, there were twenty-five members of the commission in the Carter 
administration so this would attest to the fact that this group had more influence over 
the national government than any other private organisation. 
   Although its members try to avoid the appellation, the Trilateral Commission is a 
“rich man’s club” and is determined to consolidate elite control over society, as the 
conspiracy theorists allege. Justin Vaisse referred to this element of the Trilateral 
Commission which fed conspiracy theories. He wrote: ‘The organization thought up 
by Brzezinski and his friends in the fall of 1971 had thus not avoided certain 
criticisms they had anticipated and dismissed in advance. But more than the “rich 
man’s club” theme, it was the theme of elitism that fed conspiracy theories and the 
suspicions of populists on the right and on the left.’235 
    The organisation comprises an impressive list of attendees from some of the most 
influential sectors of society and has been known to serve in crystallising elite opinion 
on a variety of global issues prior to any action being taken by the government. That 
is to say that the Trilateral Commission arguably formulates policy that is later 
implemented by governments, which suggests that it is, to some extent, pulling the 
strings from behind the scenes. This viewpoint is further reinforced by the fact that 
Brzezinski alludes to the policy-making role of the Trilateral Commission in stating: 
‘we are engaged in a rather ambitious effort to develop a more enduring American-
Japanese-European relationship, through the device of joint policy planning and 
public education.’236 This statement shows that the aim of the Trilateral Commission 
is to devise policies for western governments, that is to say it is engaged in policy 
formulation which governments of the three regions will then implement, and is more 
than just an advisory group. It seeks rather to mould the policies of Western 
governments. The following statement by Dino Knudsen further proves that the aim 
of the Trilateral Commission is to directly influence governments: ‘An important 
theme for the TriCom organizers was the output of the Commission. Although 
Rockefeller hoped to produce some “new thinking” in the Commission, he thought 
that the process of trilateral “conclusion-reaching” was more important than original 
research; the Commission should not aim to produce books, similarly to the projects 
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of the Council on Foreign Relations, but rather “agreed reports and 
recommendations.”237 
   The Trilateral Commission exercises a domineering and arguably a stewardship role 
over Western governments, in that it debates major policies, decides 
recommendations, and places its members into high office to see that they are 
implemented. The following statement confirms this: ‘It was concluded that the 
Commission would have to be “oriented towards practical action and not research 
alone, and should work vigorously to assure that its recommendations were 
implemented by the appropriate national governments and international 
organizations.’238 
   It is clear from the evidence thus far presented that the Trilateral Commission is 
more than just an advisory body. It is the financial and intellectual elite of the Western 
world attempting to shape the policymaking of their respective governments. Dino 
Knudsen referred to this thrust of the Commission when he stated Kohnstamm, one of 
the European executive directors: ‘wanted the Commission not just to assist, but to 
push governments.’239 
   From 1973 until 1976 Brzezinski served as the director of the North American 
regional committee. Brzezinski was of the view that only America, being the 
strongest of the Western powers, was in a position to galvanise support for Trilateral 
cooperation and that America’s input, for the sake of promoting unity amongst the 
Trilateral nations, was absolutely essential.240 Brzezinski also believed that the onset 
of the technetronic era was rendering the preceding era of nation states obsolete and 
that, furthermore, the political integration of the capitalist countries of the world 
would work to the detriment of the Soviet Union. As Andrianopoulos put it:  
 
Brzezinski was convinced that trilateral cooperation was possible because the 
advanced countries share both common security concerns and certain political-
philosophical assumptions, and have the needed economic and technological 
resources. Hence, they should shape, though not necessarily coordinate, their 
policies with broader concerns in mind than the dictates of national interest 
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alone. Such cooperation appealed to Brzezinski because he felt that Soviet 
opposition to it could neither prevent it nor exploit it.241 
 
   The Trilateral Commission was also to play a role in bringing to an end the Cold War. 
The Commission sought to herald in the post-industrial age in the West and eclipse the 
Soviet Union in the race to institute their universal creed as the dominant socio-political 
doctrine of the world. It promoted unity among Western powers that was essential if the 
West was to face down the Soviet threat. As Justin Vaisse wrote:  
 
It was because America had reached a more advanced historical stage in its 
development, because it was already between two ages (and not stuck in the 
industrial age) that it ran into turmoil. But that phase was only transitory: there 
would soon be as much distance between the United States and the USSR as 
there was between industrial societies and agrarian societies. Historic 
inevitability, in other words, was switching sides. What was inscribed in material 
and social reality was not the Soviet Union catching up with and overtaking the 
United States (Nikita Khrushchev’s “we will bury you”), but the Soviet Union’s 
bogging down with a promise of implosion.242 
 
   The Trilateral Commission thus sought to hasten the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
was a tacit alliance between the Western elite versus the communist bloc. The 
Commission followed Brzezinski’s advice and sought to disentangle the Eastern 
European countries from the Soviet Union. This was one means of ending the Cold War 
short of military conflict and would speed up the process of integrating the East into the 
rest of the world. As Dino Knudsen wrote: 
 
The idea of having an open attitude towards the socialist countries was in line 
with Brzezinski’s thinking in Between Two Ages. If the Eastern European 
countries were brought closer to the West, the Soviet Union would either have to 
follow its satellites or lose them altogether and this, Brzezinski believed, could 
help “terminate the civil war” that had “dominated international politics among 
the developed nations for the last two hundred and fifty years.243 
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   Through his service as executive director of the North American branch of the 
Trilateral Commission Brzezinski exerted a certain degree of influence over the 
worldviews of its members.244 It was through membership of the Trilateral 
Commission that a relatively unknown governor of Georgia named Jimmy Carter 
would receive his nomination to run for the presidential candidacy in 1976.245 This is 
both a remarkable and an unprecedented occurrence, demonstrating the heavy-weight 
influence this recently established private organisation had acquired in the U.S. 
political arena. Peter Kuznick noted that ‘Brzezinski and Rockefeller saw something 
in Carter that convinced them he was worth cultivating and got behind his candidacy 
early.’246 The Carter administration was in one sense a TriCom administration that 
sought to transcend the traditional Cold War bipolarity and inaugurate a post-Cold 
War world that focused upon interdependence and the ushering in of globalization. As 
Daniel J. Sargent wrote: ‘The Carter administration, as one aide put it, committed 
itself to making “the world safe for interdependence.” The only Democrat to occupy 
the White House between 1969 and 1993, Carter embraced a conception of “world 
order politics” that enjoyed support in his party and drew upon his experiences in the 
Trilateral Commission. What Carter attempted as President was novel in relation to 
his Cold War forebears but exemplary of contemporary ideas.’247 Jimmy Carter was 
thus the first Trilateral Commission president. 
   Carter seems to have required an adviser with foreign policy expertise as ‘he 
brought to the White House no foreign policy experience.’ Indeed, George C. Herring 
wrote that: ‘his views were formed in a crash course provided through Trilateral 
Commission meetings.’248 Furthermore, as Lubowski pointed out, Brzezinski 
performed an important service for President Carter in that he ‘not only taught him 
and polished him like an uncut diamond… he also made him credible in the eyes of 
the elite.’249 When elected to the White House, Carter included no less than twenty-
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five fellow members of the Trilateral Commission within his administration, some of 
whom occupied the highest positions.250  
   In his memoirs, Brzezinski stated: ‘All the key foreign policy decision makers of the 
Carter administration had previously served in the Trilateral Commission.’251 Indeed, 
the Carter administration ‘showed the imprint of the Trilateral Commission.’252 Justin 
Vaisse correctly pointed out that the top members of the Carter administration were 
exclusively Trilateral Commission members when stating ‘Carter named only 
trilateralists to key positions in his administration.’253 
   Furthermore, Brzezinski helped to cultivate Trilateral Commission members for 
positions in government. As Daniel J. Sargent wrote: ‘The Trilateralists also worked 
to build connections to government officials. Such approaches were easy to make; 
many of the Trilateralists had worked in government. Brzezinski cultivated political 
leaders, sending them encouraging notes, often attaching his own articles.’254 It was 
Brzezinski, though, who would become the President’s right hand man and who 
would retain the greatest share of influence in Carter’s foreign policy team. As John 
Orman pointed out, throughout Carter’s years in office ‘Brzezinski’s presence was 
pervasive in the national security and foreign policy arena. He is never really 
challenged for access to the president.’255 Indeed, Brzezinski was in direct contact 
with President Carter for the four years of his term. He stated: ‘Coordination is 
predominance. I learned that lesson quickly. And the key to asserting effective 
coordination was the right of direct access to the President, in writing, by telephone, 
or simply by walking into his office. I was one of three Assistants who had such 
direct access at any time, not subject to anyone’s control.’256  
   In addition to having direct access to the President almost every day he was in office, 
Brzezinski was also the one who alone presented the President’s Daily Briefing to 
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Carter each day. He wrote: ‘From the very first day of the Presidency, I insisted that 
the morning intelligence briefing be given to the President by me and by no one 
else…..I continued to brief the President alone during the entire four years.’257 This 
action increased Brzezinski’s influence over the President significantly as he was the 
main person responsible for not only going through the President’s Daily Brief with 
Carter but also in shaping his response to it and what policies were to be put forth. As 
Peter Kuznick put it: ‘Brzezinski quickly instituted a significant change in procedure 
that allowed him to exert inordinate influence on the president. Whereas in the past, a 
top CIA official had given the President’s Daily Brief, Brzezinski arranged to do this 
himself, with no one else present.’258 
   President Carter wrote in his White House Diary that Brzezinski was his principle 
foreign policy adviser. He stated: ‘Zbig had been my primary foreign affairs advisor 
during my presidential campaign and continued in this role as national security 
advisor. He and I were in close contact throughout each day and had an excellent 
personal relationship.’259 
   In his memoirs, Carter also mentioned the fact that he got along really well with 
Brzezinski and that the two of them enjoyed a cordial, one could even say intimate, 
relationship: 
 
To me, Zbigniew Brzezinski was interesting. He would probe constantly for new 
ways to accomplish a goal, sometimes wanting to pursue a path that would be ill-
advised – but always thinking. We had many arguments about history, politics, 
international events, and foreign policy – often disagreeing strongly and 
fundamentally – but we still got along well. Next to members of my family, Zbig 
would be my favourite seatmate on a long-distance trip; we might argue, but I 
would never be bored.260 
 
  It is worth noting that Brzezinski was ardently anti-Communist and that this would 
colour the administration’s approach to the Soviet Union given that he was the 
president’s right-hand man. As Justin Vaisse pointed out: ‘… the Moscow press 
attacked him quite frequently, starting in the early 1960s, and his image among the 
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top Soviet leadership is revealed by a declassified report dating from 1978: “Dr. 
Brzezinski was seen as the arch enemy, a man not to be trusted. This perception was 
based on several factors: On what was seen as a past record in academic life of 
speaking and writing against the Soviets; on the fact that he was a Sovietologist and 
the view that Sovietologists as a genre are anti-Soviet; and on the fact that he was of 
Polish ancestry. He could thus be expected to continue to be anti-Soviet in his new 
position… Both Gromyko and Dobrynin interpreted the appointment of Dr. 
Brzezinski as an indication that an inexperienced President Carter might come under 
the influence of anti-Soviet adviser.’261 
   Carter once admitted prior to running for president that he had been an ‘eager 
student’262 of Brzezinski and when finally introducing him to the members of his 
cabinet the day after the presidential inauguration, the president stated: 
 
The last person I would like to introduce to the audience and to the nation is the 
one who, among all others, has helped me most to learn about foreign policy… 
He will be my closest adviser in tying together our economics, foreign policy, 
and also defence matters… He will put together the most intimate preparations 
for any kind of crisis that affects our Nation.263 
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Fig. 1 Zbigniew Brzezinski & David Rockefeller at a gathering of the Trilateral 
Commission 
 
Fig 2. The Logo of the Trilateral Commission 
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Fig. 3 U. S. President Jimmy Carter & National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Washington D.C., 1977 
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3) The Carter Administration  
 
Background 
 
   The focus of this chapter is upon the policies formulated and implemented by 
Brzezinski during the Carter administration from 1977 to 1981. More specifically, it 
deals with the issues of human rights, the use of soft power through Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty in Soviet Eastern Europe, the normalization of relations 
with China as well as the Soviet-Afghan War. While not every issue Brzezinski was 
involved can be examined, priority is given to the three central strategic fronts 
(Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia) on which Brzezinski sought to curtail Soviet 
influence. Brzezinski was in many ways the guiding light during the Carter years and 
the policies he had recommended for breaking up the Soviet Union in his writings and 
during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, he now had the chance to 
implement directly.  
   In running for president, Jimmy Carter pledged to bring honesty back into politics 
with a slogan that declared ‘I will never lie to you’ and also used to political 
advantage his lack of official connections in Washington. Indeed, Carter’s 
untarnished reputation and quaintly informal approach to politics suggested to most 
Americans that he represented a departure from the policies of the two former 
Republican administrations. The Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal had 
damaged the international standing of the United States and brought its political 
system into disrepute. Promising change, President Carter set out to restore the trust 
of the American people in their government, to champion American ideals worldwide 
and ‘he tried to apply the trilateral approach to his foreign policy.’264 Although 
considered to be an outsider by the American electorate, the “insider” or 
establishment Trilateral Commission were in fact manoeuvring one of their own 
groomed political candidates into power, as was shown in the previous section. 
   The 1970s were in many ways dismal for the United States. In particular, the oil 
embargo, the loss in Vietnam, and the realisation that power would have to be shared 
with four other great powers instead of being exercised predominantly by the U.S. in 
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a bipolar world, awakened Americans to the fact that their nation was susceptible to 
international crises and not incapable of being militarily defeated. Nancy Mitchell 
corroborated this point when she wrote: 
 
Despite the disco music, the garish polyester, the drugs, and the sexual 
revolution of the 1970s, the global politics of the decade were, for Americans, 
somber. They grappled with failure in Vietnam and strategic parity with the 
Soviet Union; they faced the Arab oil embargo and growing economic 
competition from the European Community and Japan. They suffered through 
Watergate, the congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), and stagflation. There seemed to be weekly reminders that the United 
States was losing power and influence.265 
 
   However, when the Carter administration came into power, things began to improve 
in the sense that the tide was turned against the Soviet Union and the groundwork was 
laid for the Reagan offensive of the 1980s. The United States could be said to have 
rebounded from its post-Vietnam malaise and pursued victory in the Cold War more 
vigorously. 
   Carter also maintained following his inauguration that the promotion of American 
values worldwide would be a central tenet of his administration. As Best, Hanhimaki, 
Maiolo, and Schulze put it: ‘When he won the November 1976 presidential election 
Carter assured the nation that he would restore moral principles and human rights as 
the principal ideas guiding foreign policy.’266 In relation to the posture he would 
adopt toward the Soviet Union, with the guidance of Brzezinski, who was by now 
National Security Adviser, the United States would undertake a new course - placing 
human rights high on the agenda and initiating a foreign policy that was now openly 
critical of both the domestic and the international conduct of the Soviet Union. This 
was a departure from the traditional policy of containment as formed by George 
Kennan. Whereas Kennan had argued that the U.S. ought not to involve itself in the 
internal affairs of the Soviet Union, Brzezinski and Carter would depart from this, 
become heavily involved in supporting dissidents, and take the Cold War to the 
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Soviet home ground.267 While Kennan did support covert action, the use of economic 
pressure, as well as propaganda to bring about change in the Soviet Union, he stopped 
short of intervening in Soviet internal affairs. Carter would publicly support Soviet 
dissidents and would step up dramatically American assistance to them inside the 
communist bloc, as well as implement Brzezinski’s policy of “peaceful engagement” 
to reward those states which showed a degree of independence from Moscow.  
   Carter sought to transcend traditional containment and usher in a new approach to 
waging the Cold War. As John Lewis Gaddis put it:  
 
Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977 determined to reverse the 
preoccupation with containment that had dominated American foreign policy for 
so many years. The time had come, he insisted, to move beyond the belief “that 
Soviet expansion was almost inevitable but that it must be contained,” beyond 
“that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator 
who joined us in that fear,” beyond the tendency “to adopt the flawed and 
erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our 
own values for theirs,” beyond the “crisis of confidence” produced by Vietnam 
and “made even more grave by the covert pessimism of some of our leaders.”268 
 
   Brzezinski had argued in Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics in 1962 that the 
United States should pursue foreign policies that would serve to rouse nationalist 
sentiments within the Soviet Bloc, entice member-states to identify politically with 
the West and also widen the cultural and ethnic cleavages of the Communist camp. 
Fifteen years later as arguably the most influential statesman in the White House next 
to the President, Brzezinski was in a position he would later recall ‘where I could 
apply my notions much more directly and authoritatively for four years.’269 There is 
no doubt that Brzezinski seriously intended to work to the detriment of the Soviet 
Union upon becoming National Security Adviser. A White House Aide once quoted 
Brzezinski as saying he enjoyed being “the first Pole in 300 years in a position to 
really stick it to the Russians.”270  
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   The Carter administration entered the White House with an utter determination to 
bring about the liberation of Soviet Eastern Europe, and this drive and enthusiasm to 
do so largely stemmed from Brzezinski, the President’s right-hand man. As discussed 
earlier, it was Brzezinski’s lifelong mission to bring down the Soviet Union and once 
he became National Security Adviser he applied all his skills and knowledge 
passionately to this end. Overseeing the National Security Council, Brzezinski took 
charge of the general thrust of national security policy and coordinated the overall 
conduct of the Cold War for the administration. He was also in charge of the Special 
Coordination Committee, which instigated covert activities and crisis management. 
Through this committee, Brzezinski would spearhead a campaign to attack the 
internal legitimacy of the Soviet Union, in particular Central Asia, through fomenting 
nationalism and ethnic unrest. Thus, right from the outset of the presidency, 
Brzezinski acted covertly with utter determination to inflict maximum damage upon 
the Soviet Union while, at the same time, pursuing cooperative relations on a state-to-
state level. The Carter administration’s conduct of the Cold War was a mixture of 
conflict and cooperation, as had been the case with previous administrations, but in 
the area of conflict, Brzezinski was very much in the driver’s seat and the intensity of 
the conflict was stepped up considerably. 
   As Brzezinski was Carter’s principal foreign policy adviser, it is not surprising that 
many of Carter’s policies in this area reflected the prescriptions being advocated by 
him over the decades preceding his taking up of the position of National Security 
Adviser.271 Indeed, not to diminish the input of Carter over his presidency, for he 
clearly did exercise personal control over affairs and was responsible for a large 
number of policies as well as leading the nation more generally throughout the time 
he was in office. Yet it must be pointed out that, as Brzezinski was an expert on 
international affairs whose views were more authoritative than those of the President, 
it was only natural that Carter was so deferential to him. 
   When the Carter administration assumed office, there were three overarching 
principles it sought to implement. These are elucidated by Justin Vaisse as follows: 
 
The United States thus had to have three priorities. First, it had to shape more 
cooperative relations among the democracies of Europe and Japan, a condition 
sine qua non for strengthening their power and for a good response to the other 
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two priorities. Second, it had to increase North-South cooperation and encourage 
development, seeking especially to separate the radical nations from the 
moderate ones. Finally, it had to find an accommodation with the Eastern bloc. 
“East-West accommodation should be a major purpose of American policy, for 
the East-West conflict bears directly on the problem of human survival. The 
ideological as well as political conflict between the West and the Soviet Union 
will go on but one should strive gradually to moderate it. To achieve that 
moderation both vigilance as well as cooperation will be necessary. 
Consequently, the maintenance of a strong American military deterrent is a 
necessary precondition for a stable, increasingly comprehensive as well as a 
reciprocal détente.272 
 
   Jimmy Carter’s presidency is particularly associated with American values and their 
promotion worldwide. Support for democracy as a counterforce to the spread of 
communism was an important aspect of his administration’s agenda, and this dates to 
Kennan. As John Lewis Gaddis wrote: ‘Democracy at home might not require the 
existence of a completely democratic world, but neither could it survive in one that 
was completely totalitarian: the United States did have a vital interest in the continued 
independence of at least some nations resembling it.’273 To Carter and Brzezinski, the 
encouragement of democratic political procedures around the world was an important 
means of not only containing communism but also safeguarding American national 
security through ensuring that regimes hostile to the United States did not emerge 
anywhere in the world. The democratic peace theory factors into this. The U.S. felt 
that it would have cordial relations with other democratic countries whereas 
totalitarian regimes were inherently aggressive and represented a threat to their 
national security. Democracies have not been known to go to war with each other 
therefore the U.S. therefore the U.S. did not feel the promotion of democracy would 
be detrimental to its interests. The policy of promoting the Western socio-political 
system inside the Soviet bloc in order to fragment it was recommended by Kennan in 
1948 though had not been pursued with such voracity until Carter came into power. 
While economic aid had been given to the communist countries before Carter, 
following his inauguration the administration dramatically stepped up its support for 
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the political liberalisation and economic independence of the eastern bloc from 
Moscow. In 1948, Kennan wrote that:  
 
It has been our conviction that if economic recovery could be brought about and 
public confidence restored in western Europe – if western Europe, in other 
words, could be made the home of a vigorous, prosperous, and forward looking 
civilization – the communist regimes in Eastern Europe would never be able to 
stand the comparison, and the spectacle of a happier and more successful life just 
across the fence… would be bound in the end to have a disintegrating and 
eroding effect on the communist world.274 
 
   Carter and Brzezinski both believed that the sheer example of the West, in particular 
it’s political liberties and economic prosperity, would suffice in drawing the satellite 
states away from Moscow’s control and entice them to Westernise. This strategy dates 
to Kennan but was implemented with especial resolve during the Carter 
administration as countries that liberalised their political systems and pursued 
economic independence from Moscow were rewarded whereas others that did not 
were refused aid. Carter and Brzezinski thus made especial use of soft power to help 
liberate the Soviet Union from Russian domination and this was very much in line 
with the earlier writings of Brzezinski. Furthermore, Carter believed human rights 
could be used as a weapon against the Soviets all the while the relationship would 
continue as before. As John Lewis Gaddis wrote: ‘He thought he could embrace the 
cause of dissidents in the Soviet Union, with all that implied in terms of interfering in 
the internal affairs of that country, and still continue “business as usual” on other 
issues.’275 
   The Carter administration must also be situated in the context of the Nixon and 
Ford administrations and the changing circumstances of the Cold War. Jimmy Carter 
portrayed himself above all as a moral leader to offset the damage done by the corrupt 
and unprincipled Richard Nixon. He intended to practice transparent diplomacy as 
opposed to Kissinger’s secretive back-channel diplomacy. Upon entering office it was 
his goal to maintain détente however he wanted to transform US-Soviet relations 
from the previous period of conflict and competition to one of peace and cooperation. 
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However Brzezinski was ultimately determined to dismantle the Soviet Bloc and 
liberate Eastern Europe.  So while Carter sought to transcend containment and 
promote peaceful relations at the outset of his presidency, it needs to be stressed that 
for Brzezinski, the NSC and other hawks in the administration the goal was to do 
utter and irreparable damage to the Soviet Union so as to hasten the Cold War’s 
conclusion.  
   Carter was passionate about championing American values worldwide and seeing to 
it that the U.S. did not settle for the international status quo but rather sought to 
transform the nature of states from dictatorships to democracies and from human 
rights abusers to ones respectful of their citizens’ rights. He sought to uphold 
international law, promote democracy and civil rights, and maintain cordial relations 
with the Soviet Union all the while working to undermine it anyway he could. Before 
analysing the substantive issues dealt with by the Carter administration and 
Brzezinski’s role in influencing them, it is appropriate to begin with an analysis of 
Brzezinski and Kissinger and compare the performance and worldviews of the two 
national security advisers. 
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   Brzezinski and Kissinger: A Comparison 
 
   What separated Brzezinski’s policy orientation from that of Henry Kissinger was 
that, in the Nixon years, Kissinger was prone to viewing the Eastern Europeans as a 
fixed part of the Soviet bloc and therefore within its sphere of influence. Thus, he 
followed a non-interventionist approach that Brzezinski was apt to challenge. 
Brzezinski saw intervention in the Soviet sphere as a necessary prelude to the region’s 
liberation as the nations of Eastern Europe had been held captive to a large degree and 
required external intervention to save them from continued Soviet domination. 
Whereas Kissinger was content in dealing with the status quo in the Soviet Bloc, 
Brzezinski most certainly was not.276 That marked the key difference between the 
Nixon and Ford administrations with that of the Carter administration. Justin Vaisse 
made the point that:  
 
The latter (Kissinger), to go back to Mario del Pero’s characterization, “explicitly 
rejected progressive and teleological visions of history, preferring the analysis of 
structure and stability to that of transformation and evolution.” Brzezinski, on the 
contrary, embraced and welcomed historical change, all the more so in that he 
often viewed it as playing positively for America. He was a man of movement, 
not stability. His faith in America and his optimism offered a striking contrast to 
Kissinger’s Splengerian pessimism.277  
 
   Brzezinski sought to transcend the Cold War divide and hasten the conflict’s 
demise, whereas Kissinger was in favour of prolonging the status quo. Brzezinski felt 
that the U.S. need not fear Communism as its adherents could only pose a threat in the 
military sphere and were not a serious political, economic, or ideological rival. As 
Daniel J. Sargent put it: “Fear of Communism is no longer the glue that holds our 
foreign policy together,” Zbigniew Brzezinski concurred. These declarations did not 
mean that Soviet power could be disregarded. The point was that anti-Soviet 
containment no longer offered a rationale for foreign policy.’278 Brzezinski advanced 
beyond containment and indeed “rollback” to dismantlement and sought the complete 
destruction of the Soviet Union. 
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   The Carter administration sought to transform the Cold War from a bipolar conflict 
into an interdependent relationship whereby the Soviet Union would be forced to 
accommodate to the West and accept inferiority. While Kissinger sought to maintain 
the status quo and preserve equilibrium Brzezinski and the Carter administration 
sought to gain unilateral advantage over the Soviets and attain superiority. This was 
what Brzezinski called a historically optimistic détente. As Daniel J. Sargent wrote:  
 
In the past,” Brzezinski explained, “US-Soviet relations dominated everything”. 
“Other priorities in international relations,” he now asserted, “are equally or 
more important.” The Carter administration thus deprioritised the Cold War, 
acting on historical assumptions that inverted Kissinger’s. Unsure of the West’s 
prospects, Kissinger had tried to stabilise the status quo. More optimistic about 
the future, the Carter administration assumed that the Soviet Union was on the 
wrong side of history and that Soviet leaders would have to choose between 
obsolescence and interdependence. “We are challenging the Soviets to cooperate 
with us or run the risk of becoming historically irrelevant,” Brzezinski asserted. 
The insight had implications for foreign policy. “The objective,” Brzezinski 
explained, was “to assimilate East-West relations into a broader framework of 
cooperation, rather than to concentrate on East-West relations as the decisive and 
dominant concern of our times.” The Carter administration thereby presumed 
that it could push the Soviet Union harder on issues like human rights while 
preserving détente’s gains. Brzezinski called this a “historically optimistic” 
détente, in contrast to Kissinger’s alleged pessimism. Its practical viability 
remained to be tested.279 
 
   The Carter administration entered office with a view to transcending the Cold War 
and hastening its demise, a vehemence and resolve to ultimately beat the Soviets that 
was in significant measure due to the influence of Brzezinski. Kissinger had sought to 
stabilise a great power condominium however Brzezinski was determined to liberate 
Eastern Europe and this meant interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet bloc. 
Brzezinski was all about transforming the Cold War but Kissinger was all about 
preserving it. Kissinger had been in favour of realpolitik and a great power 
consortium of the five major world powers. Brzezinski was an idealist who wanted to 
                                                 
279 Daniel J. Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, p. 263 
 117 
see the West triumph over the Soviets and implement the new world order and herald 
in the technetronic era. As Justin Vaisse put it:  
 
There are three fundamental differences between “peaceful engagement” as 
advocated by Brzezinski and détente as implemented by Kissinger. Whereas the 
latter had a pessimistic foundation (it sought to limit the effects of the American 
decline), Brzezinski’s approach was optimistic (his approach sought to put the 
assets of the West, its power of attraction, into play). The first, which aimed to 
stabilise the status quo, was “geopolitically conservative.” The second sought to 
go beyond the status quo. Finally, while the first minimised the ideological 
element, the second aimed to exert direct influence on the evolution of Eastern 
European societies.280 
 
   Brzezinski maintained in his early writings that the Soviet Union was a dynamic 
society never in favour of settling for the status quo but constantly trying to move 
history forward toward the goal of world communism. This very thrust of Soviet 
ideology and foreign policy meant that the Soviet Union would never settle for 
peaceful coexistence with the West and resign itself to a balance of power between 
the capitalist and communist countries. A limited sphere of influence in the world was 
incompatible with exporting revolution abroad and advancing the cause of 
communism to the four corners of the earth. Brzezinski thus had a more sophisticated 
understanding of Soviet objectives than Kissinger, seeing them as essentially 
threatening to the West and therefore necessitating a tough response.  
   Brzezinski, unlike Kissinger, was not willing to accommodate with the Soviets but 
rather saw the urgency with which this totalitarian super-state had to be not only 
contained but, ultimately, dismantled. As Walter LaFeber wrote: ‘In the early 1970s, 
Brzezinski had condemned the détente policies of Kissinger, a person with whom he 
had competed professionally since the early 1950s. Railing against Kissinger’s 
willingness to coexist with Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, he advocated the 
“independence” of such bloc states as Rumania.’281 Brzezinski sought to apply a 
strategy consistently designed to hasten the Soviet system’s collapse rather than 
manoeuvring between conflict and cooperation as Kissinger had done. Furthermore, 
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Brzezinski saw the principle of promoting human rights as something not only 
laudable in and of itself but also a useful means to undermine the legitimacy of Soviet 
rule over its satellites and furthermore foster domestic unrest and criticism of 
Moscow. Kissinger, on the other hand, was reluctant to support the cause of human 
rights in the Soviet Union because of the obvious damage that would cause to 
relations between the two superpowers.282  
   The Carter administration’s rendition of détente, largely attributable to Brzezinski, 
therefore differed between that of the Nixon and Ford administrations. Brzezinski 
understood détente to mean equality amongst the two superpowers and placed a 
particular emphasis on the words ‘global’ and ‘reciprocity,’ meaning détente applied 
to the conduct of both powers throughout the world and that there had to be a quid pro 
quo to their exchanges in the sense that both powers extended favours to each other 
equitably. Brzezinski felt that the Soviets were transgressing the rules of détente in the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War through their adventurism throughout the Third World, 
particularly in Africa. As Zubok wrote: ‘Raymond Garthoff, participant and scholar of 
détente, observed that both sides wanted to obtain, whenever possible, a unilateral 
advantage over the other side.’283 Brzezinski therefore felt détente had to be placed on 
an equal footing and restoration of harmony had to be achieved. What is ironic 
however is that Brzezinski would then implement policies to gain unilateral advantage 
over the Soviets in the Third World just as the Soviets had done to the Americans, 
such as in the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia and concerning the funding 
of the Mujahedeen. 
   While détente was important at the outset of the Carter administration, this author 
would argue that Brzezinski was driven all along by the ultimate goal of defeating the 
Soviets and that détente was just  a phase of cooperation that would inevitably be 
trumped by a renewal of conflict as both powers were so fundamentally opposed to 
each other and locked into hostilities that a period of peace could only be transitory 
and therefore the conflict would have to resume and be brought to a close, with one 
power triumphing over the other. Justin Vaisse offered an accurate description of what 
détente meant to the Carter administration. He wrote: 
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The Soviets seemed to consider that détente had worked to their advantage, and 
he thought that these gains could well precipitate a new era of Soviet 
assertiveness, owing to the Soviets new confidence, their sense that the 
“correlation of forces” was working in their favour, along with the crisis that 
reigned in the West. Détente thus had to become reciprocal and global; it had to 
give Americans the same access to the USSR as the Soviets enjoyed to the 
United States, and it had to encompass all aspects of the relationship, including a 
moderation of Soviet behaviour in the Third World. Those two key terms of 
struggle against Kissinger’s détente – reciprocal and global – quickly became 
stakes in Brzezinski’s contest with Cyrus Vance over the definition of Carter’s 
foreign policy.284 
 
   Concerning their similarities, Brzezinski and Kissinger may both be considered 
realists who were primarily interested in great power politics and in gaining advantage 
over states with whom the United States was competing with in the international 
system. They both played the game of realpolitik while in power.285 Brzezinski and 
Kissinger both appear to have exceeded their authority somewhat whilst in 
government. That is to say, they dominated both formulation and implementation of 
US foreign policies to a degree that marks them off from other National Security 
Advisers. As Walter LaFeber put it: ‘Kissinger and Brzezinski transformed the 
National Security Advisor’s position into another, and at times more powerful, State 
Department. The 1947 act creating the National Security Council assumed the 
Advisor would act as the President’s foreign policy coordinator, not his formulator of 
foreign policy.’286  
   Stuart Eizenstat points out the similarity of the two national security advisers as 
domineering personalities who made their views explicit policy and exercised 
effective leadership from the top. He stated:  
 
There are two types of White House national security advisers. In the Kissinger-
Brzezinski model the adviser organises interagency meetings and decisions for 
the president, but strongly advocates his own ideas. To my mind Brzezinski ran a 
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fair and transparent decision-making process but brought along his own strong 
views. Brown, for example, never felt Brzezinski suppressed his 
recommendations. The other model is best exemplified by Brent Scowcroft, 
President Ford’s national security adviser, who saw his role as a coordinator, a 
synthesiser of inevitable interagency disagreements, but not a forceful advocate. 
Of course it would have been hard for him to act otherwise with Kissinger also 
serving as Ford’s secretary of state.287 
 
   Although Brzezinski was the most influential person within Carter’s administration, 
he does not appear to have wielded the same amount of authority as Kissinger had in 
the Nixon administration. While both were dominant personalities, Brzezinski appears 
to have delegated more tasks to subordinates than Kissinger, who evidently was rather 
exclusive and took the lead personally on many issues.288 
   Kissinger and Brzezinski are both proponents of a new world order, whereby the 
United States would shape a new international community of states who would cede 
some if not all of their sovereignty and agree to establish some sort of supranational 
institution, even a world government, which would regulate relations amongst them. 
Both were concerned that anarchy was an enduring feature of international affairs and 
they sought to mitigate the effects of such a hazardous and chaotic international 
environment through having the United States spearhead, largely through the United 
Nations, a movement to provide more global stability. Through using the UN to 
enforce collective security and the peaceful arbitration of disputes, both sought, 
incrementally and gradually, to bring about a new world order that would render the 
world less susceptible to international conflict and rivalry amongst nation-states.289 
   On the issue of opposing the Soviet Union and its allies, Brzezinski and Kissinger 
were both adamant that the US must be forthright and determined in its opposition to 
the expansion of Soviet hegemony around the world. Both believed the Soviet Union 
to be a destructive force in world affairs, sponsoring revolutions in Third World 
countries and generally destabilising international relations.290 
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   While both Kissinger and Brzezinski differed in their approach to the Soviet Union 
and its allies, Kissinger largely acceding to the Soviet demand for status as a global 
superpower and Brzezinski rejecting it, both however were fundamentally opposed to 
the expansion of communism worldwide. Brzezinski however, was prepared to take 
the Cold War deep inside the Soviet Bloc during his tenure as National Security 
Adviser, thus undermining the very fabric of Soviet society and delegitimizing 
communism from within. The significance of this is that such a policy would 
contribute substantially to actually defeating the Soviets. Therefore opting for a policy 
of promoting human rights rather than refraining from doing so, would make it appear 
that, as Shlomo Avineri put it, ‘in retrospect, Brzezinski was proven right and 
Kissinger was wrong.’291 
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Fig 4. Zbigniew Brzezinski & Henry Kissinger 
 
Fig. 5 Zbigniew Brzezinski & Henry Kissinger on the Charlie Rose Show 
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Eastern Europe and Human Rights 
 
   The Helsinki accords, signed in 1975 by President Ford, had set up an international 
standard for human rights to which the Soviet Union had become, for the first time, a 
signatory party. However, the impact of the Helsinki conference was initially quite 
limited. The coming to power of President Carter in 1977, in effect, signalled the 
onset of a far more comprehensive campaign to promote human rights 
internationally.292 Indeed, Carter’s election led to a burgeoning interest in human 
rights internationally.293 Samuel Moyn noted this coming of age of the human rights 
movement in the 1970s. He stated: ‘Over the course of the 1970s, the moral world of 
Westerners shifted, opening a space for the sort of utopianism that coalesced in an 
international human rights movement that had never existed before.’294 Furthermore, 
Moyn referred to the role of Jimmy Carter in spearheading the international human 
rights movement. He observed: ‘Even politicians, most notably American president 
Jimmy Carter, started to invoke human rights as the guiding rationale of the foreign 
policy of states. And most visibly of all, the public relevance of human rights 
skyrocketed, as measured by the simple presence of the phrase in the newspaper, 
ushering in the current supremacy of human rights.’295  
   From the outset of the Carter presidency human rights were to be used to show up 
the weaknesses of the Soviet political system and encourage dissent within it. 
Brzezinski and Carter both saw human rights as a soft power weapon of great 
potential for doing internal damage to the communist bloc, in particular its political 
leadership. While Carter favoured supporting human rights for moral reasons 
primarily, for Brzezinski the main aim was to do damage to the Soviet political 
system and bring about its collapse. Madeleine Albright referred to the viewpoints of 
both the President and his National Security Adviser regarding human rights when she 
stated: ‘President Carter was idealistic; he wanted America to present a morally 
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untainted image to the world. His national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
distrusted the Kremlin leaders and had no illusions about our struggle with the Soviet 
Union. But both agreed that we would be more successful in countering Communism 
if we made respect for human rights a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy and in 
our national interest.’296  
   Implementing many of the policies long advocated by Brzezinski, the Carter 
administration delved into ideological warfare within the communist bloc.297 They 
elevated human rights to a higher standard internationally through spearheading their 
advocacy and immediately promoted human rights activists with an aim to 
undermining Soviet internal legitimacy. As Daniel J. Sargent pointed out: ‘The United 
States, Carter announced, would meddle in the internal affairs of foreign countries if 
human rights concerns warranted it doing so. This was a bold commitment and a 
striking departure from Washington’s previous diplomatic practice.’298 This meddling 
in the internal affairs of another state for the purpose of promoting human rights was a 
novelty and was not what human rights were traditionally utilised for. As Samuel 
Moyn put it: ‘The “rights of man” were about a whole people incorporating itself in a 
state, not a few foreign people criticising another state for its wrongdoings.’299 Carter 
however would champion interference in another state’s domestic activities for the 
purpose of promoting international codes of conduct and respect for basic rights. The 
human rights campaign thus affected not just the Soviet Union but also other regions 
of the world where dictatorships were in power. What Carter began has remained the 
official policy of the United States government; to criticise the treatment of human 
rights abuses by foreign governments and to intervene when deemed to be necessary, 
under the label of “humanitarian intervention” to uphold the proper treatment of 
citizens believed to be physically endangered by their government, as was the case in 
Libya in 2011. 
   If the Kremlin leaders weren’t already suspicious of the United States for 
encouraging dissident activity in the aftermath of Helsinki, then President Carter’s 
decision in 1977 to publicly inform Russian defector Andrei Sakharov of his firm 
commitment to supporting human rights in the Soviet Union certainly spelled out their 
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concerns. As Samuel Moyn noted in this regard: ‘It was Carter’s carefully crafted 
reply to Sakharov, which the latter released in mid-February, that caused a major 
uproar and showed that Carter really meant what he said. “Human rights is a central 
concern of my Administration,” reporters transcribed from the copy in Sakharov’s 
apartment. “You may rest assured that the American people and our government will 
continue our firm commitment to promote respect for human rights not only in our 
country but also abroad.”300 
   The Soviets considered the human rights campaign a blatant transgression of their 
sovereign rights and an attack upon their internal legitimacy. The Soviets wished to 
“remain masters in their own house” and be free from external criticism which might 
call into question their oppressive actions.301 Or, as Samuel Moyn put it: ‘Soviet 
diplomacy and its international law conceptions stressed sovereign equality in 
international affairs more than human rights…’302 The Soviets thus felt that a state 
had the right to treat its own citizens as it saw fit and was not legally subject to 
external intervention which sought to remedy its perceived injustices. 
  However, that being said, the Soviets were blatant transgressors of human rights and 
denied their citizens the entitlements that were commonly held by those residing in 
the West. Sarah B. Snyder alluded to this when she wrote: ‘… the communist system 
inherently repressed a number of human rights, including the freedom of religion, 
movement, and property ownership.’303 Freedom of speech was an important 
additional right they infringed and many dissidents made their way to the West where 
they could openly criticise the Soviet political system. Alexander Solzhenitsyn is one 
example, whose Gulag Archipelago had an enormous impact in the West and in the 
Soviet Union and served to expose the injustices of the Soviet forced labour camps. 
The most prominent dissident the Carter administration supported was Andrei 
Sakharov, the nuclear physicist who immigrated to the United States.   
   President Carter’s unwavering and resolute commitment to human rights was aptly 
described by Lars Schoultz who wrote: ‘In mid-1976 presidential candidate Jimmy 
Carter promised that his administration would “restore the moral authority of this 
country in its conduct of foreign policy,” no one was surprised to hear the new 
president assert that “our commitment to human rights must be absolute,” nor to hear 
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his conviction that “human rights is the soul of our policy.”304 Carter’s human rights 
campaign was also designed to win the approval of neoconservatives opposed to 
détente. He felt that such an offensive action as the human rights campaign was sure 
to garner support from the right in moving beyond détente and stepping up an attack 
on the internal legitimacy of the Soviet Union. The neoconservatives were in favour 
of renewing hostilities with the Soviet Union and Carter, although ostensibly soft on 
the Soviet Union, nonetheless had a National Security Council filled with hawks who 
were determined to cause as much damage to the Soviets as possible. Brzezinski 
described what the human rights policy of the Carter administration entailed, 
recording in his memoirs that: 
 
In courting Eastern Europe, the Carter Administration worked to encourage 
political and economic trends already very much in evidence. We sought to 
reward those nations which demonstrated an evolution toward a more liberal 
internal political system and to call to attention the human-rights abuses in those 
nations which remained committed to totalitarianism. Through the Conference of 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, we maintained public pressure on the 
Soviets and their satellites to comply with the provisions of the Helsinki 
Accords.305 
 
   The person who served as deputy assistant to National Security Adviser Brzezinski 
was Robert Gates, who was Secretary of Defence in the Obama administration. In a 
book he wrote entitled From the Shadows, Gates described how President Carter’s 
foreign policy differed from that of previous administrations: 
 
The effort to promote human rights, support dissidents, and stir up the 
nationalities went far beyond presidential statements and letters. Beginning early 
in the administration, and going beyond the human rights campaign, Brzezinski 
initiated, and Carter approved, an unprecedented White House effort to attack the 
internal legitimacy of the Soviet Government.306  
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   Prior to 1977, the Soviet ‘homeland’ had not been the main concern of the CIA; the 
Cold War was waged, militarily and ideologically, in regions that lay outside of the 
Soviet bloc. Brzezinski had, since the beginning of his academic career in the 1950’s, 
advocated policies of ‘peaceful engagement’ designed to encourage political change 
inside the Communist camp. As Gates goes on to mention, the United States 
purposefully refrained from carrying out policies to influence domestic affairs in the 
Soviet bloc - ‘this just wasn’t done; it wasn’t within the parameters of the rules of the 
game as it had been played for many years.’307 Traditionally, the two superpowers had 
respected the territorial integrity of one another as well as their right to pursue 
whatever domestic policies they deemed fit. This is how international relations had 
been orchestrated for centuries. States did not interfere in the internal affairs of one 
another and the domestic policies of one state were its own business. The policies of 
previous U.S. administrations during the Cold War had adhered to this norm of non-
interference. As Sarah B. Snyder wrote: ‘The White House often felt that more could 
be gained in its relationship with the Soviet Union by overlooking human rights 
violations than by championing them.’308 Carter transformed this, making the 
intervention in a state’s internal affairs a prerogative of a state if it failed to adhere to 
international codes of conduct. He was thus a forerunner to the neoliberal policies of 
humanitarian intervention. The Soviets wished to maintain the traditional state-to-
state practice of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations. As 
Barbara Keys and Roland Burke put it: ‘The “equality of the superpowers and “non-
interference” in internal affairs were détente’s foundational principles, Brezhnev 
wrote, referring Carter to the 1972 Basic Principles Agreement.’309  
   Carter’s human rights campaign had a distinct anti-Soviet thrust. The human rights 
campaign had as its implicit goal the liberation of Eastern Europe, in addition to being 
pursued for purely altruistic reasons. As Samuel Moyn noted: ‘But it was also the case 
that human rights became almost immediately associated with anti-Communism.’310 
The United States sought to promote conditions within foreign countries conducive to 
the observance of human rights. As one State Department official put it: ‘We seek 
social, economic, and political conditions in all countries which foster observance of 
human rights and encourage attitudes within each country that contribute to progress 
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in this field.’311 The U.S. would discontinue its economic assistance to any country 
that was a gross violator of human rights. 
   Barbara Keys and Roland Burke emphasised that human rights advocates were 
preoccupied with meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign countries, particularly 
the Soviet Bloc. They wrote: ‘The architects of East-West détente emphasised non-
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states as the basis for cooperation. The 
transnational human rights movement emerging at the same time challenged this 
premise, arguing that global security and internal affairs, in the form of respect for 
human rights, were intertwined.’312 This is evidently true as the spread of communism 
throughout the world would have endangered human rights in other countries and 
therefore it would appear necessary for human rights activists and governments to 
intervene in a country’s affairs to ensure universal standards of respect for citizens’ 
rights were being upheld.  
   It was the goal of the Carter administration from the outset to foment unrest within 
the Soviet bloc. Human rights was the chief weapon to be used in promoting rebellion 
within as the highlighting of Russia’s mistreatment of dissidents and the advocating of 
rights that they were entitled to was sure to cause serious damage to the very fabric of 
communist societies. Carter believed he could advance the cause of human rights 
which would hasten the breakdown of the Soviet Union while simultaneously 
pursuing peaceful relations with Moscow. As Daniel J. Sargent wrote: 
 
Unlike Kissinger, Carter assumed that he could advance human rights while 
making progress in other areas of Soviet-American relations. It was “not his 
intention,” Carter reassured the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly 
Dobrynin, “to interfere in the internal affair of the Soviet Union.” Yet this was 
how Soviet leaders construed Carter’s entreaties on behalf of Soviet dissidents. 
“We will not allow interference in our internal affairs,” Brezhnev insisted, “no 
matter what kind of pseudo-humane pretense is used.” Talking about human 
rights nonetheless remained the essence of Carter’s interference.313 
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   Following the inauguration of President Carter the United States adopted a policy of 
public as well as covert support for Soviet dissidents - certainly for the sake of the 
citizens themselves, but implicitly for the purpose of undermining Soviet unity. As 
Fred Halliday remarked, ‘Carter’s human rights policy was transformed into an anti-
communist crusade in a new guise.’314 For Carter the human rights campaign was 
something he felt a moral commitment to; for Brzezinski however, it was a means to 
wage ideological warfare with and attack the internal legitimacy of the Soviet Union. 
Samuel Moyn noted how significant human rights became following Carter’s 
inauguration: ‘In this broad sense, Carter’s election, in a campaign suffused with 
promises of moral transcendence of politics, opened the way for the astonishing 
explosion of “human rights” across the American political landscape.’315 Human 
rights thus became highly respectable owing to Carter’s sponsoring of them. Samuel 
Moyn made the point that ‘In the right place in the right time, Carter moved “human 
rights” from grassroots mobilization to the center of global rhetoric.’316 
 Carter felt deeply concerned about the welfare of citizens across the world. 
Brzezinski, although sharing such concerns, was more focused on the geopolitical 
implications of using human rights as a form of soft power to bring about 
communism’s erosion. As Daniel Sargent has written: ‘Zbigniew Brzezinski 
considered Carter’s human rights to be “more embedded in morality and religion than 
in geopolitics and strategy.” For Brzezinski, the reverse was true.’317 Justin Vaisse 
stated: ‘For Brzezinski, then, the defence of human rights represented a genuine 
commitment, and also one of the key differences between the West and the 
communist bloc. For this reason, it was also an instrument of the Cold War.’318 
Brzezinski described how the human rights campaign was partly aimed at attacking 
the internal legitimacy of the Soviet Union: 
 
I felt strongly that a major emphasis on human rights as a component of U.S. 
foreign policy would advance America’s global interests by demonstrating to the 
emerging nations of the Third World the reality of our democratic system, in 
sharp contrast to the political system and practices of our adversaries. The best 
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way to answer the Soviets’ ideological challenge would be to commit the United 
States to a concept which most reflected America’s very essence.319 
 
   Brzezinski understood that the issue of human rights was sensitive for the Soviet 
Union. He hoped not only to highlight their abuses for the sake of safeguarding the rights 
of Soviet citizens but, more importantly for him in the Cold War struggle, he sought to 
inflict as much damage as possible upon the Soviet leadership. By highlighting their 
mistreatment of citizens their legitimacy and reputation would be damaged and this 
would hasten their downfall and replacement by a more liberal government. He was thus 
exploiting their weaknesses; namely, their inhumane mistreatment of their own citizens. 
As he put it: 
 
I felt strongly that in the U.S.-Soviet competition the appeal of America as a free 
society could become an important asset, and I saw in human rights an 
opportunity to put the Soviet Union ideologically on the defensive. Arguing that 
“human rights is the genuine historical inevitability of our times,” I suggested 
that by actively pursuing this commitment we could mobilise far greater global 
support and focus global attention on the glaring internal weaknesses of the 
Soviet system.320 
 
   The human rights campaign had an enormous impact worldwide and the United 
States effectively secured the release of thousands of political prisoners.321 The 
campaign also inspired millions of Soviet citizens and reminded them that they had 
inalienable rights. As Stuart E. Eizenstat put it, Carter’s human rights campaign 
offered ‘hope to the oppressed peoples in the communist bloc.’322 
   Furthermore, Eizenstat goes on to describe in detail why Brzezinski sought to use 
human rights as a weapon in the Cold War. He wrote: 
 
Zbig maintained that cooperation in the face of Soviet aggression served only to 
make Carter look indecisive and that the Soviets needed to be stopped in their 
tracks. He was deeply suspicious of the Soviets; gravely concerned at their major 
military buildup; and eager to counter their aggressive export of revolution in 
                                                 
319 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.124 
    320 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.149 
    321 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.144 
322 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Jimmy Carter, p.6 
 131 
Africa, through their Cuban proxies, in such far-flung places as Angola, 
Namibia, and Ethiopia, and their support of Western European Communist 
parties. He believed that opposing them externally would weaken them 
internally, and told the president that the Soviets were engaged in a “selective 
détente,” only where and when it suited them. The proper response, Brzezinski 
advised Carter, was not to undermine cooperative relationships “but to increase 
the costs of Soviet behaviour in the malignant category. In the briefest form, this 
meant continued insistence on human rights as part of the ideological 
competition, heightening the cost of Soviet interventionism, and more 
affirmative political initiatives in areas of Soviet sensitivity, such as China. So 
for Zbig, human rights was not mainly a handmaiden of peace, but a weapon in 
the Cold War.323 
 
   Although unknown at the time, the Carter administration’s human rights policies 
would go on to play a significant role in ending the Cold War. It put the spotlight on 
the internal weaknesses of the Soviet Union and highlighted the glaring lack of 
respect for the human rights of Soviet citizens. As Stuart Eizenstat put it: ‘In later 
years Soviet dissidents would be virtually unanimous in their praise of Carter’s policy 
and its importance in elevating their cause. Robert Gates, who served on Brzezinski’s 
NSC staff, and as Defense secretary in both the George W. Bush and Obama 
administrations, wrote: “Too bad for Carter that the important impact of his policies 
would only become known years later, as dissidents fled the East and those affected 
by his policies would become leaders as their nations became free.”324 
   Initially the Soviet Union did not grasp the enormity of the threat posed by Carter’s 
human rights campaign. It was only following the Soviet Union’s collapse that the 
cumulative impact of Carter’s human rights initiative would become known. Zubok 
pointed out that: ‘Andropov had long insisted that the human rights campaigns were 
nothing but “attempts of the adversary to activate hostile elements in the USSR by 
means of providing them financial and other material assistance.’325 Little did they 
know that the human rights movement begun by Carter would help spur the creation 
of the Solidarity movement in Poland and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia as well as 
many other activist groups, which together would help bring about the downfall of the 
                                                 
323 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Jimmy Carter, p. 592 
324 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Jimmy Carter, p.605 
325 Zubok, A Failed Empire, p. 256 
 132 
Soviet Union as they exposed the inhumanity and illegality of its treatment of citizens 
and garnered opposition to it from amongst the recalcitrant populations of the Soviet 
Union.  
  The United States chose to pursue a selective human rights policy whereby countries 
that were close allies to the United States and were important in the Cold War 
struggle against Moscow, such as Iran, were exempt from criticism and allowed it 
impunity to abuse the human rights of their citizens. Other countries, such as those of 
Latin America, were called into question and forced to respect the human rights of 
their citizens. This was necessary as the United States relied upon the continued 
support of such allies and could not afford to seek to topple their regimes when they 
effectively acted as a bulwark against the spread of Communism. One could argue, 
however, that they could have remained allies of the United States while modifying 
their behaviour so as to respect the human rights of their citizens. Daniel J. Sargent 
commented on this situation. He wrote:  
 
Still, it was easier to embrace human rights in the abstract than to advance the 
cause in specific contexts, where human rights might conflict with other goals 
and purposes. Many of the non-Communist governments that NGOs targeted 
were regimes the United States had nurtured. Indonesia, Iran, and South Korea 
were proven violators, but they were also close allies in rough neighbourhoods. 
The People’s Republic of China had a woeful human rights record (which the 
NGOs did little to excavate). China, however, remained a pivot point on which 
Cold War geopolitics turned. In these cases, human rights faced uphill struggles. 
The principles might be noble, but American diplomats, unlike the NGOs, would 
have to weigh human rights against other priorities. Thus, while Carter wanted to 
strike a balance that was quite different from Kissinger’s, the trade-offs between 
human rights and competing priorities endured, as did the countervailing claims 
of sovereignty.326 
 
Barbara Keys and Roland Burke commented on the inherent hypocrisy of Carter’s 
human rights policy. They pointed out the administration pursued a double standard in 
its relations with abusers of human rights. On the one hand, they called into question 
abusers of human rights and chastised them, so they would mend their ways. On the 
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other, hand they turned a blind eye to human rights abuses in countries that were of 
strategic significance to the United States in the Cold War struggle against Moscow. 
They wrote: 
 
In his 1977 inaugural address, Carter promised to restore morality to a central 
place in foreign policy. Human rights, however, was only one factor in 
policymaking, and other interests sometimes took precedence. Where cold war 
security and economic interests were marginal, as in Uganda and Paraguay, the 
administration was a strong critic of abuses. Where such interests were 
significant, the administration’s willingness to subordinate human rights 
considerations invited charges of hypocrisy.327 
 
   There were of course limitations to Carter’s human rights campaign. He advanced 
the cause significantly and made human rights an issue to be taken seriously by 
governments worldwide, thus lending them further legitimacy. However, there was 
only so much Carter could accomplish through supporting human rights given the 
restraints imposed upon him by alliances and Cold War exigencies. As Daniel J. 
Sargent wrote: ‘The International League for Human Rights credited Carter with 
making human rights “a subject of national policy debate in many countries (and) the 
focus for discussion in international organizations.” These were judicious verdicts: 
they lauded Carter for raising the profile of human rights but acknowledged that he 
led the world’s dominant superpower – not an NGO with nuclear missiles.’328 
   The Carter human rights campaign had a significant impact worldwide and also 
boosted the reputation of human rights amongst governments. Brzezinski 
fundamentally believed in human rights, not only as a means to undermine support for 
the Soviet Union but also as a desirable goal in and of itself, and he played a major 
role in the Carter administration in advancing their cause. As Justin Vaisse pointed 
out: ‘Brzezinski pressed regularly in favour of human rights. For instance, he 
discussed Carter’s policies in this area with the newly elected pope John Paul II, who 
thanked him with a big smile.’329 The human rights campaign would play a significant 
role in ending the Cold War and in mobilising opposition to the Soviet Union within 
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the communist bloc, and Carter and Brzezinski’s roles in spearheading this campaign 
and thus helping to end the Cold War is not to be underappreciated. As Barbara Keys 
and Roland Burke have written: ‘In stark contrast to the cold war’s division of the 
world into two antagonistic blocs, ideas about universal human rights brooked no 
global divides: they were predicated on a belief that the most important identity was a 
common humanity. Such ideas predated and outlasted the cold war and, while the 
conflict persisted, became powerful enough to play a role in ending it.’330 
   President Carter chose from the outset of his inauguration to support Soviet 
dissidents and human rights internationally. This would serve to help bring the Cold 
War to an end. As Barbara Keys and Roland Burke have written: ‘Solzhenitsyn, 
physicist Andrei Sakharov, and other Soviet dissidents created a human rights 
movement behind the Iron Curtain that eventually affected the nature and course of 
the Cold War. The dissident movement was a distinctly Soviet phenomenon that 
sprang from internal sources but harnessed the cold war competition for global public 
opinion to its own ends – and in a twist that surprised everyone, thereby helped bring 
the conflict to a close.’331 Human rights was thus a factor which helped end the 
conflict and this campaign moved into full operation during the Carter presidency. 
Also, of importance is that the glaring inadequacies of the Soviet Union were exposed 
and called into question. As Sarah B. Snyder wrote: ‘Although the United States did 
little to ensure the agreement’s (Helsinki Accords) implementation at first, the 
commission, transnational activism, and the Carter administration would ultimately 
transform U.S. attention  to and engagement with human rights violations in the 
Soviet bloc.’332 The campaign thus did have a tangible impact upon domestic politics 
in the Soviet Union, in addition to spurring the formation of dissident movements 
which would help to bring about communism’s collapse a decade later.  
   Nancy Mitchell described starkly how influential Carter’s human rights campaign 
was upon the outcome of the Cold War. She wrote: 
 
Carter did not initiate the discussion of human rights; he rode a wave that had 
been growing since the end of World War II and that had gained momentum in 
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1975 when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the countries of Europe, East 
and West, signed the Helsinki Accords. Many in the United States, including 
Carter, had denounced Secretary of state Henry Kissinger and President Gerald 
R. Ford for signing an agreement that seemed to legitimate Soviet domination of 
Eastern Europe. They failed to grasp the significance of the fact that the 
agreement committed all signatories to respect the human rights of their citizens. 
This was the Greek army in the Trojan horse; invisible at first, it penetrated the 
heart of the Soviet empire and destroyed it.333 
 
   As well as declaring public support for Soviet defectors, President Carter’s 
campaign to undermine the internal legitimacy of the Soviet Union entailed efforts to 
strengthen dissident East European radio stations. In March 1977, Brzezinski pressed 
Carter to submit to Congress a “Report on International Broadcasting.” Consequently, 
the United States began providing additional transmitters to the U.S. sponsored Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The sixteen 250-kilowatt transmitters given to the 
stations were effective in overcoming jamming efforts by Soviet leaders. 
Furthermore, in 1977 Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were the only alternative 
modes of public communication allowing dissidents to contact their respective 
national communities. Brzezinski’s success in guaranteeing the supply of transmitters 
for the East European radio stations now meant communist party leaders would find it 
increasingly difficult to suppress them. As Patrick Vaughan remarked, ‘Brzezinski 
engaged in a personal campaign to save the station, leading Jan Nowak-Jezioranski to 
call him the “patron saint of Radio Free Europe.”334 Thus the U.S. sponsored radio 
stations, reaching millions of listeners each day, were able to serve their purpose as 
vehicles for political change in Soviet Eastern Europe.  
   Sponsoring Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty through providing them with 
transmitters, funds and waiving restrictions on their freedom were policies in line 
with what Brzezinski had been advocating since the 1960s, namely, the use of soft 
power to undermine the legitimacy of the Soviet Union. As Andrianopoulos 
observed: 
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Since the 1960s he (Brzezinski) had urged Western leaders to try and shape East 
European public opinion as the Soviets cultivated Western public opinion, and 
not to be too concerned about damaging relations with East European 
governments since they were becoming more responsive to public attitudes. For 
this task he viewed Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as indirect but useful 
means and opposed any restrictions on their freedom.335 
 
   In 1986, Brzezinski described the enormous contribution Radio Free Europe had 
made to political reform in Eastern Europe, saying how the station ‘has almost single-
handedly prevented Moscow from accomplishing a central objective: the isolation of 
Eastern Europe from the rest of Europe and the ideological indoctrination of its 
people.’336 In his memoirs, Brzezinski wrote that:  
 
I also used my office to provide more support for Radio Free Europe. I felt 
strongly that the Radio offered us the best means for influencing the internal 
political transformation of Communist systems and that more use should be 
made of this vital instrument. Accordingly, I pressed for larger financial support 
and I also used my White House office to free the Radio of excessive political 
control, notably from State. While the Radio should not be used to foment 
insurrections in the East, it should, in my judgment, serve as an instrument for 
the deliberate encouragement of political change. This meant that the broadcasts 
had to be addressed to the internal problems of the Communist systems and offer 
a genuine alternative to Communist policies.337 
 
   Brzezinski thus took direct action upon becoming National Security Adviser to 
increase the influence of Soviet dissidents. In providing funds for these two radio 
stations he helped wage propaganda warfare against the Soviets and thus boost the 
standing of the West inside the Soviet bloc. As Justin Vaisse wrote: ‘Brzezinski’s 
support for the radio broadcasts RFE-RL and Voice of America, for the circulation of 
information via samizdat, and for ethnic minorities was conceived as a way of 
supplying tools at the service of dissidents in the eastern bloc and elsewhere.’338 
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   That the Carter campaign to support human rights was also a means to undermine 
the internal legitimacy of the Soviet Union seem beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, 
Michael H. Hunt in his work Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy stated that 
‘Brzezinski, who carried from his native Poland a deep-seated anti-Soviet animus, 
pushed the president toward a policy of confrontation and skilfully played on the 
themes of self-determination and human rights to advance his own crusade against the 
Kremlin’s grand strategy of expansion and its repressive practices at home.’339 
   Brzezinski and Carter thus did considerable damage to the Soviet Union through 
supporting the cause of human rights and providing funds for Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty. These two policies would play a significant role in ending the Cold 
War over the following decade and would prove that soft power could be utilised 
effectively to help bring the conflict to a close, in addition to traditional hard power. 
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The Third World 
 
   The upsurge in Soviet interventions throughout the Third World in the late 1970s 
convinced some in America that Moscow sought to capitalise on the recent defeat of 
the U.S. military in Vietnam. The Soviets saw this defeat as a chance to advance their 
interests in the Third World, seek increased military bases, recruit client states, and 
further the spread of communism. As Vladimir O. Pechatnov wrote: ‘In the Soviet 
Union détente was also full of contradictions. Proponents of U.S.-Soviet cooperation 
were soon outnumbered by those who saw détente as a chance to fill the vacuum left 
by America’s weakening power and expand the sphere of Soviet influence in Africa, 
the Middle East, and Central America.’340 That the USSR sought to capitalise on the 
recent defeat of the US in Vietnam has now been confirmed, for as Gaddis wrote: 
‘The Brezhnev regime, it appeared, had taken the American defeat in Vietnam as a 
signal to seek opportunities elsewhere in the “third world” an accurate enough 
assessment, Soviet sources now confirm.’341  
   As well as using Cuban proxies in Angola to prop up a Marxist regime, the Soviets 
were making their presence felt in Ethiopia, situated at the strategically important 
Horn of Africa. However, it is to be pointed out, as Piero Gleijeses makes clear, that 
the Cubans were also acting of their own accord in assisting fellow communist 
regimes in Africa and were not just taking orders from Moscow.342 They felt they had 
a mission to help others in the Third World and were not just acting as proxies for the 
Russians. Gleijeses observed that the Cubans were idealistic in assisting Angola, and 
sent thirty thousand of their citizens over there to serve in armed combat as well as to 
teach and provide medical treatment to the Angolans.343  
   Soviet leaders felt confident they could exert power around the globe with the 
United States in a relatively weaker position. As Odd Arne Westad wrote: ‘Recent 
memoirs and Moscow’s own declassified documents show that the MPLA victory in 
Angola, together with Hanoi’s victory in Vietnam, gave rise to unprecedented 
optimism in Soviet Third World policy – “the world,” according to one of their high 
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officials, “was turning in our direction.”344 The U.S. felt the Soviets were becoming 
an increasingly expansionist power and that they were determined to gain a 
geostrategic advantage over the West. Vladislav M. Zubok captured how the Carter 
administration felt about this Soviet self-assertiveness. He wrote:  
 
Jimmy Carter’s lack of clear assumptions about the Soviet Union played as much 
a part in the undoing of détente as Brezhnev beliefs had in conceiving it. Under 
the influence of Brzezinski and neoconservative critics, the U.S. president began 
to suspect that the Soviet Union was a reckless, unpredictable power, confusing 
the aging and reactive Kremlin leadership with the activist rambunctious 
leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. In May 1978, Carter wrote to Brzezinski that 
“the combination of increasing Soviet military power and political short-
sightedness fed by big power ambitions might tempt the Soviet Union both to 
exploit local turbulence, especially in the Third World, and to intimidate our 
friends, in order to seek political advantage, and eventually even political 
preponderance. This is why I do take seriously Soviet action in Africa, and this is 
why I am concerned about the Soviet military build-up in Europe. I also see 
some Soviet designs pointed toward the Indian Ocean through South Asia, and 
perhaps toward the encirclement of China.345 
 
   Brzezinski regarded the use of Soviet air transport and Cuban soldiers to fight in 
remote areas of the world as a new type of threat. As Justin Vaisse argued: 
‘Moreover, when the team discussed the content of a statement on defense, 
Brzezinski insisted on a strong America and on the fact that the recent expansion of 
Soviet military gave the Soviets a strategical and tactical global reach that it had not 
had before.’346 Brzezinski viewed Soviet actions abroad as part of an overall strategy 
to promote communism internationally and viewed such adventurism as a serious 
danger to international security. As Walter LaFeber stated: ‘Brzezinski viewed the 
world largely in bipolar terms and believed the Soviets posed an immediate global 
threat.’347   
   In response to what was seen as a renewed phase in Soviet expansionist policy, the 
United States provided aid to Somalia in their border war against Marxist Ethiopia, 
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receiving in return naval and air facilities. As Fred Halliday observed, Soviet and 
Cuban collaboration in Angola and Ethiopia ‘seemed to confirm the impression of a 
concerted Soviet drive through the third world designed to weaken America.’348 
   The Carter administration was arguably divided over how to respond to these 
developments. This was especially due to certain contradictions and ambiguities in the 
president’s posture toward the Soviet bloc. The Soviets perceived a U.S. 
administration pursuing policies designed to enhance mutual stability in the area of 
nuclear weapons while, simultaneously stepping up its efforts to exploit the domestic 
problems of the Soviet bloc. As Brzezinski, and Carter for that matter, understood the 
U.S.-Soviet relationship to involve a mixture of conflict and cooperation, both were 
inclined to oppose aggressive Soviet actions abroad while at the same maintaining 
positive relations with communist states, including Russia itself. As Andrianopoulos 
stated: ‘believing that the success of revolutionary movements revive Soviet 
revolutionary expectations, Brzezinski recommended the use of force in areas where 
local power could not stop communist force, terrorism, and/or guerrilla warfare. He 
saw no contradiction between peaceful engagement toward some Communist states 
and a forcible stand against violence by others.’349  
   The image of a divided administration derives largely from the competing policies 
put forward by Secretary of State Vance and National Security Adviser Brzezinski. 
Whereas Vance believed the US should treat the SALT II negotiations as entirely 
separate from other issues, Brzezinski insisted on ‘linkage’ between American 
concessions in the arms control talks and Soviet behaviour abroad. When the Soviets 
airlifted supplies and 13,000 Cuban troops to Ethiopia ‘Brzezinski urged Carter to 
send a U.S. fleet to the area to tell the Soviets to pull out the Cubans or else U.S.-
USSR arms talks would stop. Vance hotly disagreed. He wanted no such 
“linkage.”’350 The impact of linkage on the process of détente is addressed in the 
following quote:  
 
Indeed, the United States made clear its determination to link the future of 
détente with Soviet action in the Horn of Africa (and other regional conflicts.) 
While the Carter administration was deeply divided over such linkage – with 
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Secretary of State Cyrus Vance opposing it and National Security Adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski proposing to take it further – the crisis in the Horn of Africa 
only further complicated the prospects for continued détente.351 
 
   Stuart Eizenstat pointed out that the dispute between Brzezinski and Vance was 
detrimental to the image of the administration and pulled its policies in opposite 
directions. The dispute could have been resolved had one of the advisers been given 
the upper hand, but Carter was receptive to the advice of both men and therefore there 
was a tug of war dimension to the administration’s policy toward the Soviet Union, 
with the NSC favouring a hawkish approach and the State Department a dovish one. 
As he stated: ‘Vance felt that negotiations were the best way of managing the 
complex relationship with Moscow. Brzezinski was more of a tough Cold Warrior, in 
part because of his family’s Polish background, but also his keen sense of history and 
the role of the United States in combating what was at the time an aggressive Soviet 
Union. Carter paused for a second and said, “I like hearing different opinions. I can 
handle it.” But their ideological differences were far more difficult to reconcile than 
he realised, and often gave a Janus-like quality to the administration’s stance toward 
the Soviet Union.’352 Significantly, Carter tried to entertain the views of both his 
National Security Adviser and his Secretary of State. As Nancy Mitchell put it: ‘The 
real problem was not that Carter was torn between Vance and Brzezinski, but the 
opposite: he held both their viewpoints simultaneously. That is, he believed in patient 
diplomacy and in the dramatic gesture; he saw beyond the Cold War and he was a 
firm Cold Warrior.’353 
   This dispute between Vance and Brzezinski over Soviet policy would do damage to 
the reputation of the administration and the media would focus on it significantly in 
order to hone in on the image of a divided administration. Concerning linkage, in an 
interview conducted in 1986, Brzezinski justified this line of thought by stating that ‘it 
seemed to me absolutely counterproductive to the long-range stability of the 
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American-Soviet relationship to ignore regional conflicts while single-mindedly 
pursuing SALT.’354 
   Odd Arne Westad puts forth a definition of what Brzezinski understood détente to 
mean. He wrote:  
 
Brzezinski, a Polish émigré intellectual who became a U.S. citizen in 1958, 
favoured a much more hard-headed approach to the Soviets and to communism 
in general. Brzezinski was particularly concerned about Moscow’s intentions in 
the Third World. Already in 1976 memorandum to Carter, the future national 
security adviser warned the future president that:  
 
The Soviet leaders have openly stated that détente is meant to promote the 
“world revolutionary process,” and they see American-Soviet détente not only as 
a means of preserving peace, but also a way of creating favourable conditions for 
the acquiring of power by the communist parties, especially given the so-called 
aggravated crisis of capitalism… (We must make) it unmistakeably clear to the 
Soviet Union that détente requires responsible behaviour from them on 
fundamental issues of global order and it is incompatible with irresponsible 
behaviour in Angola, the Middle East, and the UN. 
 
   Brzezinski considered Soviet and Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa as ‘a 
violation of the code of détente.’355 This is debatable. The Soviets would argue they 
were merely defending an ally from an aggressor and that their actions were not 
intended to in any way harm détente. Brzezinski’s assertion that their intervention was 
a violation of détente is therefore seemingly untrue. Brzezinski would later state that 
“détente lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden” and this is largely true. The Ogaden 
war reignited hostilities between the Americans and the Soviets and led to a period of 
increased tensions which lasted until the end of the Cold War. As Cary Fraser has 
written: ‘If the Vietnam war proved to be a catalyst for the relaxation of cold war 
tensions by way of détente and the US-PRC rapprochement, it was the decolonisation 
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of the Portuguese empire in Africa that signalled that détente between the 
superpowers was ephemeral.’356 
  Eizenstat believed that having the two men on the same administration was a mistake 
due to their diametrically opposing views with regards to dealing with the Soviets. As 
he put it: ‘As I had expressed to Carter during the transition, while each was highly 
able and agreed on many foreign-policy goals, putting them together on the same 
team was a mistake, because of their major differences in temperament and 
worldview, particularly on the Soviet Union.’357 Vance the patrician was a dove 
whereas Brzezinski was a hawk and having the two of them on the same team pulled 
the administration in opposite directions, with Vance seeking to continue SALT II 
negotiations and appease the Soviets for their expansive behaviour abroad whereas 
Brzezinski sought to delay SALT if necessary in order to punish the Soviets and 
counteract their Third World policy. 
   Vance wanted to stabilise the relationship with the USSR and pursue détente and 
arms control. Brzezinski, however, was cognizant of the fact that the Soviets were on 
the move geopolitically, engaging in adventurism in the Third World and seeking to 
exploit the U.S.’s post-Vietnam malaise. As Justin Vaisse wrote: ‘Brzezinski saw 
things differently. From his standpoint, the USSR, despite its domestic paralysis, was 
in a phase of geopolitical self-assertion, and he thought that the Soviets could use 
détente to stabilise the relationship on a bilateral level, in particular with regard to 
arms control, even as they pressed their advantage elsewhere, especially in the Third 
World.’358  
   Brzezinski seems to have been willing to derail SALT for the sake of counteracting 
the Soviets in the Third World. To him, inflicting damage on the Soviets was more 
important than maintaining the SALT II process, even if this meant foregoing a 
reduction in nuclear stockpiles. As Daniel J. Sargent wrote: ‘But Brzezinski believed 
that the Soviets should be kept on a short leash and that their foreign incursions 
should be condemned even at the cost of a new SALT treaty; failure could then be 
blamed on Soviet expansionism.’359 The administration was also divided over how it 
pursued détente with the Soviet Union. Whereas Brzezinski believed in an optimistic 
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détente whereby the US could use its non-military advantages over the Soviet Union 
to achieve supremacy Vance sought to stabilise the status quo and pursue arms 
reductions through the SALT II negotiations.’360 
Justin Vaisse offered an accurate description of the difference between Brzezinski’s 
and Vance’s roles within the administration. He wrote: ‘Brzezinski thus served as 
“chief strategist,” the architect of Carter’s foreign policy, the one who set its overall 
directions. Vance, by contrast, appeared as the “chief negotiator,” the one who 
handled America’s external relations with excellent results…’361 It is important to 
note however that Brzezinski was clearly the more influential of the two largely due 
to his domineering personality and the fact that the National Security Council took on 
a greater role in foreign policy decision-making than the State Department.  
   In relation to the Ogaden War, it was Brzezinski and the NSC’s recommendations 
for a tough response that won the day. The United States would go on to supply Siad 
Barre’s Somalian army with weaponry in their border war against Marxist Ethiopia. 
As Odd Arne Westad wrote: 
 
Already right after he had taken over as President in 1977, Jimmy Carter had 
become concerned that the Soviets were positioning themselves to control the 
West’s access to raw materials – and especially oil – through interventions in 
Africa and the Middle East. Much helped by his National Security Adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter began seeing a pattern of Soviet activities that 
conformed to this picture. While the president remained convinced that an 
improved Soviet-American relationship in other areas, such as arms control and 
trade – could prevent what he termed “regional crises” from spilling over on to 
the superpower relationship, Carter remained sensitive to any Soviet action that 
would be seen to threaten the Gulf region, directly or indirectly. When the 
Soviets in 1978 intervened to support Ethiopia, its new ally on the Horn of 
Africa, in the war against Somalia, the U.S. president had therefore already been 
primed to see Moscow’s decision as a dramatic stepping up of international 
tension.362 
 
   The Ogaden War was a setback for the United States as Ethiopia claimed victory. 
However, it was sympthomatic of the United States’ new policy to oppose Soviet 
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expansion as this policy could be justified as the U.S. could not allow the Soviets to 
exploit their post-Vietnam malaise and gain strongholds in the Third World. Westad 
pointed out why exactly the United States chose to support Somalia. He wrote: ‘By 
June (1977) Brzezinski had suggested to the president that the United States might 
consider giving aid to Somalia in its confrontation with Mengistu’s regime. To 
Brzezinski, the deteriorating Ethiopian human rights record and the consolidation of 
the Soviet position in the country went hand in hand.’363 However, it was chiefly 
down to geopolitics that the U.S. supported Somalia, not Ethiopia’s human rights 
record. The U.S. did not want to see the Soviets gain control over the Red Sea 
adjacent to Ethiopia and access to a warm water port as this would endanger U.S. 
interests in the region. This was the chief reason for U.S. support for Somalia. 
   Concerning U.S. fears that the Soviets were trying to dominate the Horn/Red Sea 
area… these were validated: ‘By early 1976 Ambassador Ratanov and his military 
attaché also underlined to Moscow the strategic use of Ethiopia for Soviet military 
purposes. Ratanov stressed the opportunity for the Soviet Union to increase its 
influence in the whole region (Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan) and the operational 
possibilities for the Red Navy in the Red Sea. He also held up the spectre of greater 
influence of the United States and China, if Moscow did not respond positively to the 
Ethiopian leaders overtures.’364 It would therefore seem that Brzezinski was 
vindicated in giving aid to Somalia in order to counter the Soviets as they were trying 
to capitalise on the US’s weakness and dominate the region therefore a tough response 
could be seen as necessary. Westad wrote of the significance of this Soviet move for 
their world position. He stated: 
 
To many Soviet leaders of the World War II generation, it was the successful 
intervention in the Horn of Africa that established the Soviet Union as a real 
global power – a power that could intervene at will throughout the world with 
decisive consequences.365 
  
   In 1977-78, events in Angola and Ethiopia immediately convinced Brzezinski of the 
need to advance progress in the normalization of relations with China and, equally if 
not more important, to foster an extensive strategic partnership between that country 
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and the United States. Zubok wrote of this strategic gambit and stated: ‘In order to 
contain the Soviets in Africa, Brzezinski and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
came up with a Realpolitick move, a rapprochement with Beijing in order to use “the 
China card” against the Soviets. Vance opposed such a policy as dangerous for 
Soviet-American relations, but Carter sided with Brzezinski and Brown. He sent 
Brzezinski to Beijing with broad authority to normalise relations with the Chinese 
Communists.’366 Brzezinski felt this was a strategic move of the utmost importance in 
the Cold War in order to regain the upper hand over the Soviets. In his memoirs he 
wrote:  
 
I had by then become quite preoccupied with Moscow’s misuse of détente to 
improve the Soviet geopolitical and strategic position around Saudi Arabia, 
especially through the Cuban military presence in Ethiopia. I believed that a 
strategic response was necessary.367 
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Fig. 6 U.S. President Carter, National Security Adviser Brzezinski & Secretary of State 
Vance 
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Normalization of Relations with China 
 
   In moving towards normalization with China the key interest for some in the National 
Security Council was that of forging a quasi-military alliance with China, directed against 
the Soviet Union and its allies.368 The aim was to tip the balance of power decisively 
against the Soviets and bring about a U.S. unilateral advantage over the Communist bloc. 
There had been rough equality between the Soviets and the Americans prior to this 
diplomatic move and the subsequent normalization of relations between the People’s 
Republic of China and the United States which was consummated in 1978. Stuart 
Eizenstat wrote about the purpose of Brzezinski’s visit and reaffirms that it was a 
strategic gambit designed to weaken the Soviet position around the world. He wrote:  
 
Normalising relations with China was pushed by Brzezinski and his China 
expert, Michael Oksenberg, from start to finish. Brzezinski saw the move as a 
way to counter Soviet strategy to achieve superiority from Western Europe and 
the Middle East to Southern Asia and the Indian Ocean, and also to “counter the 
image of the Carter administration as being soft vis-à-vis the Soviet Union,” 
even at the expense of delaying SALT II. He did so provocatively, going on Meet 
the Press after his first visit to China and blasting Soviet conduct around the 
world, while Vance was negotiating arms control with them.369  
 
   However, President Carter was torn between the proactive policies of NSA Brzezinski 
and the more precautionary line of Secretary of State Vance. In the end, Brzezinski’s 
views would prevail. Before the end of the Carter presidency, three of Brzezinski’s 
prominent opponents within the administration, including Cyrus Vance, had resigned. 
The policies they had advocated which placed a premium on the U.S.-Soviet relationship 
were eschewed and, as one writer observed ‘their demises confirmed the rise in influence 
of the man most actively promoting the Cold War within the Administration, 
Brzezinski.’370 Carter once noted in his diary that ‘Zbig is a little too competitive and 
incisive’ and this may well reflect the fact that Brzezinski strove hard within the 
administration to ensure that his views became official policy.371 
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   The first diplomatic envoy sent to China by President Carter had failed to resolve 
the issue of Taiwan. Subsequently, Brzezinski was invited to visit the People’s 
Republic in April 1978. This somewhat informal visit was not simply designed to 
finalise the progress already made by Nixon and Kissinger. Brzezinski had advised 
Carter to authorise the transferral of ‘dual use’ military technology to China. In his 
memoirs, he stated: ‘Vance, Brown, and I agreed to give the Chinese some advanced 
imaging systems as well as some small jets with sophisticated navigational equipment 
of the type that we would under no circumstances sell to the Soviets.’372  
   Prior to his departure, Brzezinski also ordered NATO representatives to brief the 
Chinese on the strategic dimensions of the U.S.-Soviet contest, whilst he himself 
would later deliver an overview of the progress that had been so far made in the 
SALT II negotiations. As preparations got under way, Brzezinski wrote, ‘gradually, 
the trip began to acquire greater strategic significance and more ambitious political 
goals.’373 Brzezinski also wrote that: ‘My own talks with the Chinese convinced me 
that I was the top official in the Carter administration in whom they had genuine 
confidence and whose strategic perspective to some extent they shared.’374  
    Brzezinski was sent to China in response to aggressive Soviet actions in the Horn 
of Africa, and furthermore to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, 
ensuring that the US gained more from its relationship with them than they do from 
each other.375 The Chinese invited Brzezinski to come to China more than once, 
showing how eager they were for a visit from him. In the end, President Carter also 
felt that the impact such a visit would have on US-Chinese relations was worth 
sending Brzezinski to Peking. 
   Brzezinski’s diplomacy was distinguished from Kissinger’s mainly by the fact that he 
further elaborated upon the geo-strategic imperatives of the new relationship by securing 
a tangible Chinese commitment to countering Soviet regional advancements. Also, 
Brzezinski was determined not to allow the Sino-American stalemate over Taiwan detract 
from their mutual accommodation on other important matters. The Soviet Union was, 
from this perspective, the preeminent threat to international stability and countermeasures 
aimed at addressing this ‘international menace’ took precedence over other issues.   
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   In a memorandum for Brzezinski from Mike Oksenberg, dated April 25, 1978, the 
nature of Brzezinski’s visit to China, Japan and South Korea was revealed: ‘In 
accordance with the Shanghai Communique of February 1972, Dr. Brzezinski will 
engage in consultations with Chinese leaders. He will also stop in Tokyo and Seoul for 
consultations with Japanese and South Korean leaders.’ It was furthermore stated that the 
purpose of his visit was: ‘In all three countries, to consult about matters of common 
strategic concern. The President has stated that we consider China to play an important 
role in the maintenance of the global equilibrium. We believe we have many points in 
common in the world today. We think it useful therefore to consult with Peking’s leaders 
periodically so that the two sides continue to understand our respective positions on a 
wide range of issues.’  
   When Mike Oksenberg was asked why the trip was taking place at this time and was it 
being carried out in order to play the “China card” against the Russians, he stated: 
‘Certainly not. Our relations with China grow out of our awareness of the historic and 
strategic importance of China. We approach each of the communist giants on the basis of 
our interest involved with each. We do not seek to use one against the other.’376 It is 
important to note however, in spite of Oksenberg’s affirmation of the US as not seeking 
to play the Chinese off against the Russians, that Woodcock (the US ambassador to 
China) was seen by the Chinese as being too soft on the Russians. They therefore 
welcomed a visit by Brzezinski, a known hard-liner, as this would establish a rapport 
between him and the equally anti-Russian Chinese leadership.  
   In a Presidential Statement, President Carter made explicit the official policy that the 
U.S. did not seek to engage with China at the expense of the Russians. However, this was 
only the official line, adhered for the sake of appearing peaceful. In reality, the U.S. was 
determined to gain a geostrategic advantage over the Soviet Union and was, as will be 
shown, playing the “China card.”  President Carter put it thus: ‘We are not normalizing 
for tactical or expedient reasons.’ He stated furthermore that: 
 
The change I am announcing tonight will be of long-term benefit to the peoples 
of both the United States and China – and, I believe, to all the peoples of the 
world. Normalization – and the expanded commercial and cultural relations it 
will bring with it – will contribute to our welfare, to stability in Asia, and to the 
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emergence of a diverse and peaceful community of independent nations. Positive 
relations with China can beneficially shape the world in which our children will 
live. 
 
   The major obstacle to normalization was the issue of Taiwan. It had been the United 
States’ position to supply that country with defensive weapons since Chiang Kai Shek 
was forced to set up the Chinese nationalist state there. President Carter sought to 
pursue normalization while continuing to sell arms to Taiwan, a sticking point for 
China, but one they would reluctantly accept given their determination to develop 
their economy and modernise. President Carter thus paid especial attention to this 
issue and reaffirmed Nixon and Kissinger’s position that Taiwan was China’s 
domestic issue and that the U.S. hoped it would be resolved peacefully and the 
country reintegrated with the mainland in the near future. As he put it:  
 
We will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue. I have paid special attention to ensure that normalization between the 
United States and the People’s Republic will not jeopardise the well-being of the 
people of Taiwan. 
 
   Finally, the President stated that: ‘The normalization of relations between the United 
States and China has no other purpose than this – the advancement of peace.’377   
Although President Carter denied that the normalization of relations with China had 
no purpose other than the promotion of peace, to some in the National Security 
Agency the goal was explicitly and deliberately to promote the U.S. position in the 
Cold War vis-à-vis the Soviets. In a memorandum from Paul B. Henze to Brzezinski, 
dated May 11, 1978, Henze outlined ‘what we want’:  
 
Chinese role in South Asia that serves to counter-balance Soviet influence 
there… 
We wish to prevent any outside power from gaining a position of dominance and 
we support the independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the 
region… 
Our basic strategic interests in Southeast Asia are to support the independence of 
friendly states in the area, to protect the freedom of the shipping lanes (which are 
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vital to all maritime powers), and to limit opportunities for the Soviets to “fish in 
troubled waters” – all interests which we share with China… 
We will maintain a strong strategic presence in Asia and the Pacific.378 
 
   The real purpose of normalization, regardless of President Carter’s assertions to the 
contrary, was, as Henze’s statement shows, to work to the detriment of the Soviet 
Union in East Asia and help bolster the U.S. position in the region. That Brzezinski 
sought to play the “China card” is the view taken by the eminent historian Walter 
LaFeber, who wrote that ‘Brzezinski became highly infatuated with China and the 
possibility of using the “China card” against the Soviets.’379 This argument is 
corroborated by the historian Daniel J. Sargent, who wrote that:  
 
Eager to leverage Beijing against Moscow, Brzezinski advocated a rapid 
expansion of Sino-American ties. He found a like minded partner in Vice 
Premier Deng Xiaoping, who emerged in 1977 as China’s dominant leader. Deng 
calculated that normalizing relations with Washington would advance China’s 
reintegration into the world economy while consecrating a strategic partnership 
against the USSR.380 
 
   In a conversation with Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, Brzezinski stated that: ‘With regard 
to the Middle East, I believe that our positions are fundamentally similar. We wish to 
promote a peaceful settlement in the area and to either reduce or exclude Soviet 
influence from the area.’ They thus shared a common geopolitical objective with the 
Chinese; namely, to expel the Soviet Union from the Middle East and, wherever 
possible, to curtail its influence on the world stage. Brzezinski also made the point 
that: 
 
We therefore feel that our relationship with China is of historic significance. It is 
an enduring relationship. It has long-term strategic importance. It is not only a 
tactical anti-Soviet expedient. If the Soviet Union remains a threat, if it persists 
in its hegemonistic designs, we want to cooperate with you in resisting them; but 
if we succeed in accommodation to some extent, if SALT reduces Soviet 
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strategic danger, we nevertheless feel that for global reasons, for historical 
reasons, we wish to have a relationship of ever closer friendship and cooperation 
with China because you are a major, vital force in world affairs, whether the 
Soviet Union is peaceful or aggressive, friendly or hostile to the United States. 
My personal guess is that the Soviet Union will remain hostile and aggressive for 
some time to come.381 
 
   It is interesting to note that Brzezinski stated that his visit was intended not only as a 
tactical anti-Soviet expedient, implying that it was, in part, designed to weaken the 
Soviet position in the region and internationally.  
   In a conversation with Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Brzezinski described the U.S. 
position in relation to China. He stated: ‘I can assure you that the U.S. has made up its 
mind.’ Brzezinski affirmed here that the U.S. was ready to proceed with 
normalization. 
He added: ‘We recognise that there is only one China.’ Brzezinski was stating here 
that Taiwan was considered by the U.S. to be a part of China. ‘We recognize the 
resolution of the Taiwan issue is your domestic affair.’… ‘We are continuing and will 
continue our military withdrawal from Taiwan.’… ‘We agree that we share much 
common ground and that we should work together to contain the Polar Bear.’… ‘We 
agree with you that one must not use China as a pawn to divert the Soviet Union 
against China. That is not our intention.’… ‘We do not agree that the main 
characteristic of the present era is a rivalry for world hegemony. We do not agree 
because while we are contesting the Soviet Union we are not contesting it to establish 
hegemony. We believe in a world of diversity composed of different systems and of 
different ideologies. Our own relationship with you is proof of this. We are opposing 
an effort to establish world hegemony. We are a world power. But the essence of our 
effort is not the promotion of hegemony but the opposition of hegemony.’  
   Brzezinski then stated unequivocally that the US was not a hegemonic power. This 
was the traditional position maintained from the outset of the Cold War; that the U.S. 
was in favour of diversity worldwide and not hegemony by a single power. As Stuart 
Eizenstat put it: ‘The announcement referred to mutual opposition by China and the 
United States to “hegemony” – an incendiary Chinese code word for Soviet global 
                                                 
381 Memorandum of Conversation – Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Chairman Hua Kuo-
feng, Brzezinski Donated Materials. 
 154 
ambitions, which Brzezinski had happily agreed should be included as a signal to the 
Soviets.’382 That the U.S. is not in favour of establishing hegemony is an idea that a 
considerable number of people would be prone to disagree with, especially when 
considering the military doctrine of Full Spectrum Dominance383 that has become 
central to U.S. military thinking in recent years. Arguably the U.S. was and still is a 
hegemonic power, perhaps bent not just on regional but global hegemony. One could 
argue that during the Cold War the U.S. was seeking to bring about a world of 
diversity and however this author would argue that, in the realist tradition, the United 
States is another great power that seeks hegemony and the maximising of its power 
for its own ends. However, if the U.S. did seek global hegemony this would surely 
have not been their official policy as the effect may have been to unite much of the 
world against them.  Brzezinski furthermore made the point that:  
 
We also do not agree with the view that war is inevitable. We believe war is 
avoidable providing we are strong, determined, and build up sufficient forces on 
the strategic and conventional level to make certain that anyone who starts a war 
will perish in such a war. We have the means to accomplish this objective, and I 
believe that this Administration has the will.’ ‘Our discussions show mutual or 
shared understanding of the central issues of this historical time, that the 
challenge confronting mankind is either that of hegemony or diversity.384 
 
   The primary purpose of Brzezinski’s visit was to advance the consultative 
relationship between the two countries, to ensure they exchange views in a frank and 
direct manner concerning their resolution of the issue of Taiwan. The second purpose 
of his going there was to advance the process of normalization. As President Carter 
himself stated:  
 
My purpose in sending you to China is two-fold: 
1. To continue the consultations called for by the Shanghai Communique; 
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2. To reassure the Chinese that my Administration is serious in seeking 
normalization.385 
 
   However, despite the limitations President Carter set upon Brzezinski’s negotiations 
with the Chinese, Brzezinski also took it upon himself to establish a tacit anti-Soviet 
alliance between the Chinese and the United States. In the aforementioned 
conversation with Huang Hua Brzezinski also mentioned he made ‘a series of 
suggestions as to steps the Chinese might take to assure more effective parallel action 
in dealing with Soviet designs in various areas.’386 Brzezinski was emphatic that the 
U.S. did not seek global or regional hegemony and in a speech to Foreign Minister 
Huang, Madame Huang, Chinese and American friends, he stated the following:  
 
We recognise – and share – China’s resolve to resist the efforts of any nation 
which seeks to establish global or regional hegemony. 
 
   Furthermore, in a subtle reference presumably to the Soviet Union, he stated: 
 
Only those aspiring to dominate others have any reason to fear the further 
development of American-Chinese relations.387 
 
   In a memorandum concerning a meeting with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao P’ing, dated 
May 21, 1978, at the Great Hall of the People in Peking, Brzezinski noted that: ‘In our 
relationships we will remain guided by the Shanghai Communique, by the principle 
that there is only one China and that the resolution of the issue of Taiwan is your 
problem.’ Brzezinski also referred to the Soviet Union as ‘our mutual adversary’. He 
stated: ‘Precisely because we have certain common fundamental interests and because 
we face the same challenge from the polar bear I think it would be useful to maximise 
contacts at a high level even if you cannot visit Washington.’ Thus, Brzezinski was 
seeking to establish an alliance with the Chinese because they both share the same 
enemy. This was a tactical anti-Soviet expedient. 
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   In relation to the process of normalization, Brzezinski stated: ‘Although my visit 
here is not to negotiate normalization, I would like to think of it as contributing to a 
step forward and not to a step backward.’ 
   Brzezinski then alluded to how little he was perturbed by the prospect of offending 
the Soviet Union: ‘I can assure you that my inclination to be fearful of offending the 
Soviet Union is rather limited.’ He added furthermore that: ‘As far as being afraid to 
offend the Soviet Union, I would be willing to make a little bet with you as to who is 
less popular in the Soviet Union – you or me.’ 
   Brzezinski understood that Moscow sought to drive a wedge between the U.S. and 
China and keep the two countries from coming together. Brzezinski therefore was 
determined to unite with China as this would have an enormous impact upon the 
balance of power between the two blocs. He mentioned what it was the Russians 
wanted. As he put it: ‘I think that it is clear that from the Soviet point of view absence 
of cooperation between the US and China is desirable. The Soviet Union would like to 
see a poor relationship between the U.S. and China.’ Brzezinski then described the 
US-Soviet relationship as one involving a mixture of competition and cooperation. He 
stated:  
 
I personally see no contradiction, and I think I speak for President Carter in this 
regard, between signing a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union when it is in 
our mutual interest and at the same time competing effectively when challenged 
politically or even reacting more directly when that challenge is more aggressive 
and assertive. We have seen examples of that in Africa. We may see examples of 
that in the Middle East. In that context, I think it is important that we not only 
consult but that we also consider in what ways our respectively independent 
reactions might be complementary.  
 
   Brzezinski is almost pleading with the Vice Premier of China for joint action in 
dealing with the Soviets. Such a move was extremely important in tipping the balance 
of power. The United States was allied with most of the great powers already. Having 
the communist giant and former ally of the Soviet Union China join their side was an 
enormous strategic coup.  Brzezinski fragmented the Soviet bloc from within but he 
also managed to build upon Kissinger’s success in turning Moscow’s former number 
one ally against the Soviet Union. He stated furthermore: ‘The fact is that in many 
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parts of the world in different ways we can do things and you can do things the effect 
of which is to reduce Soviet influence or repel Soviet aggression.’ He also added: ‘We 
are not naïve in dealing with the Soviet Union. For the last thirty years it has been the 
U.S. which has opposed Soviet hegemony designs and that is roughly twice as long as 
you have been doing it, so we have a little bit of experience in this.’  
   Interestingly, Teng, in responding to Brzezinski, made a prescient remark about the 
long term consequences of America’s policy of unconditional support for Israel in the 
Middle East. He stated: ‘If you side with Israel you antagonize yourselves with over 
100 million Arab people, then it is impossible to solve the Middle East issue 
forever.’388 It is important to note that, according to Brzezinski’s message to President 
Carter, he stated that the Chinese were more than just receptive of his 
recommendations for joint action in countering Soviet regional designs for hegemony. 
He stated: ‘In their conversations the Chinese were intensely anti-Soviet, not inclined 
to debate my firm rejection of the US as appeasing, and quite prepared to speak of 
“parallel” efforts to prevent the spread of Soviet hegemony.’389 
   Within the White House, Brzezinski was ready to move ahead with normalization at 
a quick pace. He advised that Beijing be not only placed on an equal footing to 
Moscow but that President Carter should actually grant ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status 
to China and also extend preferential treatment over the Soviet Union, particularly in 
the areas of advanced scientific and military technology.390 It seems that when an 
opportunity to strengthen the U.S. position vis-à-vis the Soviets presented itself, 
though one which conflicted with the administration’s human rights policy, gaining an 
advantage over the Soviet Union was considered more important. As Walter LaFeber 
stated: ‘China’s government regularly imprisoned dissidents. But instead of 
effectively protesting, Carter (at Brzezinski’s urging) sent new technology to the 
Chinese.’391 
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   Secretary of State Vance argued that an ‘even-handed’ approach ought to be 
pursued with respect to China and Russia, extending assistance and privileges to both 
simultaneously. Those who sided with Brzezinski however, pushed for a more 
‘balanced’ approach that would favour the Chinese in highly contentious areas, 
particularly military technology. Brzezinski explained the logic of this argument by 
stating that: 
 
We simply made the case that since China was so much weaker than the Soviet 
Union – posing no immediate military threat to us – and since it was helpful to us 
in various parts of the globe, greater consideration for China was necessary.392  
 
   This marked a significant departure from the policies of the previous two 
administrations. Kissinger had tried to balance closer ties to China with a firm 
commitment to détente. Brzezinski realised détente had been “buried in the sands of 
the Ogaden” and sought to increase hostilities with the Soviet Union and utterly defeat 
them.  
   Not only would Brzezinski successfully push for military technology to be 
transferred to China, but he also opposed the transfer of such technology to the Soviet 
Union, as he believed any aid given to the Soviets would only serve to perpetuate the 
Soviet Union, something that he was firmly against. As Andrianopoulos wrote, 
Brzezinski ‘opposed Soviet access to US credits and technology and the collaborative 
efforts in space because in his view they helped the Soviet economy and buttressed the 
Soviet political system, thus, reducing domestic pressures for needed reforms.’393 
Justin Vaisse pointed out that it was Brzezinski who put forth the policy to supply 
military equipment to the Chinese. He added furthermore that: ‘During the months that 
followed, China rapidly gained access to a whole gamut of advanced technologies and 
American military support equipment.’394 
   After arriving in Beijing in May 1978, Brzezinski would give a presentation to the 
Chinese Foreign Minister in which he clarified the new position of the Carter 
Administration. He described how both countries were confronted by the threat posed 
by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a military power with almost global reach. At 
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this first meeting, which included several high-ranking Chinese military officials, 
Brzezinski stated in his memoirs how: 
  
I went on to summarize Soviet strategy as involving an attempt to achieve 
strategic superiority, to gain political preponderance in Western Europe, to 
radicalise the Middle East, to destabilise Southern Asia, to penetrate the Indian 
Ocean region, and to encircle China.395 
 
   After this preliminary meeting with the foreign minister, Brzezinski had succeeded in 
convincing the Chinese to accept proposals for the exchange of trade delegations and 
military missions. A year later, the delegation sent out to China would become the 
‘most high-powered science and technology delegation ever sent by the United States 
to any foreign country.’396 The wide range of interests embodied in the delegation 
Brzezinski led is worth noting. It included top ranking officials from the Department of 
Defense, such as Mort Abramowitz, as well as Samuel Huntington of the National 
Security Council and Richard Holbrooke of the State Department. Many of the aims of 
the Chinese Communist Party regarding the ‘four modernizations’ of industry, 
agriculture, science, and defence were addressed by the respective delegates 
accompanying Brzezinski. While military hardware was provided to the Chinese, the 
U.S. stopped short of providing them with weaponry. 
   Indeed, even after both countries had concluded the signing of the Shanghai 
Communiqué on the normalization of diplomatic relations, Brzezinski established 
within the National Security Council several Chinese Committees, including ones for 
Science and Technology, Economics, and Culture. The Chinese also began to monitor 
Soviet military activity and provide intelligence on it to the United States. 
Furthermore, Brzezinski also made sure that the advances being made in Sino-
American relations would become practically irreversible. He stated:  
 
An even more important bureaucratic ploy was for Oksenberg and me to 
schedule a number of trips to China by various members of the Cabinet, thereby 
involving every key policy maker and every major bureaucracy in a constructive 
relationship with China.397  
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   Brzezinski finally met with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping over an informal dinner, 
where the two men discussed what had hitherto been the major obstacle to 
normalization, the issue of Taiwan. The greatest success of Brzezinski’s trip, many 
would say, was that he convinced the Chinese to go ahead with normalization whilst 
the United States continued supplying arms to Taiwan. Brzezinski was aware that 
Deng could not ‘openly’ permit the US to supply weapons to Taiwan, but he also knew 
the urgency that the Chinese leader placed upon economic reform was such that he 
could no longer allow the issue to obstruct negotiations.  
   With the issue of Taiwan resolved, the two countries were able to proceed with 
normalization. Within the official statement the Chinese released concerning 
normalization it was stated:  
 
As is known to all, the Government of the PRC is the sole legal government of 
China and Taiwan is a part of China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial 
issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the USA. It 
has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit of the Shanghai 
Communique and through their joint efforts, thus enabling the normalization of 
relations so ardently desired by the people of the two countries. As for the way of 
bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the 
country, it is entirely China’s internal affair.398 
 
   This author would argue the greatest success of Brzezinski’s trip to China was that 
the Chinese began to oppose Soviet expansionism and the effect this had upon the 
balance of power. However, the overcoming of the issue of Taiwan was a major 
breakthrough and allowed for cordial and constructive relations to be established 
between the two great powers. When Brzezinski spoke of an eventual reunification 
occurring sometime in the future, he also reaffirmed that the United States withheld the 
right to supply defensive weapons to Taipei. Enrico Fardella argued that Brzezinski 
‘knew how to exploit Chinese willingness to achieve normalization in order to get the 
best compromise possible.’399  
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   Brzezinski was prepared to offer even more extensive military aid to China than 
previous administrations had done. By proposing to the Chinese access to American 
technology beyond what they had anticipated, Brzezinski may have realized that Deng 
would be even less likely to let the issue of Taiwan inhibit a Sino-American 
rapprochement. Brzezinski thus managed to draw the Chinese into a quasi-military 
alliance owing largely to their desire for access to economic aid, yet America’s support 
for Chinese nationalist and anti-communist separatists on the island of Taiwan 
continued largely unabated.  
   Within the Chinese political elite many knew Brzezinski and they agreed with the 
firm and comprehensive measures he recommended for dealing with Soviet regional 
hegemony. Mike Oksenberg, the Carter administration’s specialist on Chinese affairs, 
made the very significant observation that after negotiations had stalled following 
Vance’s first visit, the Chinese ‘turned to the official whose world view more closely 
corresponded to their own.’400 Brzezinski and Deng Xiaoping shared many similar 
views when it came to the primacy of national interests and the need to check the 
growing power of the Soviet Union. Their mutual understanding would lead to the 
establishment of military and diplomatic ties between the world’s most powerful state 
and the world’s most populous one.     
   According to Henry Kissinger, ‘for a long time, American policymakers, blinded by 
ideological preconceptions, failed to appreciate that the Sino-Soviet split represented a 
strategic opportunity for the West.’401 That strategic opportunity, made possible by 
Nixon and Kissinger’s diplomacy, was more fully realised following Brzezinski’s 
initiatives. To gain such a de facto military partnership with China that would also 
serve to weaken the Soviet Union was an enormous political breakthrough for the 
United States. As Enrico Fardella has remarked:  
 
Brzezinski achieved normalization with Beijing at conditions that were 
considered “unimaginable” previously—that is, the continuation of arms sales to 
Taiwan —and strengthened the strategic partnership with Beijing, thus 
establishing an advantage over Moscow that was unprecedented in the history of 
the Cold War.402 
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   At this point in history, the United States had firmly rejected strategic parity between 
itself and the Soviet Union but sought out predominance over its communist foe. This 
was a policy in line with the views of Brzezinski.403 
   As a result of Brzezinski’s visit to Beijing, China would receive American military 
technology that was unattainable for the Soviet Union.404 J.P.D. Dunbabin remarked 
how ‘the incoming Reagan administration was reportedly ‘startled by the depth and 
breadth’ of U.S.-Chinese relations.’405 American financial investment and scientific 
expertise soon began to flow into China helping that country to become the 
economically dynamic power it is today. The Chinese also began to help counter 
Soviet regional influence by backing the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia against the 
Soviet-sponsored North Vietnamese and, indirectly by helping to fund the Mujahedeen 
against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Brzezinski’s visit to China also 
included a stop-off in Japan, where, according to Keio University Professor Yoshide 
Soeya, he convinced the Japanese foreign minister to go ahead with the signing of the 
Peace and Friendship Treaty with China. He asserted that: 
 
The established theory is that after Brzezinski's China visit in May 1977, the U.S. 
and China moved toward normalization. On his way home from that visit he 
stopped over in Japan. In his memoirs, Brzezinski wrote that he tried to convince 
Japanese leaders to move toward the TPF and he also wrote that after his talks, 
Japan began to move in that direction. There are many in our field in America 
who espouse this theory.406 
 
   In his memoirs, Brzezinski spoke of how he was able to convince the Japanese to go 
ahead with the ratification of the treaty. He was able to bridge the division over the 
issue by assuring them that ‘opposition to regional hegemony,’ the controversial clause 
in the treaty, implied opposition not solely to hegemony by the Soviet Union but by 
any power. Brzezinski was able to reassure the Japanese on this point and in doing so, 
helped to end the official ‘state of war’ that Asia’s two foremost powers had been in 
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since World War II. In a memorandum summarising Brzezinski’s meeting with 
Ambassador Ch’ai Tse-min, Brzezinski stated:  
 
I am pleased with the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan. 
After leaving Peking, I talked to the Japanese leaders about this issue and 
encouraged them to move ahead. This was different from the previous 
Administrations, which adopted a posture of non-involvement. We believe this 
treaty will help secure peace and prevent the appearance of domination or 
hegemony by other countries.407 
 
   When Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had first visited China in 1972, the USSR 
seemed almost on a par geopolitically with the United States. As a result of 
Brzezinski’s East Asian trip, China had sided decisively with the United States against 
the Soviets and also undertook to establish peaceful relations with Japan. Brzezinski’s 
diplomacy would go a considerable way toward tipping the balance of power in favour 
of the United States and its allies. The ‘triangular-diplomacy’ Kissinger advocated, 
involving China, Russia and the United States, was to a certain degree being replaced 
by Brzezinski’s ‘pacific triangle’ which aimed at closer cooperation between Japan, 
China and the United States, to the exclusion of the Soviet Union.408 As 
Andrianopoulos stated:  
 
   Emphasising Moscow’s desire to derail the PRC’s modernization to preclude 
the emergence of another modern power in the Far East and stressing that a 
rapidly modernizing PRC could assist in preventing Moscow’s domination of 
Eurasia, Brzezinski recommended that the US and Japan actively support the 
PRC’s economic modernization and quietly expand the scope of informal 
security consultations with Peking in order to establish an informal geopolitical 
triangle in the Far East.409  
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   George C. Herring provided a seemingly accurate account of Brzezinski’s control 
over the Carter administration’s normalization policy with China as well as its 
significance. He wrote: 
 
   With Brzezinski in the driver’s seat, the Carter administration in 1979 moved 
full throttle toward closer ties with China built around mutual opposition to the 
Soviet Union. The NSC ignored Vance’s continued calls for balance and shut the 
State Department out of China policy. The administration stopped short of the 
alliance Deng apparently preferred but collaborated closely to thwart Moscow’s 
perceived hegemonic aspirations. The USSR had become Vietnam’s closest ally 
and chief benefactor after the fall of Saigon, arousing fears in Beijing. Even 
before normalization was consummated, Carter appears to have given Deng the 
green light to invade Vietnam – an ironic twist in that a decade earlier the United 
States had gone to war there to stop Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. China 
became a major outpost for snooping on the Soviet Union. The United States 
removed export controls and sold China modern technology and eventually 
weapons. In a move of enormous symbolic importance, the administration in the 
summer of 1979 ignored the Jackson-Vanik amendment, winked at China’s 
human rights violations, and offered most-favoured-nation status and Export-
Import Bank Credits. Normalization was an obvious move, but in taking it the 
administration lost a necessary sense of balance and was enticed into a 
connection that compromised its ideals and damaged broader global interests. 
Mutual antipathy toward the Soviet Union proved a flimsy basis for a lasting 
Sino-American relationship.410 
 
   Daniel J. Sargent argued that the major consequence of the Sino-American 
rapprochement was to set back Soviet-American relations. He wrote: ‘Rather than 
liberalising China, the major consequence of the Sino-American rapprochement of 
1978-79 would be to exacerbate the deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations.’411 
However, while this is true, it is arguable that it was a price worth paying in order to 
cause damage to Soviet international standing and drive a wedge between the former 
giant communist allies.  
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   Finally, Brzezinski reveals the extent to which he envisaged Sino-American military 
cooperation would go when he proposed in January 1980, following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan that: 
 
We use the Soviet invasion of a country in a region of strategic sensitivity to 
Asia as a justification for opening the doors to a U.S.-Chinese defence 
relationship.412 
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Fig. 7 U.S. National Security Adviser Brzezinski & Vice Premier of the People’s 
Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, Beijing, 1978 
 
Fig. 8 The Eurasian Chessboard. 
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The Soviet-Afghan War 
 
   In Brzezinski’s landmark work, The Grand Chessboard, he described how the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan ushered in a new geo-strategic engagement for the US 
military: 
In the Cold War’s final phase, a third defensive “front” – the southern – appeared 
on Eurasia’s map. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan precipitated a two-
pronged American response: direct U.S. assistance to the native resistance in 
Afghanistan in order to bog down the Soviet army; and a large-scale build-up of 
the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf as a deterrent to any further 
southward projection of Soviet political or military power. The United States 
committed itself to the defence of the Persian Gulf region, on a par with its 
western and eastern Eurasian security interests.413 
   The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was regarded by President Carter as possibly the 
greatest threat to international peace since the Second World War.414 Within hours of 
the event, a decision was made by a number of countries, informally led by the United 
States, to arm and fund the Mujahedeen. The Afghan resistance was trained and 
equipped to fight a protracted war, providing the United States, in Brzezinski’s 
calculation, the ‘opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.’415 The Soviet-
Afghan officially ended the period of détente between the superpowers and ignited the 
Second Cold War which renewed hostilities until the conflict’s close in 1991. The 
invasion brought forth a tough response from President Carter. As Westad wrote: 
 
For hardliners in the Carter administration, and especially for the National 
Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
provided much welcome proof of Soviet aggressive intentions in the Third 
World. In his report to Carter on the day of the invasion, Brzezinski noted that 
“both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil” and that “the age long dream of 
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Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean” was in the process of being 
fulfilled. While the president himself had been sliding toward a more alarmist 
interpretation of Soviet actions at least since the Horn of Africa crisis, it was 
Brzezinski’s portrayal of Brezhnev’s Afghanistan policy as a naked act of 
aggression and as a first step in challenging US positions in the Gulf area that 
won Carter over to seeing the Soviets as implacable enemies and the invasion of 
Afghanistan as the gravest threat to world peace since 1945. When the National 
Security Council met to discuss US countermeasures, the president surprised 
even his National Security Adviser by supporting all proposals that were on the 
table including a prohibition on U.S. grain exports to the Soviet Union and a 
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, both measures that would do little good 
to the embattled president’s chances of re-election. But for Carter, the need to get 
back at the Soviets and, as he saw it, deter further Soviet aggression was stronger 
than even his political survival skills. “Soviet actions over the next ten to twenty 
years will be coloured by our behaviour in this crisis,” the president said. “We 
should… try to do the maximum, short of a world war, to make the Soviets see 
that this was a major mistake.416 
 
   For the Soviet Union it marked the first and the last time its military forces would 
advance beyond the borders of the Warsaw Pact. Whilst not the primary cause for the 
disintegration of the USSR, the war in Afghanistan was a devastating conflict 
reminiscent of the American experience in Vietnam, in that it sapped the resources of 
the Red Army. The foregoing shall therefore include an analysis of both the causes of 
the Soviet-Afghan war as well as the impact it had upon the decline of the Soviet 
Union and the rise of American regional hegemony.    
   Prior to the Carter Administration the United States had not considered Afghanistan 
a critical security issue. Of greater concern to the two previous administrations were 
the reorientation of Egypt toward the West and efforts to establish relations with 
China. Afghanistan was of little economic value to the United States; its significance 
for a great power derived mostly from its proximity to the Middle East, Central Asia 
and the Indian subcontinent. It can be seen to occupy the centre of the Eurasian 
chessboard. It was especially in this context that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
was considered by the United States to be a major threat to regional stability. As Mike 
Oksenberg stated in a memorandum to Brzezinski:  
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If the newspaper accounts are reliable, the coup in Afghanistan is a significant 
development with major implications for Iran, Pakistan, and China. As you 
know, the major trading routes in that part of the world cross Afghanistan and 
provide access, therefore, into the troublesome border regions of all three 
countries.417  
 
   The United States was concerned above all that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
would be a stepping stone to possible control over Afghanistan’s southern and 
western neighbours, Iran and Pakistan and, by extension, would lead to Soviet control 
of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. This is how the invasion was regarded by the 
Carter administration. As Zubok wrote:  
 
President Jimmy Carter and his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
concluded that the invasion of Afghanistan could only be the beginning of a 
strategic thrust toward the Persian Gulf, the largest oil pool in the world. This 
meant a clear and imminent danger to the most vital interests of the United 
States. In a series of punitive sanctions, the White House froze and suspended 
most détente agreements, talks, trade, and cultural relations with the Soviets. 
Carter even imposed an embargo on profitable grain sales to the USSR and 
appealed to the world to boycott the Olympic Games scheduled to take place in 
Moscow that summer.418 
 
   In a memorandum for the President, written by Brzezinski and dating from the day 
after the Soviet invasion, Brzezinski stated: ‘If the Soviets succeed in Afghanistan, 
and if Pakistan acquiesces, the age-long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the 
Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled.’ Brzezinski sought to use the invasion of 
Afghanistan as a justification for uniting the Muslim world against the Soviets. He 
stated: ‘World public opinion may be outraged at the Soviet intervention. Certainly, 
Moslem countries will be concerned, and we might be in a position to exploit this.’ 
Brzezinski therefore sought to galvanise the Muslim world against the Soviet invasion 
and would encourage the President to recruit militants to the Afghan Mujahedeen 
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from countries right across the Muslim world, especially from Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan. Brzezinski also recommended encouraging the Chinese to help the rebels, 
launching a propaganda campaign in Muslim countries to foster support for the 
Afghan rebels and also to gain financial support for them. Finally, he recommended 
going to the UN to elicit a condemnation of Soviet action as a threat to the peace.419  
   The first half of the Carter administration was characterised by a greater deference 
to Soviet involvement in Third World countries. However, more frequently in the 
second half Secretary of State Vance’s views were overruled by those of National 
Security Adviser Brzezinski and thus the United States took on a more hard-line 
approach toward Moscow. Brzezinski did not wish to see the State Department’s 
preoccupation with the conclusion of the SALT II treaties take attention away from 
expansive Soviet behaviour abroad. In 1979, President Carter decided to go ahead 
with the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Europe and the United 
States also increased its naval presence in the Persian Gulf, particularly in response to 
Soviet involvement in Ethiopia and Angola. A Rapid Deployment Force was 
established as a means to resolve a regional conflict before it would escalate. This was 
an initiative which Brzezinski proposed. As he stated: ‘The President also approved 
my idea for developing a very small rapid intervention force, capable of very quick 
reaction, for the purpose of helping a friendly government under a subversive 
attack.’420 With the Soviet Union having lost sway in Egypt and much of the Middle 
East, and with China gravitating toward the West, Moscow became determined to 
prevent Afghanistan from falling outside of its political ambit.  
   The Carter administration felt that not to do prevent the expansion of the Soviet 
Union into Afghanistan would set a dangerous trend. As Marshall Brement of the 
National Security Council put it in memorandum to Brzezinski: ‘If the Soviets 
manage a successful counter-insurgency effort, it will lead almost inevitably to further 
“adventurism” in the years ahead.’421 
   Brzezinski was the one who got the United States military permanently involved in 
the Middle East through establishing a Rapid Deployment Force in the wake of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As Daniel J Sargent wrote:  
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Zbigniew Brzezinski’s role in the Arab-Israeli peace process was peripheral, but 
the national security adviser was not disengaged from the Middle East. Far from 
it, he became in 1979 the architect of a strategic reorientation that turned on 
events in Iran. In late 1978, Brzezinski adopted the idea that an “arc of crisis” 
spanning Aden to Chittagong – a crescent atop the Indian Ocean – was the 
source of “our greatest vulnerability.” In this arc, Brzezinski explained, a 
“political vacuum” arising from “fragile social and political structures” might 
“be filled with elements more sympathetic to the Soviet Union.” Eager to pre-
empt that eventuality, Brzezinski began to envisage a “consultative security 
framework” for the region. It would involve consolidating alliances with Egypt, 
Israel, and Turkey and an enhanced “special” relationship with Saudi Arabia. 
Brzezinski proposed development assistance, invoking the Marshall Plan, but his 
regional framework presumed a hard-defensive shell. “We shall have to augment 
our military presence,” Brzezinski wrote. He envisaged the permanent 
deployment of US forces, even the establishment of “an East-of-Suez Command 
entity of some sort.” Now that the shah had dropped the responsibilities for 
regional security that Britain had forsaken in the late 1960s, the United States, 
Brzezinski implied, would have to assume that hegemonic role itself.422  
 
   Brzezinski was thus the one who devised a hegemonic role for the U.S. in the 
Middle East. The Rapid Deployment Force and bases acquired in the Persian Gulf 
would evolve into Central Command and was the initiative which gave birth to a 
domineering presence for the United States throughout the region, which the United 
States particularly fulfilled following the withdrawal of the Soviets from the region 
and which continues to the present day. 
   While some observers in the United States viewed the invasion as part of a broader 
imperial design for Soviet southward expansion, the Russian leadership justified its 
intrusion as necessary in order to assist a legitimate Communist government against 
an externally supported insurrection. As Leonid Brezhnev stated in January 1980, 
Afghanistan ‘encountered an external aggression, rude interference from outside into 
its internal affairs. Thousands and tens of thousands of insurgents, armed and trained 
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abroad, whole armed units were sent into the territory of Afghanistan.’423 That the 
invasion was not part of some broad imperialistic design to advance toward the 
Persian Gulf has now been confirmed. As Best, Hanimaki, Maiolo, and Schulze put it: 
‘In reality, the Soviets probably launched the invasion of Afghanistan not to threaten 
Western access to oil, but in order to prevent the rise of another fundamentalist 
Islamic regime on their own doorstep.’424 
   It has now been conclusively proven that the Soviets were in fact not acting 
aggressively but were defending a legitimate communist government from an 
insurrection. As Sargent has written: ‘Soviet motives were in fact more defensive than 
aggrandising: some Kremlin leaders hoped to pre-empt the rise of Islamist influence; 
others worried about Afghanistan’s defection from the East Bloc’425Thus, the invasion 
of Afghanistan was a defensive move and brought part of some broad regional thrust 
toward the Persian Gulf. Zubok commented on how the Soviets were determined at all 
costs to prevent the Americans from winning the allegiance of Afghanistan as this 
would bring them dangerously close to the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union. As he 
put: ‘As a former senior KGB officer recalls, he viewed Afghanistan as a Soviet 
sphere of interest and believed that the Soviet Union “had to do whatever possible to 
prevent the Americans and the CIA from installing an anti-Soviet regime there.”426  
The Carter administration, Brzezinski in particular, nonetheless cleaved to a 
maximalist interpretation of Soviet goals and seized the opportunity to implement its 
regional security framework.’427 Such a maximalist interpretation provided the 
justification for funding the Mujahedin and, equally if not more important, for 
establishing the RDF and acquiring military bases in the region, thus establishing U.S. 
hegemony over the Persian Gulf/Middle East region, to the detriment of the Soviets.  
Westad discussed Brzezinski’s role in garnering support for the Mujahedeen from 
Pakistan. Brzezinski would travel throughout the country and visit a military training 
facility in the Khyber Pass. He wrote: 
 
In February 1980, barely six weeks after the Soviet invasion, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski went to Pakistan, where he discussed an expanded covert action 
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program with General Zia and travelled to the Afghan frontier, where he was 
photographed waving a khalashnaov rifle roughly in the direction of the border 
line. On his way home, Brzezinski stopped in Saudi-Arabia, where he agreed a 
Saudi matching contribution for the Mujahedeen to anything the Americans 
would provide. Well before Carter had been defeated by Ronald Reagan in the 
U.S. presidential election in the fall of 1980, there was agreement within the 
administration that Afghanistan could, and should, be made into a “Soviet 
Vietnam.”428 
 
   It is clear that the Soviet leadership, following the Iranian revolution, was also 
fearful that radical Islamic ideologies would spill into Soviet controlled territories. 
This would pose a major threat to the communist leadership as Islam would provide 
alternative rallying cry to communist ideology and allegiance to the communist 
government. As the Soviet Union had suppressed religions in its satellites, their 
revival would pose a threat to the authority. As Andrew Hartman noted: ‘the sweeping 
gains being made by Islamic fundamentalism, including the Iranian revolution that 
placed Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini in power, were as much a warning to the Soviets 
as they were to the Americans.’429  
   The Soviets were concerned above all that fundamentalist Islam would spread into 
the Central Asian Republics. As Best, Hanimaki, Maiolo and Schulze put it: ‘First, the 
Soviets were clearly concerned about the possible rise of fundamentalist Islam, which 
formed the major opposition to the PDPA’s rule, as it presented a latent threat to 
Soviet control over its Central Asian Republics.’430 That the Soviets were afraid of 
such a prospect is confirmed by the following quote: ‘The Soviet nightmare was that 
the United States would support the rise and spread of anti-Soviet fundamentalist 
Islam to the southern belly of the USSR.’431 Indeed, this had been Brzezinski’s 
intention all along: to foment radical Islam in the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union 
in order to fragment the Soviet Union and bring about the secession of the Central 
Asian Republics. This was carried out by several means, including exporting Korans 
to the region in order to radicalise its inhabitants. 
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   In a letter to President Carter dating from December 29, 1979, Brezhnev stated: ‘I 
want to once more stress that the limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan has only 
one goal – to provide assistance in repulsing the acts of external aggression, which 
have been taking place for a prolonged period of time and have now assumed even 
greater scale.’ 432 
   Brezhnev, reacting to the Islamic extremists supported by the United States and its 
allies who sought to topple the Afghan communist regime, promised that once this 
threat was neutralised the Soviet forces would be withdrawn. Little did he know at the 
time that, thanks to Brzezinski and others in the Carter administration, the aid to the 
Mujahedeen would be stepped up to such an extent that the Soviet military would be 
effectively bogged down in a war that it could not decisively win and from which it 
would not be able to withdraw.  
  President Carter asserted that the USSR was deceiving the world by portraying its 
actions as defensive and by claiming it was invited into Afghanistan to give support to 
a faltering communist regime. He stated: ‘The Soviets claim falsely that they were 
invited into Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed outside 
threat. But President Amin, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet 
invasion, was assassinated – along with several members of his family – after the 
Soviets gained control of the capital city of Kabul.’ President Carter emphasised the 
geopolitical threat posed by the Soviet Union, claiming its offensive actions were 
designed not merely to save communism in Afghanistan but were part of a regional 
thrust to dominate the Persian Gulf region. He stated: ‘This invasion is an extremely 
serious threat to peace – because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into 
neighbouring countries in Southwest Asia, and also because such an aggressive 
military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.’  
   Vaisse noted that Brzezinski was right in asserting that the invasion of Afghanistan 
was part of a broader objective to advance toward the Persian Gulf and establish a 
warm water port, in addition to dominating the region. This, indeed, had been a goal 
of the Russians, dating back to the Great Game of the nineteenth century. It would 
appear that while the Russians claim that they were protecting a faltering communist 
regime in Afghanistan appears valid, it is also true that one of their long-term 
objectives was to advance toward the Indian Ocean and establish a warm water port 
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and thus going into Afghanistan may have been part of a broader move to advance 
toward the Indian Ocean, despite of Russian claims to the contrary. Or, to put it more 
precisely, while the reason for going into Afghanistan may have been to prop up a 
faltering communist regime, it was a long-term goal of the Russians to advance 
toward the Persian Gulf and the invasion would have intrinsically furthered this 
interest. 
   Carter also justified US opposition to the Soviets by referring to the invasion as an 
act contravening international law. He stated: ‘It is a callous violation of international 
law and the United Nations charter.’ He also portrayed the act in religious terms, 
emphasising that the allegedly godless Soviet Union was attempting to overthrow a, 
by comparison, devoutly religious Islamic state. He said: ‘It is a deliberate effort of a 
powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people.’ President 
Carter then went on to mention the quintessentially benevolent nature of the U.S. 
opposition to the Soviet Union in light of the fact that the United States, he claimed, 
did not desire to gain hegemony over the region and had the sovereignty of the Middle 
Eastern nations in mind when moving to counteract Soviet influence in Afghanistan 
and the Middle East more generally. He stated: ‘The United States wants all nations in 
the region to be free and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged in this 
invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain their dominance over Afghanistan 
and then extend their control to adjacent countries – the stable, strategic and peaceful 
balance of the world will be changed. This would threaten the security of all nations 
including, of course, the United States, our allies and friends.’ Citing this threat to the 
freedom of independent regional states Carter then asserted: ‘Therefore, the world 
cannot stand by and permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with impunity.’ It is 
interesting to note that President Carter’s position drew popular support from a large 
number of nations, as evidenced by the fact that 40 nations petitioned the UN to 
condemn the Soviet invasion and to demand the immediate withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan. President Carter, at the end of this speech, then urged all 
nations to cease doing business with the Soviet Union until it withdraws from 
Afghanistan. He stated: ‘In the meantime, neither, the United States nor any other 
nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as 
usual with the Soviet Union.’  
   That the process of détente came to an end following the invasion is stated by John 
Lewis Gaddis, who wrote: ‘that first use of Red Army troops outside the Soviet Union 
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and Eastern Europe since the end of World War II left the administration little choice 
but to withdraw the SALT II treaty from the Senate, and to call a halt, for the time 
being, to any further steps in the direction of détente.’433  
   Finally, in reference to the enormity of the impact of the U.S. response to the Soviet 
invasion the President maintained that the U.S. reaction would be proportionate to the 
scale of the Soviet invasion. He declared: ‘The response of the international 
community to the Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of the 
Soviet action.’434 
   The United States did not begin to officially support the Mujahedeen with military 
aid until after the Soviet Army had crossed the Afghan border. In an interview with a 
French reporter in 1998, published in the newspaper Le Nouvel Observateur, 
Brzezinski admitted however that non-military aid to the Mujahedeen began six 
months prior to the Soviet invasion. He stated that:  
 
It was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to 
the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a 
note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was 
going to induce a Soviet military intervention.435  
 
   Brzezinski appeared to believe the covert aid begun by the CIA had actually caused 
the Soviets to intervene. It is now understood that this covert aid did in fact precipitate 
the Soviet intervention.436 Brzezinski described how ‘that secret operation was an 
excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap.’437 The 
presidential finding signed in July 1979 by President Carter financed Mujahedeen 
propaganda and provided radio equipment as well as cash (used to purchase arms) and 
other non-military supplies.438 
Justin Vaisse defended Brzezinski, quoting him as having said that it was not his 
intention to draw the Russians into a quagmire. He stated: ‘Brzezinski himself 
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explains that he had not sought to draw the Soviets into a trap, with the underlying 
idea that Afghanistan would end up digging the grave of the USSR, but that he simply 
wanted to create difficulties for them, to heighten the dilemma they were going to 
have to face.’439 This however is contentious. It seems beyond a doubt that they were 
deliberately trying to lure the Soviets into intervening, so they could create for them 
their “Vietnam war.” 
   Here is a quote from Brzezinski explaining what the Americans were doing in 
Afghanistan: ‘We didn’t really trap them, but we knew what they were doing. And 
what we knew is that they were injecting themselves into Afghanistan… But anyway, 
what happened is we knew they were injecting their forces into Afghanistan, already 
in the summer, we also knew that the Mujahideen were resisting. So, we first started 
to give them money, about six months before the Soviets went in. When we started to 
give them money, I told Carter that I think they’ll go in, and they’ll probably use that 
as an excuse in practice, but that they’re going in anyway, because they are taking 
over the regime. So, we didn’t suck them in but we knew what we were doing, namely 
we were in a sense engaging them in a preliminary skirmishing, prior to the more 
overt intervention.’440  
   Brzezinski evidently wants us to believe that he was not enticing the Soviets to 
intervene; that it was not his intention to lure them into a protracted military conflict, 
this despite what was said in the Nouvel Observateur interview. If Brzezinski were to 
admit that it was his intention to lure them in he could claim credit for having 
defeated the Soviets and helped bring the Cold War to an end. However, he would 
appear as the aggressor and this would no doubt do damage to his reputation and 
legacy. However, this author would argue that he was merely saving face by claiming 
it was not his intention and that in reality he was deliberately luring the Soviets into 
Afghanistan (or the “Afghan trap” as he said himself) so as to bog them down 
militarily and hasten the breakdown of the USSR. It is therefore chiefly due to 
Brzezinski that the Soviets went into Afghanistan and he indeed can be accredited 
with having played a primary role in ending the Cold War. This point is contentious. 
However, there are many in the US who believe that the Soviet Afghan War was the 
principle cause of the breakup of the Soviet Union, as it was the decisive military 
defeat that precluded the Soviet Union’s collapse. Brzezinski was responsible for the 
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decision to fund the Mujahedin, therefore he can be credited with the policy which 
brought the Soviets to their knees and ultimately led to the collapse of their empire.  
   This explanation is justified; the fact of the matter is that the whole purpose of 
funding the Mujahideen in July 1979 was to draw the Soviets into the country, create 
problems for them in their own backyard, and bog them down militarily, in the hope 
that this would hasten the breakdown of the USSR. Deliberately inciting the Soviets 
to intervene is what all the evidence points to. It was Brzezinski’s intention from the 
time he became National Security Adviser to inflict maximum damage upon the 
Soviet Union and Afghanistan provided him with the opportunity he longed for; 
namely, to sink them into a morass and sap the strength of their military.  
   It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that this aid given by the CIA to the 
Mujahedeen in July 1979 was perhaps the main reason behind the Soviet decision to 
intervene militarily. The very use of the term ‘trap’ by Brzezinski implies a deliberate 
attempt to lure the Soviets into a protracted military conflict. This view is corroborated 
by Tom Hanahoe who wrote that:  
 
President Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, subsequently 
revealed that the Soviet invasion had been deliberately orchestrated by 
Washington, beginning on 3 July 1979, almost six months before the Soviet 
invasion, when President Carter authorised the provision of covert U.S. aid to 
opponents of Afghanistan’s pro-Soviet ruling regime.441  
 
   Stuart Eizenstat also corroborated this argument. He stated: ‘Since the spring 
Brzezinski had been pressing the president to start a covert program to help the 
mujahideen. In July, in a decision almost unknown to this day, Carter approved the 
supply of communications devices and medical and other non-lethal supplies. Fully six 
months before the Soviet invasion, Washington began helping the rebels in the hope of 
improving their chances of holding Soviet proxy forces at bay.’442 
   It was not so much concern for the people in Afghanistan but rather the prospect of 
inflicting severe damage on Soviet forces which impelled the CIA to cultivate the 
Mujahedeen from across the Pakistani border and through the conduit of the Inter-
Services-Intelligence (Pakistani Secret Service).  
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   Without involvement from the CIA as well as MI6, it is still quite certain that 
opposition to the pro-Soviet government would have increased. The reforms that were 
being implemented by the Afghan Communist Party had antagonised most native 
Afghans and were to a large degree responsible for spawning the counter-revolutionary 
movement. The party lacked popular support and its ideology was increasingly at odds 
with the more traditionalist outlook of the local population. As John Lewis Gaddis 
remarked, ‘it was a meaningful moment in the history of Marxism-Leninism: an 
ideology that had claimed to know the path to a world proletarian revolution found 
itself confronting a regional religious revolution for which its analytical tools were 
wholly inadequate.’443  
   The resurgence of Islam as a unifying political force was inimical to Soviet designs 
for Afghan society.  The atheistic nature of the Soviet Union was a factor which helped 
galvanise support amongst the Afghan people for resistance to the Soviet invasion. 
This was noted by Brzezinski in a memorandum to the Secretary of State, Cyrus 
Vance, on March 30, 1979, three months after Soviet troops had crossed the Afghan 
border. Brzezinski stated:  
    
It is clear that the Afghan people fear the policies of their government. Not least 
of all, they fear the imposition of atheism from an avowedly Marxist regime 
supported by the power of the Soviet Union – which has ruthlessly oppressed 
Islam and all religions. The Afghans do not want to become central Asian 
republics of the Soviet Union nor should they have to. The Soviet Union must 
allow the people and government of Afghanistan to work out their own problems 
and find a solution that meets the needs of the country.444 
 
   However, though there had already been animosity between the Soviet Union and 
native Afghans, it is also quite clear that without the support the Mujahedeen received 
from the CIA and Islamic soldiers recruited from abroad – the Afghan Mujahedeen 
could not have endured a war lasting almost ten years against an occupying 
superpower. On December 26, the day after the invasion, in a discursive memo to 
President Carter, NSA Brzezinski authorised the expansion of U.S. aid, including 
military equipment, to the Mujahedeen:   
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It is essential that Afghanistan’s resistance continues. This means more money as 
well as arms shipments to the rebels, and some technical advice. To make the 
above possible we must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the 
rebels. This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees 
to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan 
cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy.445 
 
   In order to secure the compliance of the ISI in supporting the Mujahedeen, 
Brzezinski advised the U.S. not to make military aid to them contingent upon their 
adherence to nuclear non-proliferation. This marked the beginning of a guerrilla war 
code named ‘Operation Cyclone’. Steve Coll described vividly how ‘disguised KGB 
paramilitaries were still chasing Hafizullah Amin through the hallways of his Kabul 
palace, Soviet tanks had barely reached their first staging areas, and Brzezinski had 
already described a CIA-led American campaign in Afghanistan whose broad outlines 
would stand for more than a decade to come.’446 Indeed, not only was it Brzezinski’s 
strategy which was pursued throughout the Reagan administration, but according to 
Tom Hanahoe Brzezinski himself was ‘the person who had precipitated the 1979 
Soviet invasion and ensuing war in Afghanistan.’447 Thus it has been conclusively 
proven that Brzezinski instigated the Soviet-Afghan War which was the military 
defeat that brought down the Soviet Union. He is thus to be credited with a primary 
role in ending the Cold War, which is a title he has not yet been given and which this 
thesis seeks to accredit him with.  
  When Brzezinski visited the Mujahedin in Pakistan he told them ‘God is on your 
side’ thus invoking their common religiosity as an element of their solidarity and 
shared opposition to the Soviet Union. Diane Kirby wrote about how this tactic was 
useful for uniting the Christian world with that of the Muslim one in their common 
struggle against atheistic communism. She wrote: ‘Western propaganda in the region 
used Soviet atheism and repression of religion to suggest that the Christian West and 
the Muslim East confronted a common global foe opposed to religious faith.’448 
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   What began as a Soviet attempt to prop up a communist regime soon descended into 
a protracted guerrilla war which ultimately cost the lives of over one million Afghans 
and approximately thirty thousand Soviet troops.449 Brzezinski believed strongly that 
punitive measures should be taken against the Soviets in response to their invasion of 
Afghanistan. He was supported in this regard by his subordinates in the National 
Security Council, who also believed maximum pressure ought to be brought to bear 
on the Soviets in consequence for their actions. In a memorandum for Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and David Aaron from Robert Blackwill on December 28, 1979 it was 
stated: ‘We believe that it is essential that we make this action as politically costly as 
possible to the Soviet Union and to that end will be approaching a number of 
governments, particularly the non-aligned and the Muslim countries to speak out.’450 
Furthermore, in a memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Stephen Larrabee 
entitled ‘Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan’, dated December 31, 1979, Brzezinski’s 
approach to the situation was given additional support. It was stated: 
 
If the Soviets are successful, Pakistani security and the balance of power in 
Northeast Asia will be seriously affected…….The Soviet intervention requires a 
firm, measured and forceful response on the part of the Administration, 
particularly the President. The President must take the initiative and show 
leadership in coordinating a response with our allies and the non-aligned. If he 
does, he can help himself considerably, both domestically and internationally. If 
he doesn’t, the U.S. will be perceived as sitting idly by as the Soviets marched 
into a neighbouring country, just as Hitler marched into Austria in 1938. Our 
prestige – and that of the President – will erode further, particularly in the eyes of 
those countries most directly affected by Soviet actions, who will draw the 
conclusion that they have no choice but to accommodate themselves to Soviet 
power…….The Soviets cannot have détente and military intervention in foreign 
lands at the same time.451 
 
   Several other international developments had also prompted the Soviets to intervene. 
The stalling of ratification of the SALT II negotiations, Carter’s decision in December 
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1979 to go ahead with the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe and 
Brzezinski’s policies to implement punitive measures against the Soviets for their 
aggressive behaviour abroad  - had all alarmed leaders in the Kremlin and helped to 
bring hardliners to the fore. The Soviets became convinced that the United States was 
unwilling to settle for strategic and military parity with the USSR, as it had ostensibly 
promised during the period of détente. As Minton Goldman remarked, the Soviets:  
 
suspected, as the 1970’s were drawing to a close, that the United States was bent 
on re-establishing its military superiority vis-à-vis the USSR. What other reason 
could there be, from the Kremlin’s vantage point, for the Carter Administration’s 
decisions to construct the new MX missile system and to increase defence 
spending by five percent for each of the next four years.452 
 
   Following the assassination of Afghan president Taraki and his replacement by 
Hafizullah Amin, whom the Soviets suspected of having ties to the CIA, Soviet 
military intervention was imminent. The Kremlin worried that Amin would switch 
allegiance to the American side, as President Sadat had previously done in Egypt. This 
would bring Americans ever closer to the politically sensitive borders of Soviet Central 
Asia. However, apart from the geo-strategic importance of Afghanistan to an 
occupying power, the United States also worried about the security of vital resources, 
especially oil. As President Carter said in his address to the nation on 4th January, 
1980: ‘A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a 
steppingstone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies.’453  
   The importance of Afghanistan as a bridgehead for further expansion toward the oil-
rich regions of the Persian Gulf was understood by the United States, and helps explain 
why President Carter reacted quickly and decisively to the invasion by giving support 
to the Mujahedeen, imposing trade embargoes upon the USSR, curtailing its fishing 
privileges in American waters, and boycotting the Moscow 1980 Olympics. Brzezinski 
was in agreement with these punitive measures taken against the Soviets and believed 
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that the bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union must 
necessarily suffer as a result of Soviet actions in Afghanistan.454  
   Brzezinski feared that if the United States did not exude strength and determination 
in reaction to Soviet aggression other countries would be faced with the grim prospect 
of having to submit to Soviet influence. Brzezinski believed that by the United States 
showing resolution in opposing Soviet designs for regional hegemony the countries of 
the Middle East would be reassured that their independence would be safeguarded. In a 
memorandum for the President entitled ‘Possible Steps in Reaction to Soviet 
Intervention in Afghanistan,’ dating from 2 January 1980, Brzezinski stated: 
 
As you know, I believe that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan requires a firm 
and tangible response on our part, including our bilateral relationship with 
Moscow, and that we must show forceful leadership with our allies and other 
countries if we are to bring them to agree to punish this Soviet aggression. If 
the U.S. is perceived as passive in the face of this blatant transgression of 
civilized norms, our international credibility and prestige will be seriously 
eroded, particularly in the eyes of those countries most vulnerable to Soviet 
intervention, either directly or indirectly. Without firm U.S. action, some of 
these countries may draw the conclusion that they have no choice over the 
long run except to accommodate themselves to Soviet power.455 
 
   The Soviet Union, in deciding to send troops into Afghanistan, was mobilizing 
troops beyond the borders of the Soviet Union for the first time since the end of the 
Second World War. Brzezinski recalled then how the U.S. failed to act decisively in 
response to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
when the Soviet Union was virtually given a free hand to forcibly subjugate those 
countries to control from the Kremlin. He stated: ‘In effect, because we did not 
overreact to their previous acts of assertiveness, they have discounted the likelihood 
of a genuinely punitive reaction on our part to this extraordinary application of Soviet 
military power.’ Brzezinski was adamant that the Soviet Union not get off lightly for 
its invasion of Afghanistan and pressured President Carter into spearheading a 
                                                 
454 Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘Our Response to Soviet Intervention in 
Afghanistan,’ 29 December, 1979, Brzezinski Donated Materials. 
455 Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘Possible Steps in Reaction to Soviet 
Intervention in Afghanistan,’ 2 January, 1980, Brzezinski Donated Materials. 
 184 
regional coalition willing to oppose it and thus protect U.S. economic interests in the 
Middle East. 456     
   Brzezinski asserted that President Carter must correspond with the other countries in 
the region to ensure their compliance and possible assistance in opposing Soviet 
regional hegemony. He stated: ‘Finally, we need to do something to reassure the 
Egyptians, the Saudis, and others on the Arabian peninsula that the U.S. is prepared to 
assert its power, and that requires a visible military presence in the area now. You 
might consider consulting with Sadat about military deployment to an Egyptian base 
of a U.S. brigade for joint manoeuvers. This would be an impressive demonstration of 
U.S. determination to contest, if necessary, Soviet military pre-eminence in the 
region.’ Brzezinski then reminded the President that the opportunity thus afforded in 
taking a firm stand against the Soviets was reminiscent of the Truman doctrine 
whereby the United States committed itself to opposing subversive Soviet influence 
around the world by protecting vulnerable governments from armed insurrection.457 
   On February 6, 1980, in a memorandum for the President, Brzezinski stated the 
following: 
 
Since the Pakistanis have basically decided to stand up to the Soviets, we need to 
increase our military assistance. In addition to whatever we can raise from others 
(and the Saudis promised to make a substantial contribution), we may eventually 
have to go beyond the $200 million if we want them to be effective in 
responding to a low-level threat. Their military position is really deplorable: poor 
equipment, no infrastructure, little effective communications.  
 
   Furthermore, Brzezinski’s role in establishing the RDF and an effective US military 
presence in the Middle East is attested to in the following statement from the same 
memorandum: 
 
As soon as practicable and welcomed by host Middle Eastern countries, some 
amphibious marine landings and a joint exercise with a U.S. airborne brigade 
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would provide a credible and impressive display of our ability – and therefore 
will – to project effective American power into the region.458 
 
   In a letter written to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance from Soviet Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet case for invading Afghanistan was 
explicitly made. In it Gromyko defended the Soviet action as necessary to prop up a 
legitimate communist government facing an externally supported insurrection. Firstly, 
Gromyko stated that the worsening of US-USSR relations did not begin with the 
invasion of Afghanistan, but rather much earlier. The deployment of the MX mobile 
ICBM system in the United States after SALT II had been concluded led to an 
increase in tensions, according to Gromyko. Also, The Rapid Deployment Force was 
seen by Gromyko as an aggressive act. He stated: ‘There is the long-range program of 
permanent defense spending increases and arms build-up imposed by the U.S. on its 
NATO allies.’ He then added: ‘Finally, there is the decision to deploy new U.S. 
missiles on the soil of Western Europe, which creates a serious threat to the security 
of the USSR and its allies.’ Gromyko complained that the United States was 
embarking on an arms build-up while stalling ratification of the SALT II Treaty. He 
stated furthermore: ‘Try to see all this through our eyes. Can these facts be seen in 
any way other than as a departure by the U.S. from the principle of equality and equal 
security which was reconfirmed in Vienna, as evidence of a policy line now pursued 
by the U.S. to break out of the existing military and strategic parity between the 
USSR and the U.S., to rush ahead in an effort to gain military superiority for itself?’ 
Gromyko believed the United States was bent upon achieving strategic superiority 
and that the invasion of Afghanistan is being used as a pretext for an increase in US 
defence spending and nuclear arms production and deployment of nuclear weapons 
inside Western Europe. Gromyko stated: ‘No references to events in Afghanistan can 
conceal this turn in US policy – a turn from détente to a new aggravation of 
international tensions, to a new round of the arms race.’  
   Gromyko believed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a legitimate response to 
a government in need of assistance. He stated: ‘Facts do not cease to be facts because the 
US side does not want to admit that acts of aggression against Afghanistan have been and 
continue to be committed from the territory of Pakistan. Also indisputable is the fact that 
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in aiding Afghanistan to repel external aggression, the USSR has acted in full accordance 
with the UN Charter and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR 
and the DRA.’ Concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Gromyko 
observed: ‘if the US really wanted this to occur sooner, it could, of course, take measures 
to stop the aggression against Afghanistan. So far, the practical actions of the United 
States go exactly in the opposite direction: everything is being done to expand armed 
incursions into the territory of Afghanistan.’ 
   Gromyko also believed that the U.S. was intent upon installing a government in Kabul 
that would be hostile to the Soviet Union, despite its official rhetoric to the contrary. He 
wrote: ‘You say in your letter that the U.S. has no interest in seeing a government in 
Kabul hostile to the Soviet Union. In fact, however, the United States is exerting every 
effort toward uniting counterrevolutionary Afghan groups under foreign auspices and 
even toward the virtual establishment of an illegal Afghan “government in exile” in the 
territory of Pakistan.’ It is also interesting to note that Gromyko claimed that the USSR 
has no intention to dominate the countries of the Middle East. He made the point: ‘We 
have no “designs” whatsoever upon Iran or any other countries of this region.’ Gromyko 
considered the United States to be rather arrogant in asserting that events in Afghanistan 
are occurring within a region that is to be considered as part of its ‘vital interests’. He 
stated: ‘It is clear that an approach whereby the U.S. arbitrarily declares regions of the 
world thousands of kilometres away from it to be a sphere of its “vital interests” and 
reduces everything only to securing its own narrow egoistic interests without wishing to 
take account of the legitimate interests of others, cannot lead to anything good.’ Gromyko 
does not wish to see the Cold War escalate and wants the United States to return to a 
policy of strategic parity between the two countries. He stated: ‘We would be prepared, if 
the United States is also willing, to seek opportunities to return to the path of cooperation 
between our two countries and with other states for the sake of improving the 
international situation, strengthening peace and universal security.’  
   This was obviously not to be as Brzezinski and other hardliners within the 
administration were bent upon exploiting the situation in Afghanistan, embarking on an 
arms build-up and an increase in defence spending, along with a general thrust towards 
decisively winning the Cold War. Finally, Gromyko reaffirms that the Soviet Union 
desired to proceed along the path of Détente and peaceful coexistence. He stated: ‘If, as 
your letter says, Soviet-US relations are now at a “critical juncture,” then the choice of 
which way to proceed is up to the US. Our choice is clear. We would like to hope that the 
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US will also make the only sensible choice – in favour of détente and peaceful 
coexistence.’459 
   Those in favour of pursuing a confrontational policy with the Soviet Union, 
involving giving massive sums of military aid to the Afghan Mujahedeen, as opposed 
to those who would have preferred to remain uninvolved in the conflict, gained the 
upper hand in U.S. policymaking following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Brzezinski argued that President Carter must act immediately and used his influence 
as National Security Adviser to ensure that he responded firmly and vigilantly to what 
was perceived as a major threat to U.S. interests in the region. In a memorandum for 
the President dated January 9, 1980, Brzezinski gauged the significance of the Soviet 
invasion in a broad geopolitical context. He stated: ‘You have stressed – rightly so – 
that the Soviet action has created consequences which cannot be dealt with in only a 
few weeks or with a series of short-term measures. The Soviet action poses a test 
involving ultimately the balance of power between East and West. Our response will 
determine how several key states will adjust their foreign policy and particularly 
whether they will accommodate themselves to the projection of Soviet military 
power.’  
   Brzezinski was one of the main US officials responsible for the creation of the 
Rapid Deployment Force and encouraged the President to formulate a ‘Carter 
Doctrine’. He stated: ‘Our response has to be a sustained one and a regional one. 
Success or failure will depend on what we do in terms of the longer run in Southwest 
Asia. You might want to think of a “Carter doctrine”.’ Brzezinski urged the President 
to act immediately, fearing the grave consequences upon U.S. security and economic 
interests should the president fail to do so. He stated:  
 
We will never know whether any of this could have been averted, but we do 
know one thing: if we do not respond in a timely fashion, the consequences of an 
inadequate response will be even more horrendous because our vital interests in 
the Middle East will soon be directly affected.460 
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   A day after this memorandum was received by President Carter, on January 10, 
1980, the President gave a speech denouncing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and 
establishing beyond any reasonable doubt that the United States would meet this act 
of aggression vigilantly. He stated: ‘A brutal act of Soviet aggression against 
Afghanistan, and continuing Soviet efforts to hammer a small but sovereign country 
into the new shape of a captive state, has called forth from America a firm response.’ 
   That the United States would meet this act of aggression with a proportionate 
response was also stated by the President: ‘In Southwest Asia, and in other threatened 
areas of the world, we will stand by our commitments and by our friends. We will 
provide levels of assistance equivalent to the threats they face.’ President Carter also 
claimed that the US was not responsible for an escalation in tensions between the two 
powers, particularly in the sphere of nuclear weapons (this in spite of Soviet claims to 
the contrary) when he stated that: ‘We will maintain our policy of refusing to be the 
first to introduce new levels of sophisticated weapons or to fuel unnecessary arms 
races.’461 
   In another speech, made the following day, 11 January, 1980 Carter made the point 
that the increase in defence spending by 5% in real terms was done in order ‘to begin 
compensating for more than a decade’s steady growth in Soviet military spending in 
both strategic and conventional forces.’ The President also referred to the fact that the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would potentially put in jeopardy Western access to 
Middle Eastern oil. He stated: ‘Whatever its (the Soviet Union’s) motives for invading 
Afghanistan, it is now consolidating a strategic position that is gravely threatening to 
the security of Middle East oil.’462 
   On February 12, 1980, in a memorandum from Brzezinski for the Secretaries of 
State, Treasury, Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of 
the International Communication Agency, entitled ‘The US Response to Afghanistan’ 
Brzezinski laid out the official position to be taken by the Administration: 
 
The President has asked that officials be reminded that the State of the Union 
speech contained our basic assessment of Soviet motives and actions in 
Afghanistan as well as a description of how we intend to meet this Soviet threat 
in an area of vital interest to us. He thinks it is particularly important in this 
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context for U.S. officials dealing with this and ancillary problems to be 
supportive on three points: First, that the Soviet action has broad strategic 
significance and that it challenges us in an area of vital interest to us. Second, 
that it takes place against the backdrop of the steady growth and increased 
projection of Soviet military power beyond their own borders. Third, that there 
will be no quick return to “business as usual” for the foreseeable future and that 
our response will remain firm, measured, and for the long haul.463 
 
   According to Fred Halliday, the anti-Soviet stance Carter took during the second half of 
his term ushered in the ‘second Cold War,’464 or the period in which the military contest 
of the Cold War would be revived. The Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, Halliday wrote, ‘more than any other events of this wave of third world 
defiance, were to become the supposed reasons for justifying a new assertion of US 
power in the third world.’465  
   The United States, departing from détente, became fully committed to the cause of the 
Afghan resistance in the hope of draining the Soviet army’s resources.466 Milton Bearden, 
who was the director of the CIA’s operation to arm the Mujahedeen, stated that ‘the 
agency would deliver several hundred thousand tons of weapons and ordnance to 
Pakistan for distribution to the Afghan fighters.’467 Weapons manufactured within the 
Soviet bloc were also acquired and during the course of the conflict the United States 
supplied over three billion dollars in funding to the Mujahedeen; a covert operation of a 
size that was unprecedented in the history of the CIA.  
   The expeditionary force initially sent by the Soviet Union was soon reinforced by more 
than one hundred and twenty thousand troops. The fighting sharply intensified until the 
turning point of the war came about in 1986, when the U.S. decided to supply the 
Mujahedeen with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Only shortly before this decision was 
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made, Mikhail Gorbachev had described the conflict as ‘a bleeding wound’.468 From this 
time onward, the Soviets lost an average of one or two aircraft per day.469 Although the 
United States expressed a desire to see the Soviets negotiate terms for withdrawal, the 
Reagan Administration annually increased funds as well as weapons supplies to the 
Mujahedeen. The United Nations representative, Diego Cordovez, who was designated 
the task of trying to broker a peace settlement, tellingly commented that ‘both the US and 
Pakistan took the line of deception on Afghanistan with a public posture of negotiating a 
settlement while privately agreeing that military escalation was the best course.’470 
   The war was cumulatively a huge expense for the Soviet Union, particularly at a time 
when movements for political reform were gathering momentum in Eastern Europe and 
when Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts to restructure and open-up the Soviet Union were 
running contrary to Russian interests by encouraging dissidents to further push for 
national independence. The Soviet-Afghan war is not often cited as a major factor in 
causing the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet, Andrew Hartman claimed that ‘many in 
the USA credit the eventual fall of the Soviet Union to the covert war in Afghanistan.’471 
Indeed, as early as 1980, Stansfield Turner, then Director of Operations at the CIA, 
observed ‘how assertive the Soviets will be in the future will very likely depend upon 
how ‘successful’ the Soviet leadership views their intervention in Afghanistan to have 
been.’ Robert Gates, on this prediction commented ‘Turner had it exactly right.’472 
   Several other considerations should also be taken into account to explain why the war 
in Afghanistan helped to bring down the Soviet Union. Soviet forces were confronting a 
well-armed resistance that was supported by over thirty-five thousand foreign troops 
recruited from across the Muslim world. Within the Soviet Army there was also rampant 
corruption and a staggeringly high rate of desertion. As news of the growing stalemate 
began to reach the populations within the Soviet bloc, the military establishment came 
under heavy criticism. This played into the hands of those who advocated perestroika and 
glasnost; the war being cited as a striking example of unwarranted Soviet control over 
foreign countries. Even amongst the leadership of the Soviet military some began to 
question the capacity of the Red Army to suppress movements for independence. As 
Rafael Reuveny and Aseem Pakash have stated, the war caused Soviet military 
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commanders to doubt the ‘efficacy of using force to keep non-Soviet nationalities within 
the Union.’473  
   The eventual success of the Mujahedeen in driving the Soviets from Afghanistan would 
reverberate throughout the Soviet bloc, conveying to dissident groups the message that 
the Soviet army was not invincible. Many believed by the end of the war the Soviet 
Union was in a state of ‘imperial overstretch’ and they were therefore encouraged to 
exploit this situation and ‘push for independence with little fear of a military backlash.’474 
Brzezinski’s policy to arm and train the Mujahedeen could arguably be seen as one part 
of a larger endeavour to propagate Islamic fundamentalism in the Soviet Union’s soft 
underbelly, Central Asia, and in doing so incite revolution against the communist 
governments installed in the region. Peter Kuznick is certainly of this view, writing that 
‘Brzezinski understood the Soviets’ fear that the Afghan insurgency would spark an 
uprising by the 40 million Muslims in Soviet Central Asia.’475 Popular movements for 
national independence and secession from the Soviet Union seemed no longer impeded 
by the traditional fear of a Soviet military intervention. Unlike events in Hungary in 1956 
and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet-Afghan war demonstrated that such courses of 
action could not afford to be repeated. The central role of the Soviet military in 
safeguarding the borders of the Communist bloc had been severely undermined. As 
Reuveny and Prakash have pointed out ‘since the Soviet Army was the glue that held the 
diverse Soviet Republics together, its defeat in Afghanistan had profound implications for 
the survivability of the Soviet Union.’476  
   The fact that the Kremlin leadership had tried to downplay the significance of the 
troubles in Afghanistan meant that attacks from non-Russian Soviet soldiers would 
become more vociferous. The Central Asian troops protested being forced into combat 
against their ethnic kin in Afghanistan. When Moscow would not acknowledge their 
dissent, more and more began to desert the army and offer their support to the 
Mujahedeen. The reports of brutality against innocent Afghan civilians spread throughout 
the Communist bloc and the non-Russian Soviet nationalities increasingly galvanised 
around the issue of the Soviet-Afghan war. In 1989 many refused to join the Soviet army 
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during call-ups in Lithuania, Georgia and Latvia and instead openly protested with anti-
war banners denouncing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.477 In Armenia, Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan anti-war riots broke out, signalling to the Russian leadership that 
condemnation of the war was so pervasive throughout the Union that it would be 
impossible to use military force to subdue both the European and Central Asian 
nationalities along Russia’s vast borders. The media also played an important role in 
disseminating the news of atrocities committed against Afghan civilians. 
   The eminent political scientist Charles Tilly, while acknowledging the many factors 
that led to the breakup of the Soviet Union, nonetheless considered the war in 
Afghanistan as reminiscent of the traditional military defeats that precede the collapse of 
an empire. He stated that: ‘the costly stalemate in Afghanistan, itself a product of a 
hugely expensive Cold War with the United States, provided the closest equivalent to 
those earlier empire-ending wars.’478 The war has been cited by historian Vladislav M. 
Zubok as an example of an empire over-extending itself. He wrote: ‘In retrospect, the 
invasion of Afghanistan, despite its initial military success, presents itself as one of the 
first signs of Soviet imperial overstretch.’479 
   According to Tom Hanahoe, Brzezinski himself appeared to have believed that the 
Soviet-Afghan War was responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union. The effect of 
drawing the Russians into the “Afghan trap,” he wrote, was ‘giving the Soviet Union its 
own ten-year Vietnam-type war that ultimately, he (Brzezinski) claimed, resulted in the 
breaking up of the Soviet empire.’480 The Soviet economy, unable to endure a renewed 
arms race, suffered further as the war in Afghanistan dragged on for nearly a decade. The 
military parity between Moscow and Washington achieved during the early 1970s could 
not be maintained throughout the 1980s as the Soviet economy remained far behind that 
of the United States. Furthermore, the conflict in Afghanistan helped to dissipate the idea 
that the Soviet bloc was bound to eventually triumph over the United States and its allies.  
   The decline of Soviet influence in Afghanistan following the war coincided with the 
rise of American military hegemony in the region. The United States became committed 
to repelling Soviet forces from Afghanistan, but it also sought for itself a ‘decisive 
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arbitration role’ in Middle Eastern affairs.481 The Gulf War which followed the 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, as well as the consolidation of ties 
with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and with several of the leading figures of the Afghan 
Mujahedeen, were in various ways symptomatic of a broader geopolitical strategy to 
protect vital security and economic interests on the ‘third strategic front’. 
   However, the war in Afghanistan, although celebrated by some for the damage it 
caused to Soviet forces, was not without negative repercussions for the United States. 
Afghanistan descended into civil war after Soviet troops pulled out in 1989. Islamic 
extremists who had cooperated with the CIA in fighting the Soviet Union were still well 
armed and began to impose their rule upon the rest of the Afghan population. Out of this 
period of turmoil, often simply referred to as ‘anarchy’, emerged the Taliban, whose 
extremist and corrupted brand of Islam, that is closely related to Saudi Wahhabism, now 
endangered the traditions and livelihood of the already war-torn Afghan population.  
   The CIA, in giving billions of dollars to the Mujahedeen ‘freedom fighters’ perhaps 
failed to anticipate that when their role as cannon fodder expired they would before long 
turn hostile to the United States. The American success in humiliating the Soviet armed 
forces had come at the cost of sponsoring Muslim extremists - the forerunners to Al 
Qaeda. Brzezinski has been termed the “Godfather” of Al Qaeda as it was his decision to 
arm and train the Mujahedeen, out of which Al Qaeda would subsequently emerge. 
Shlomo Avineri has pointed out that ‘one cannot escape the conclusion that by 
encouraging the Islamist motivation of militarily opposing the Soviets… it (the United 
States) greatly helped turn anti-Western fundamentalist Islam from an ideology into an 
armed force.’ Furthermore, Andrew Hartman observed that the United States’  
 
decision to finance and arm the most fundamental and dangerous Muslims that 
could be rounded up – is a decision that continues to shake the world. The 
possibilities of the resulting ‘blowback’ – in the form of well documented terror 
and the not so well known heroin trade – were ignored in the drive to support 
those who would struggle against Soviet-dominated communism.482  
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   The war in Afghanistan therefore served the geopolitical purpose of countering Soviet 
southward expansion but, in hindsight, had seriously detrimental consequences to US 
national security. However, from the perspective of Zbigniew Brzezinski, it was a price 
worth paying in order to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union. When asked by a 
French reporter in the aforementioned interview, if he regretted having given support to 
Islamic fundamentalists, Brzezinski’s reply was: ‘what is most important to the history of 
the world, the Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Muslims or 
the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?’483 Brzezinski’s somewhat 
dismissive attitude towards “stirred-up Muslims” seems to indicate a belief that ‘the end 
justifies the means,’ that is, in spite of the harmful repercussions that the arming of the 
Mujahedeen would later have for American national security; it was a decision worth 
taking in order to achieve the overarching goal of liberating Eastern Europe from Soviet 
rule. Peter Kuznick pointed out that: ‘Brzezinski saw more opportunity than danger in the 
growing Islamic fundamentalism.’484 
   The role of the CIA in inciting a Soviet intervention may seem ambiguous, unless one 
is to believe Brzezinski’s opinion as expressed in the interview with Le Nouvel 
Observateur. Whilst the Soviets claim to have been restoring to power a legitimate 
Communist government after its leader was murdered, the United States asserted that 
Soviet expansionism was the real motive for invading. What might have been a relatively 
brief intervention became, owing to substantial commitments from the United States, 
China, Egypt, Britain, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, a drawn out war which wreaked 
enormous damage upon the Soviet armed forces and discredited its leadership. In this 
regard, the Soviets experienced their ‘Vietnam war’.  
   Though the war itself was not primarily responsible for the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, it was still a considerable factor, despite the scant attention the war has 
received from many historians.485 The decline of Soviet influence in Afghanistan 
following the war served the interests of American foreign policy by weakening what 
was then the arch-nemesis of the United States and its allies. However, the 
‘blowbacks’ of this military success for America and its allies came in the form of 
Islamic extremists who were both well armed and increasingly hostile to the Western 
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world. Brzezinski turned the political phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism into an 
armed force. As Dianne Kirby has written: ‘Indeed, the support of America and its 
allies in the region, most notably, Saudi Arabia, helped create a situation in which 
otherwise unpopular and unrepresentative versions of Islam were able over time, to 
secure a power and influence they would have been otherwise unlikely to attain.’486 
Islam was thus turned into a “fifth column” inside the Soviet Union, thanks to the 
policies implemented by Brzezinski. Islam was turned into a weapon, one could argue 
cannon fodder, in the larger military contest against the Soviet Union. Diane Kirby 
wrote furthermore that:  
 
Right wing Islamism had been an ideological tendency with small and scattered 
numbers. Out of power, it had neither the aspiration of drawing the strength from 
popular organization nor the possibility of marshalling strength from any other 
source. This changed following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. National 
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski saw an opportunity to export a composite 
ideology of nationalism and Islam to the Muslim majority central Asian 
republics with a view to destroying the Soviet system.487 
 
   The policy of arming Islamic extremists continues to haunt the U.S. today for, as 
Shlomo Avineri has observed ‘This policy also brought about, among other things, the 
murky connection between Al Qaeda (and the Taliban) and the Pakistani ISI security 
service which is still an enormous burden on US policy in the region, and will not easily 
go away.’488 The Soviet-Afghan war can be said to mark the opening of a ‘third strategic 
front’, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, whereby the United States has committed its 
military forces to a regional security framework, including both the Persian Gulf and 
Afghanistan. Therefore, as has been argued, the Soviet-Afghan war is central to a period 
of history in which the rise of American regional hegemony is intimately related to the 
decline and fall of the Soviet Empire, and Brzezinski’s role in orchestrating these inter-
related events is quite significant.    
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Fig. 10 The Sino-Soviet Bloc and Three Central Strategic Fronts 
 
Fig. 11 Loss of Ideological Control and Imperial Retrenchment 
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Assessment 
 
   Although the Carter Administration has been depicted by some historians and 
members of the Republican Party as rather weak in the realm of defence, there was 
actually a steady rise in military expenditure throughout the entire term489 and a 
number of significant developments in US strategic capabilities.490 Brzezinski stated 
in a speech given before the School of International Affairs Alumni Association in 
Washington, D.C., on September 27, 1979, that: ‘For the past decade, there has been 
a steady decline in the level of the defense budget in real terms. We began to reverse 
that trend in the first three budgets of the Carter administration, and President Carter 
is the first president since World War II to succeed in raising defense spending for 
three straight years in peace time.’491 Brzezinski was a firm advocate of deploying the 
new MX missile and believed the United States should not allow the Soviet Union at 
any cost to gain strategic superiority over the United States, which was something he 
feared the lenient position of the United States in the SALT II talks might engender, 
given that the United States was making significant concessions to the Soviets 
considering the danger posed by their advanced ICBMs.492 
The ‘Carter doctrine’ stipulated that:  
 
Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will 
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, 
and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military 
force.493  
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   It was Brzezinski who insisted that the threat to use force to repel the Soviets be 
included in the doctrine. Peter Kuznick pointed out that ‘the final sentence, which 
became enshrined as the Carter Doctrine, was interpreted by the Kremlin as a clear 
threat of war – even nuclear war. Vance attempted to remove it from the address, 
striking it from the draft that the State Department submitted to the White House. 
Brzezinski fought to keep it in, convincing Press Secretary Jody Powell that without it 
the speech was devoid of content. Powell persuaded Carter that his national security 
advisor was right.’494 Indeed, Carter was won over to the idea of formulating a 
doctrine in the first place by Brzezinski.  
   Concerning the Carter doctrine: ‘It was really a Brzezinski doctrine. The national 
security adviser relentlessly promoted the idea of a regional security framework for 
the Middle East, which he saw as the centre of a crisis zone in which the Soviets were 
on the offensive, in military and political terms. Following the State of the Union 
address, Brzezinski worked tirelessly to turn the document into reality, by multiplying 
agreements with regional allies (Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, Oman, and so on) for naval 
or air bases, arms and equipment supply depots, and joint exercises. He was also at 
the origin of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, consisting in 100,000 men 
capable of autonomous deployment on short notice in the Gulf region, to come to the 
aid of an ally undergoing a subversive attack.’495 
  The establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force as well as naval and air facilities 
acquired off the Somali coast were pressed upon Carter by many in his 
administration, including Brzezinski, to enhance U.S. war-fighting capabilities in the 
Middle East and South West Asia.496 
   Brzezinski has stated on several occasions that Soviet involvement in the Horn of 
Africa necessitated such a strategic response. Yet, former Professor of International 
Relations at the London School of Economics, Fred Halliday, contended that the 
United States was also partly to blame for the escalation of Cold War tensions at the 
end of the 1970’s. He stated that: 
 
Changes in the third world were ascribed to Soviet ‘expansionism’ to provoke 
widespread chauvinistic mobilization in the USA. The fact that the USSR was 
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not responsible for instigating any of these upheavals, and that it was in many 
cases inactive, was irrelevant in a context where a demonic Soviet threat was 
imagined by most of Congress and the US press to be stalking the world.497 
 
   The Ogaden War which took place in 1977-78 was cited by Brzezinski as one of the 
main reasons for the shortcomings of SALT II and more generally of détente. By 
coining the phrase ‘SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden’, Brzezinski 
explained how ‘in my judgment, Soviet behaviour in the Third World, particularly in 
the African Horn, contributed to the eventual demise of our efforts to obtain a 
significant and constructive arms control agreement.’498 However, Professor Halliday 
argued that Soviet involvement in Ethiopia did not amount to a contravention of 
international law. The Russians and the Cubans ‘were acting in quite a legal fashion, 
as they had been in Angola, by assisting a sovereign state to repel invasion. They also 
complied with US requests to limit the impact of the war by preventing Ethiopian 
counter-attacks into Somalia.’499 Furthermore, Halliday wrote that because President 
Carter ‘had encouraged the Somalis to believe the West would support them if they 
seized the Ogaden, part of Ethiopia’s territory which they claimed as theirs’… 
therefore… ‘the war there was something for which Carter himself was partly 
responsible.’ 500 Peter Kuznick noted the role of Brzezinski in instigating U.S. support 
for the Somalis and stated that ‘Carter responded mildly at first, sharing Soviet 
leaders’ sense that détente and arms control were the top priorities. Brzezinski, 
however, urged the president to stop being “soft” and stand up to the Soviets.’501 
  Prior to the Iranian revolution, when it became clear that the Shah’s regime was in 
danger of being overthrown, Secretary of State Vance as well the U.S. Ambassador to 
Iran William Sullivan, urged President Carter to establish contacts with the 
opposition. However, Brzezinski argued that the U.S. should remain steadfast in its 
support of an old ally and advised the President to encourage the shah to use force to 
put down the opposition. Not only did Brzezinski encourage Carter to support the 
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unpopular and oppressive shah, he attempted to have U.S. military forces deployed in 
Iran should the shah be toppled.502 
   Brzezinski feared that the fall of the shah could make Iran susceptible to Soviet 
intervention. In retrospect, it seems that the shah, due to his brutal oppression of all 
opposition groups within Iran, was doomed to failure as he was widely opposed inside 
the country and seen as a puppet of the US government. Therefore, Brzezinski’s 
advice to prop up a popularly despised dictator would not seem morally right and 
would appear to contradict his adherence to promoting human rights around the 
world. On the other hand, it could perhaps be argued that Brzezinski was advocating 
this policy because he believed it essential that the United States not only support an 
ally during a time of crisis but that failure to do so would provide an opening in the 
geopolitically critical region which the Soviets could then exploit. Indeed, Brzezinski 
had hoped ‘that a military coup would save the day.’503 When it became clear that the 
shah would have to flee Iran and seek refuge in the United States, Brzezinski was of 
the belief that the United States should allow him entry because the ‘U.S. reputation 
for strength and loyalty to an ally hung in the balance.’504 Following the hostage 
crisis, Brzezinski again urged Carter to pursue the military option and launch a rescue 
mission to save the hostages.505 
   Although the rescue mission was a dismal failure, to Brzezinski’s credit, attempting 
to rescue the hostages was without doubt the right thing to do. It was just unfortunate 
that the mission was unsuccessful, for the sake of freeing the hostages earlier, 
salvaging America’s reputation and of course, boosting Carter’s chances of getting re-
elected. Once again pursuing the military option, when the Sandinistas took control of 
Nicaragua in 1978, Brzezinski implored President Carter to put down the rebellion as 
not to do so would make the U.S. look “incapable of dealing with problems in our 
own backyard.”506 In El Salvador when the FMLN insurgents were about to topple a 
corrupt dictatorship loyal to the United States ‘Carter, pressured by Brzezinski, opted 
to restore military aid to the dictatorship.’507 As usual, Brzezinski encouraged Carter 
to opt for the military solution and take a forcible stand against the Soviets. 
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   In June 1980, Brzezinski was closely involved in devising Presidential Directive 59, 
which further developed James Schlesinger’s selective targeting policy and Harold 
Brown’s countervailing strategy designed to pre-empt a nuclear attack with minimal 
civilian casualties, particularly by focusing on key military targets.508 These 
developments were significant in that they provided the United States with greater 
strategic versatility in the event of an outbreak in nuclear warfare while (theoretically) 
minimizing civilian casualties. Brzezinski, along with General William Odom, was 
particularly influential in devising this new approach, which ‘stated that a nuclear war 
might not be simply a short, spasmodic apocalypse that could best be deterred by a 
posture based on the doctrine of MAD, but that it might entail engagements at varying 
levels of intensity and over an extended period of time.’509  
   According to Raymond L. Garthoff, while enhancing American strategic doctrine, 
PD 59 was also perceived in Moscow as an attempt to gain strategic superiority over 
Soviet nuclear forces. He stated that, ‘while that concept may also be conceived as a 
deterrent, the Soviet leaders were prone to see it as U.S. pursuit of a war-waging 
capability to support intimidation or even the initiation of war.’510 Despite how the 
Soviets actually felt about it, PD 59 was symptomatic of a more general collapse in the 
policy of détente. Concerning the overall strategic renewal… it was largely ‘inspired 
by Brzezinski.’511 
   It is also worth noting that at the end of the four-year term Brzezinski and Carter 
successfully managed to deter the Soviets from intervening in Poland to quell the 
Solidarity movement. This had important ramifications for the end of the Cold War as it 
nullified the Brezhnev doctrine by which the USSR felt it had the right to intervene in 
Soviet countries to put down dissent. Daniel J. Sargent described the significance of this 
when he stated:  
 
When an East Bloc summit decided to defer military intervention, U.S. officials 
declared a quiet victory. The “reason for the postponement,” Brzezinski 
explained, “was the effectiveness of the Western counter propaganda campaign.” 
This did not mean that Poland’s crisis would be resolved peacefully: having lost 
control, the Warsaw government would declare martial law one year later, 
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turning its tanks on its own people. By recoiling from invasion, the Soviet 
leadership nonetheless retreated from the implications of the Brezhnev Doctrine, 
according to which the Soviet Union reserved the right to intervene with force to 
reverse “the development of some socialist country toward capitalism.” The 
costs of further aggravating East-West estrangement, which a Soviet invasion of 
Poland would have done, looked at the end of the 1970s to outweigh the benefits 
of maintaining discipline within the bloc.512  
 
   The United States thus managed to ensure that Soviet countries could from here on 
out press ahead with their separatist and reformist movements without fear of a Soviet 
military intervention. This was an important coup in the Cold War as later during the 
Reagan administration Gorbachev would not act to put down separatist movements but 
rather allowed them to press ahead at the cost of dismantling the Soviet Union. As 
Andreas Etges wrote: ‘Gorbachev also pursued a new policy toward the communist 
allies by renouncing the Brezhnev doctrine, which had been formulated by the Soviet 
leadership to justify the violent end of the Prague Spring in 1968. Instead of 
threatening to crush independence movements, the Soviet Union allowed its East 
European allies to go their own way.’513 Brzezinski and Carter’s efforts to inhibit a 
Soviet intervention in Poland in 1980 ensured that the Soviet Union would no longer 
intervene to quash separatist movements within the Soviet Union. Brzezinski’s role in 
orchestrating the events in Poland is not to be underestimated for, as Zubok, pointed 
out: ‘Zbigniew Brzezinski and Pope John Paul II were named as the most dangerous 
instigators of Polish events.’514 
   Paul Kennedy wrote about how the Carter administration revamped U.S. defences at 
the end of his term and the impact this had upon the Soviets. He stated:  
 
Moreover, even in the closing years of the Carter administration the United 
States had resumed a defence build-up which – continued at a massive pace by 
the succeeding Reagan government – threatened to restore U.S. military 
superiority in strategic nuclear weaponry, to enhance U.S. maritime supremacy, 
and to place a heavier emphasis than ever before upon advanced technology. The 
annoyed Soviet reply that they would not be outspent or outgunned could not 
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disguise the awkward fact that this would place increased pressure upon an 
economy which had significantly slowed down and was not well positioned to 
indulge in a high –technology race. By the late 1970s, it was in the embarrassing 
position of needing to import large amounts of foreign grain, not to mention 
technology. Its satellite empire in Eastern Europe was, apart from the select party 
cadres, increasingly disaffected; the Polish discontents in particular were a 
dreadful problem, and yet a repetition of the 1968 Czech invasion seemed to 
promise little relief. Far to the south, the threat of losing its Afghan buffer state 
to foreign (probably Chinese) influences provoked the 1979 coup d’etat, which 
not only turned out to be a military quagmire but had a disastrous impact upon 
the Soviet Union abroad.515 
 
   The Cold War historian Warren Cohen, in his distinguished work The Cambridge 
History of American Foreign Relations, seemed to offer a fair and balanced report of 
Brzezinski’s aims within the Carter Administration.  
 
 
To defeat the Soviet Union the United States had to strengthen itself and its allies 
and maintain relentless pressure on the Soviets, revitalizing NATO, enlisting the 
Chinese on the side of the United States, weakening Soviet Control over Eastern 
Europe, promoting dissent within the Soviet empire, and countering Soviet 
interventions anywhere in the world. [Brzezinski] insisted that the competition 
between the United States and the Soviet Union was ordained by history and 
geography, as well as conflicting political cultures. The United States could only 
play to win.516 
 
   Especially in the latter half of Carter’s term Brzezinski came to play a more 
prominent role on many foreign policy and national security issues.517 This is partly 
attributable to the prevailing mood of the American public which favoured a higher 
level of commitment from Washington to winning the Cold War, sentiments which 
were usually congruent with the stance Brzezinski was inclined to take vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union. John Orman asserts however that Brzezinski’s strong and exceptionally 
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influential position at the helm of the Carter administration for four years was partly 
due to the President’s routine of meeting almost every day with his National Security 
Adviser. Owing to his unrivalled access to the President and seamlessly authoritative 
views in most areas of foreign policy, John Orman observed that ‘Carter’s national 
security advice was dominated by one person, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who probably was 
the most active national security adviser since Dr. Henry Kissinger.’518 By the end of 
the Carter administration, it would be fair to say that Brzezinski had contributed 
substantially to laying the foundations for a renewed U.S. commitment to combating 
Soviet forces around the globe.519 As Patrick Vaughan wrote: ‘Brzezinski’s 
appointment as Carter’s national security adviser provided a turning point in the Cold 
War.’520  
     It seems clear from the evidence thus far presented that Brzezinski was the main 
man responsible in the Carter administration for the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet 
relations. The Soviets certainly held Brzezinski responsible for the worsening of 
relations between the two countries. In an article written in Pravda, the official paper 
of the communist party, the conclusion was drawn that: “The main source of this 
worsening of the situation is the increasing aggressiveness of Carter administration 
policies and the increasingly sharp tone of statements by the president himself and his 
closest colleagues – above all Brzezinski.”’521 Justin Vaisse concurred with this and 
wrote that: ‘In this connection, it is important to mention the challenge brought to one 
aspect of Brzezinski’s personal political scorecard by liberals, contemporaries, and 
historians alike: the national security adviser was accused of having, at the very least, 
helped to precipitate a new Cold War through his hard-line toward the USSR.’522 
Brzezinski was at the forefront of the anti-Soviet hardliners who sought to reignite the 
Cold War. As Zubok stated: ‘In June 1978, Brezhnev complained at the Politburo that 
Carter “is not simply falling under the usual influence of the most shameless anti-
Soviet types and leaders of the military industrial complex of the USA. He intends to 
struggle for re-election for the new term as president under the banner of anti-Soviet 
policy and return to the Cold War.”523 
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   The historian Peter Kuznick wrote that Brzezinski had an ultimately detrimental 
impact upon the Carter presidency: ‘Carter’s lack of foreign policy experience would 
come back to haunt him, and his growing reliance on Brzezinski and other hawkish 
advisors would doom his progressive agenda, leaving the administration’s foreign 
policy awash in a sea of Cold War orthodoxy.’524 Michael H. Hunt was of a similar 
view when he wrote that ‘Carter, instructed by Brzezinski in the complexities of the 
Russian mind (It “tended to respect the strong and had contempt for the weak”) 
responded by abandoning efforts to get Soviet ratification of the SALT II agreement, 
increasing his own arms budget, and imposing a grain embargo on the Soviets. So 
much for détente and arms control.’525  
   It could indeed be said that, owing largely to Brzezinski’s policy recommendations, 
the United States had revamped its long-term objective to acquire a decisive military 
and geo-strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. In 1980, President Carter gave an 
appraisal of his National Security Adviser’s immense contribution to American 
national security and foreign policy, stating:  
 
Zbigniew Brzezinski served his country and the world… an author and architect 
of world affairs, his strategic vision of America’s purpose fused principle with 
strength… Above all, he helped set our nation irrevocably on a course that 
honours America’s abiding commitments to human rights.526 
 
   President Carter had brought the Cold War to the Soviet home-ground and, in doing 
so, essentially changed the methods through which the superpower conflict would be 
won. As Lubowski pointed out, Carter ‘was the first president of the United States to 
publicly and consistently question during the Cold War, the legitimacy of the Soviets’ 
rule in their own country.’527 In a speech addressed to the United Nations on March 
17th, 1977 Carter stated that ‘No member of the United Nations can claim that 
mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business.’528 Carter became the first 
American president to invoke the right of the U.S. to intervene, when believed to be 
necessary, in the internal affairs of sovereign nations that fail to adhere to specific 
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standards of international conduct. The impact of President Carter’s human rights 
policy made the managing of internal affairs increasingly problematic for the Soviets 
and indeed 1979 can be said to mark the onset of a slow fall for Moscow. As Warren 
Cohen remarked: 
 
The glorious achievement of parity with the United States, the exhilarating sense 
that the correlation of forces in the world favoured the Soviet Union, the joy of 
travelling the road to world leadership, had hardly been savoured before the 
foundations of the Soviet empire began to give way.529  
 
   Historians may argue as to which features of Carter’s foreign policy were or were 
not responsible for an escalation in Cold War tensions. Brzezinski’s insistence that 
arms negotiations must be considered in connection with geopolitical issues can be 
argued as having served to enhance U.S. national security by making it clear that 
America would not tolerate on any level Soviet control of regions that were 
strategically and economically vital, such as the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf. 
On the other hand, the ‘linkage’ Brzezinski was advocating essentially implied that 
punitive measures be taken against the Soviets in the arms talks should they fail to 
change their behaviour abroad and this was seen by some leaders in Europe as being 
in large measure responsible for the escalation in hostilities. French President Giscard 
d’Estaing stated that ‘the balance of power in Europe is a separate issue’ and German 
Chancellor Helmudt Schmidt apparently ‘did his best to persuade Carter to dismiss 
Brzezinski (who was commonly seen as the initiator of the new hardline).’530   
   The Carter presidency is commonly held to have been a failure while that of Reagan 
is considered a success. Yet this is not historically justified, as has been shown. 
Robert Gates wrote that “I believe historians and political observers alike have failed 
to appreciate the importance of Jimmy Carter’s contribution to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.”531 Furthermore, he pointed out that, “In 
fact, Carter prepared the ground for Reagan. He took the first steps to strip away the 
mask of Soviet ascendancy and exploit the reality of Soviet vulnerability.” When 
Reagan did come into office in 1981, the American military budget began to soar in 
response to a perceived increase in the Soviet threat, and it became clear the Cold War 
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struggle would be fought with even greater determination, further building upon the 
strategies laid down by Carter and in particular, Brzezinski.  
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Fig. 12 President Reagan’s statement on aid to Nicaraguan rebels, February 15, 1985. In 
the background are former National Security Adviser Brzezinski, former U.N. 
Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick, former Defence Secretary James Schlesinger and Vice 
President George H. W. Bush. 
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Conclusion 
 
   It has thus been proven that the Carter administration helped to end the Cold War. 
They were responsible for the initiatives which reignited superpower hostilities and 
began the initial stages of the downfall of the Soviet Union. The cumulative impact of 
Carter’s anti-Soviet policies have been assessed and these previously unrelated facts 
have been brought to light as a set of policies which did irreparable damage to the 
Soviet Union and set the stage for the Reagan onslaught. When Carter came into 
office the U.S. and USSR were on a par geo-strategically. By the time Carter left 
office, the balance had been tipped in favour of the United States and the Reagan and 
Bush administrations would capitalise upon this, helping to bring the conflict to a 
close.  
   Brzezinski was the President’s right-hand man and, as has been discussed, his ideas 
were implemented over the four years during which he was National Security 
Adviser. His life had been dedicated to bringing about the collapse of the Soviet 
Union as he felt it was an inhumane political system which fundamentally threatened 
the world and he was also committed liberating his native Poland. With utter 
determination and verve, he carried out this grand objective and is to be considered a 
key figure in bringing about the downfall of the USSR. 
   Jimmy Carter achieved considerable breakthroughs on the three strategic fronts: 
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. It was in these three arenas that he, under the 
influence and guidance of Brzezinski, would do serious and irreparable damage to the 
Soviet Union and bring about a qualitative shift in the balance of power from parity to 
U.S. predominance. That Jimmy Carter had great success on these three fronts is 
attested to by Nancy Mitchell, who wrote that: ‘during the Carter presidency, the 
United States normalized diplomatic relations with China, excluded the Soviet Union 
from the Middle East peace process, and saw a grave challenge to Soviet control over 
Poland. Yes, there were setbacks in the Third World, but there were huge gains in 
Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe.’532 
   In his writings there are several themes which are important to waging the Cold 
War. Firstly, there is the inhumane nature of totalitarianism which partly provided 
him with the impetus and resolve to bring about the system’s collapse. There is the 
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promotion of nationalism as a solution to the spread of the Communist empire and his 
conviction, as propounded in his MA thesis, that nationalism would be the death knell 
of the Soviet Union. Brzezinski, along with Carl Friedrich, helped to define and 
enhance the understanding of totalitarian political systems. In doing so, he laid bare 
their uglier aspects and by contrast, the inherent superiority of the Western political 
system. An important theme in his writings is the promotion and strengthening of 
unity amongst Western states. This was for standing strong against the Soviet Union 
in the context of the Cold War and for promoting the Western socio-political system 
as well as Western values worldwide. Brzezinski consistently argued for fortifying 
and augmenting America’s defences and this is something he adhered to upon 
becoming National Security Adviser. He also sought to transcend the Cold War and 
usher in the technetronic era and he was a firm proponent of the establishment’s 
envisioned new world order. 
  His policy of peaceful engagement was uniquely his own and was an adroit and 
sophisticated way of dismantling the communist bloc given that the military situation 
had practically reached a stalemate and the threat of nuclear war meant neither side 
could engage in direct hostilities with the other. Through enticing the Soviet satellites 
to identify with the West, through economic aid and cultural exchange, Brzezinski felt 
he could wean away the Eastern European states from Moscow’s control.  
   Brzezinski moved from the academic world to policy-making in the late 1950s and 
became involved in Kennedy’s and then Johnson’s administrations, though in a 
marginal role, serving on the Policy Planning Staff. He became a prolific writer, not 
just as a Sovietologist but as one who wrote on the major issues of the day, with a 
focus on those that dealt with the Cold War and international affairs. He wrote many 
academic articles during these years and in the 1970s following his post as a 
Columbia professor, he would travel to Japan to write The Fragile Blossom and 
subsequently would also write Between Two Ages. These two books would broaden 
his horizons and gain for him expertise as an international analyst. 
   In forming the Trilateral Commission, Brzezinski was working specifically with the 
goal in mind of further enlarging the West and its stewardship of the global 
commonweal. Brzezinski was very much an elitist, not just because of his background 
as the son of an Ambassador, but because he mixed with the WASP establishment and 
the top American academics. He and David Rockefeller sought to establish an 
organization comprised of the top echelons of the capitalist world that would, in 
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effect, mould the governmental policies of their respective regions and bring about a 
more integrated and strengthened West which would spearhead the process of 
modernization and help develop the less advanced regions of the world. The Trilateral 
Commission would go on to become eminently successful and would earn serious 
notoriety owing to its appellation as a “rich man’s club” and its secretive meetings. 
Brzezinski nonetheless had a clear view in mind in forming the Commission; namely, 
to coordinate the policies of the three most advanced regions of the world so that they 
may usher in the technetronic era. Thus, mankind would transcend the industrial 
epoch and reach the post-industrial era wherein the predominance of the services 
sector and the use of cutting-edge technology to guide the lives of the masses would 
distinguish this age from previous ones. 
   Upon entering office Brzezinski and Carter would play a significant and now more 
fully appreciated role in ending the Cold War. They helped to expose the 
vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union and most important of all, exploit its weaknesses in 
order to gain advantage over them. In addition to this, they were effective in 
revamping the American military and utilising hard power to roll back the Soviet 
Union. This was carried out by countering Soviet advancements in the Third World 
and particularly by funding counter-revolutionary groups opposed to communism. 
   Concerning the issues dealt with in this thesis, Carter was the first U.S. president to 
champion human rights and ensure they became an accepted norm to be upheld by 
governments throughout the world. More specifically, they served their purpose in 
highlighting the blatant inadequacies of the Soviet socio-political system and its 
oppression of its own citizens, in particular dissidents. The human rights campaign 
lent ample support to Soviet citizens and helped to increase the impact of the 
international human rights movement as well as boost its standing. The human rights 
campaign of the Carter administration would spur the formation of related movements 
inside the Soviet bloc and would assist in the internal erosion of communism, thus 
helping to bring about the collapse of the system. Stuart Eizenstat described the 
enormous impact the human rights campaign had as follows: 
 
The administration’s public advocacy of human rights also weakened the Soviet 
empire by attacking its soft underbelly – its domestic repression. No less than 
Anatoly Dobrynin, the long-time Soviet ambassador to Washington, conceded 
that Carter’s human rights policies “played a significant role in the… long and 
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difficult process of liberalisation inside the Soviet Union and the nations of 
Eastern Europe. This in turn caused the fundamental changes in all these 
countries and helped end the Cold War.” First enshrined during the Ford 
administration – even as he soft pedalled them – in the Helsinki Final Act in 
1975, human rights have been established as an essential element of American 
and international diplomacy. Although several later presidents have given less 
emphasis to human rights, because of Carter they were not free to ignore them 
totally, without risking public criticism.533 
 
   The human rights campaign, aside from its altruistic motives, was a full-frontal 
assault on the internal legitimacy of the Soviet Union, undermining the very fabric of 
Soviet society by highlighting its human rights abuses. Brzezinski and Carter both 
believed that by supporting human rights activists and dissidents in the Soviet Union 
serious damage could be carried out to the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev himself was 
aware of the threat posed by Carter’s human rights campaign and Barbara Keys and 
Roland Burke highlighted this: ‘By 1978 Brezhnev would lament that human rights 
constituted the West’s “main line of attack against Socialist countries.’534 Carter thus 
began the process of sponsoring human rights for the purpose of inflicting damage on 
the Soviet Union, as well as for idealistic motives, and this would culminate in the 
Reagan and Bush years in the system’s overthrow, human rights advocacy and 
dissident movements being one of the key factors which led to the Soviet Union’s 
downfall. 
   In normalising relations with the People’s Republic of China, the United States 
scored a major coup against the Soviet Union which helped tip the strategic balance in 
favour of the U.S. and alter the “correlation of forces” in favour of the democratic 
West. Brzezinski was the main man responsible for this diplomatic and strategic coup, 
and he consummated the process begun by Nixon and Kissinger in 1972. The Chinese 
began to assist the United States in its counterrevolutionary activities by financially 
supporting the Mujahedin and by opposing the North Vietnamese. The United States’ 
enlistment of the Chinese on the side of the West, most important of all, resulted in a 
seismic shift which helped to end the period of relative strategic parity and bring 
about Western domination over the Soviet bloc. Importantly for both countries, it led 
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to diplomatic relations between the two great powers and their concomitant economic 
accretions which saw them both prosper because of this mutually advantageous 
bilateral relationship. For smoothing the way to normalization, Brzezinski deserves 
the credit, and in the context of the Cold War, this was a significant victory for the 
West and a serious setback for the Soviet Union. 
   The Soviet-Afghan War is arguably the real key to ending the Cold War and for this 
Brzezinski is to be applauded. The Soviet Union was bogged down for almost ten 
years in an intractable conflict which sapped their strength and ultimately cost them 
victory in not only Afghanistan but in the superpower conflict. Following their defeat 
in Afghanistan, citizens within the communist bloc refused to enrol in the Soviet 
military and as it was a defeat for the Soviets, rebellious nations within the bloc felt 
encouraged to press ahead for independence from Moscow. Brzezinski was the one 
who decided upon the policy to fund the Mujahedin in 1979 and this policy was 
carried on by the Reagan administration who increased funding for the Afghan rebels 
and ultimately saw to it that the Soviets engaged in their last military conflict and that 
the Soviet Union was buried in the “graveyard of empires” that is Afghanistan. 
Therefore, it can be said that Brzezinski set the trap for the Soviets which cost them 
victory in the Cold War. The costly defeat in Afghanistan did irreparable damage to 
the Soviet military’s reputation, as it was the defeat which caused recalcitrant Soviet 
republics to press ahead with their separatist movements. Brzezinski thus played a 
seminal and, this author would argue, crucial role in ending the Cold War. That 
Brzezinski was the initiator of the conflict and that the conflict was in significant 
measure responsible for the downfall of the Soviet Union has been proven. Brzezinski 
therefore played a major role in defeating the Soviet Union and bringing about victory 
for the West. 
   Justin Vaisse maintained that Brzezinski is not to be credited with ending the Cold 
War through initiating the conflict in Afghanistan. He wrote:  
 
What would have happened if Brzezinski had claimed that he had anticipated 
everything and calculated everything in advance. This would amount to crediting 
himself with a key role in the downfall of the USSR. Such a position would not 
be compatible with the archives. For example, on December 26, 1979, the day 
when Brzezinski purportedly rejoiced that the Soviets had “taken the bait,” he 
wrote to Carter: “we should not be too optimistic about Afghanistan becoming a 
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Soviet Vietnam,” for the historical analogy did not work out in favour of the 
mujahideen. The latter were poorly organised and poorly led; they had no 
territorial refuge, no formal army, no state, and no external support; they were 
going to face a degree of Soviet brutality that could not be compared to the 
American hesitations in Vietnam.535  
 
   This author would challenge such an assertion and would argue that Brzezinski 
deliberately drew the Soviets into Afghanistan and that the war there played a crucial 
role in bringing down the Soviet Union, as Reuveny and Prakash have shown. This 
thesis has provided the evidence to substantiate such an assertion. Vaisse noted that 
Brzezinski tried to open dialogue with the Soviets to encourage them to withdraw 
from Afghanistan and that this undermines the “trap” theory. However, it is the view 
of this author view that Brzezinski deliberately wanted to cause as much damage to 
the Soviets to bring about the downfall of the Soviet Union. He sought, as the many 
historians cited in this thesis attest to, to give the Soviets their “Vietnam”. Nicholas 
Guyatt makes the point that: ‘(Historian John Lewis) Gaddis himself made much of 
the fact that, militarily at least, the Soviet Union had not been defeated.’536 While the 
Soviet Union had not been defeated militarily vis-à-vis the U.S., it lost a major victory 
in Afghanistan which proved to be an important factor in ending the Cold War. 
   The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave Brzezinski the upper hand in the 
administration as a tough response was needed and this served the interests of the 
hardliners. Brzezinski would press ahead with a whole host of initiatives to do 
damage to the Soviet Union. Justin Vaisse commented on this. He wrote:  
 
The invasion of Afghanistan marked a turning point in American perceptions, 
and particularly for the president, whose approach to the USSR hardened 
considerably. This explains why the last year of Carter’s administration was 
marked by a triumph of the “Brzezinski line” over Vance’s, thus accentuating the 
entry into the new Cold War. Several of Brzezinski’s recommendations in favour 
of firmness in dealings with the USSR were implemented in 1980. The three 
principal measures in this shift were sanctions against the USSR, the Carter 
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doctrine, and the new American nuclear strategy, all accompanied by a posture 
of firmness in Europe.537 
 
   Concerning the fact that many have written off the Carter administration as a failure, 
it is to be said that in the context of the Cold War the administration was in fact a 
success. However, his domestic policies along with the Iranian hostage crisis were 
what was said to be the cause of his not getting re-elected. Nancy Mitchell 
commented on this. She wrote: 
 
On Christmas Day, 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Carter 
foreswore complexity and embraced old-fashioned dualism. But his inability to 
free the hostages in Iran made it impossible for him to free himself from the aura 
of weakness that had come to define him. Paradoxically, 1980 – that annus 
horribilis when the administration seemed unable to do anything right – was, in 
Cold War terms, a very good year for the United States: the Soviets were sucked 
into the quagmire of Afghanistan and defied by the success of Solidarity in 
Poland. But in 1980, Americans, struggling at home with stagflation and 
humiliated by an Iranian rabble – were not able to penetrate the fog of war: the 
administration joined its domestic rivals in decrying the rising threat posed by 
the resurgent Soviet Union and set in motion the largest increase in defense 
spending the Korean War.538 
 
   The public at the time were unable to perceive that the country was doing well in the 
Cold War. Preoccupied by the dismal taking of the hostages and the aura of failure 
surrounding Carter because of this, they did not perceive that Brzezinski’s luring the 
Soviets into Afghanistan and revamping of the U.S. defence would, in the long term, 
prove to be a major coup and a key determinant in ending the Cold War. 
   With regards to the strategic upgrading of the United States during the Carter 
administration, Brzezinski was at the forefront in promoting the MX missile, the 
Pershing II ICBM and Presidential Directive 59 which he, along with Defence 
Secretary Harold Brown, had devised. Brzezinski also encouraged Carter to increase 
defence spending and in the final days of the Carter administration he had totally 
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revamped the American military and prepared for a period of increased tension and 
hostility with the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration furthered this strategic 
build up and this was one of the chief causes of the downfall of the Soviet Union. 
Brzezinski was the guiding light in the Carter administration concerning the 
upgrading of U.S. defences and Reagan would carry this forward substantially, 
continuing Carter’s massive defence budget increases which would serve to 
financially exhaust the Soviets, who failed to keep up while maintaining the living 
standards of their citizens and thus lost the Cold War as a result. Stuart Eizenstat 
described how the Carter administration was the one that put in place the upgrading of 
U.S. defences and how it was then built upon by the Reagan administration and 
helped lead to the end of the Cold War. He wrote: 
 
Despite his campaign promise to cut defense spending, he in fact increased it by 
an annual average of almost 3 percent in real terms, and proposed further 
increases after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Major new weapons systems 
such as the MX missile and the Stealth bomber were green-lighted, thus 
providing the foundation upon which Ronald Reagan built the strong U.S. 
defense posture that his supporters claim as the principal cause of the Soviet 
Union’s collapse. But it was Carter, not Reagan, who reversed the post-Vietnam 
decline in military spending and began upgrading America’s defences. “The 
Reagan revolution in defense spending began during the later years of the Carter 
Administration,” concludes the Pentagon’s authorised history of the tenure of 
Carter’s Defense secretary Harold Brown.539 
 
   When Carter began his term, he sought to transform the international system from a 
bipolar conflict to an integrated West that would accommodate the Soviet Union. He 
hoped to usher in the technetronic era and promote trilateral cooperation while the 
Soviets would be forced to relinquish their goal of world communism and settle for 
coexistence and cooperation with the West. The Ogaden War and the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan changed these views and resulted in a return to the traditional policy of 
containment and increased tension between the superpowers. Carter would then press 
ahead with efforts to defeat the Soviets once and for all through supporting the 
Mujahedin and upgrading U.S. defences. This was a policy promoted by Brzezinski, 
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who always felt determined to defeat the Soviets and was not in favour of settling for 
peaceful coexistence. As Justin Vaisse wrote:  
 
The gradual decline of the USSR notwithstanding, starting in 1974-1975 it 
became obvious that the Soviets were beginning to reassert their international 
power, both in terms of strategic weapons and in terms of their presence in the 
Third World. They were apparently convinced that the “correlation of forces” 
was shifting in their favour. In fact, they had achieved strategic (nuclear) parity 
by the early 1970s. The result of that shift was a return to a more classical 
strategy of containment, which was sharply accentuated starting in 1978, leaving 
more room for playing the “Chinese card” and for tactics that included harassing 
the Soviet empire, most notably the support for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan 
through the intermediary – Pakistan.540 
    
   The scholarly consensus is that following the Vietnam War the Soviet Union was an 
expansionist power bent upon exploiting America’s defeat. They sought to further the 
spread of communism and this was carried out by promoting client states throughout 
the Third World and acquiring military bases to enhance Soviet geopolitical influence. 
Brzezinski gauged this and acted accordingly to nullify Soviet expansionist tendencies 
through stepping up support for counter-revolutionaries throughout the world. 
   Brzezinski had a nuanced view of the Soviet Union and did not fear that it was in 
any way a serious rival of the United States, except in the military sphere. He believed 
the West could triumph over the Soviet Union and did everything he could to bring 
this about with the specific goal of liberating Eastern Europe. As Justin Vaisse wrote: 
Brzezinski ‘knew that the Soviet Union was too weak economically and not attractive 
enough politically to become a substitute for the United States.’541 
   After assuming his role as national security adviser, Brzezinski implemented his 
ideas for dismantling the Soviet Union and exercised a domineering influence over 
the Carter administration. The NSC was dominant over the State department, 
particularly in the latter half of the term as the president tended to side more often 
with the advice of his National Security Adviser, though he did try to follow the 
advice of both the National Security Council and the State Department. Brzezinski’s 
influence however was predominant. As Justin Vaisse put it: ‘Overall, Brzezinski 
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exercised an exceptional degree of control. Not only was he present at all these 
meetings, but he presided over the SCC, which allowed him to control a significant 
portion of the foreign policy agenda.’542 Carter was deferential to Brzezinski 
throughout the entire four years in office as he was the overarching formulator and 
coordinator of foreign policy and the grand strategist of the administration. As Justin 
Vaisse wrote: ‘Brzezinski won most of his battles on fundamental issues, given the 
clear hardening of the political line under Carter during the last year of his 
presidency.’543 
   The perception of the Carter administration as a failure needs to be remedied, and 
the book released by Stuart Eizenstat entitled Jimmy Carter: The White House Years 
goes some way toward doing that. This thesis aimed to take it a step further and argue 
that the Carter administration was in fact crucial in ending the Cold War, Brzezinski 
in particular. Justin Vaisse pointed out that the Carter administration did in fact 
achieve quite a lot during the four years in which it was in office. He stated: 
‘However, few administrations have so many tangible successes (Panama, Camp 
David, China) in only four years.’544 One might add Afghanistan, human rights, and 
soft power in Eastern Europe.  
   The strategic modernization of the Carter administration needs to be reemphasised, 
as the U.S. military was substantially revamped during his term in office, a build-up 
which was then continued by the Reagan administration. Carter thus laid the 
groundwork for ending the Cold War. The numerous policies in this area he 
implemented, all of which were promoted by Brzezinski, are described by Justin 
Vaisse as follows: 
 
These included the pursuit of the cruise missile program, the deployment of the 
MX missile, the decreased importance attributed to the Minutemen missiles, the 
modernization of the Trident submarine and their SLBM missiles, and, most 
important for the wars to come in the 1990s and 2000s, the decision to finance 
the next generation of stealth bombers (the B-2, which explains the decision to 
cancel the B-1), and the new directive concerning the nuclear deterrent (PD-59) , 
the Carter doctrine for the Middle East, and the Rapid Deployment Force. All of 
these decisions were either unknown to the public at the time or else deliberately 
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minimised by the hawks and Ronald Reagan during the 1980 campaign, thus 
contributing to the image of Carter as a weak leader who had endangered the 
security of the United States.545 
 
   While Brzezinski was the guiding light of the Carter administration and the one 
responsible for its overall strategic vision, it has to be pointed out that Carter had the 
ultimate authority and the final say in all matters. As Justin Vaisse put it: ‘Brzezinski 
was powerful enough to have substantial influence on Carter, and he could dissuade 
him from following the path recommended by Vance, but he was not powerful 
enough to force him to make a decision or to adopt his own recommendations 
wholesale.’546 
   It needs to be added also that the punitive economic sanctions Carter took against 
the Soviets following the invasion of Afghanistan had a seriously detrimental effect 
upon the Soviet Union and assisted in the process of fragmenting the communist bloc. 
As Zubok put it:  
 
The economic sanctions placed on the USSR by President Carter after the 
invasion of Afghanistan exacerbated economic tensions inside the Soviet bloc. 
No longer could the Soviet leaders force their client Central European regimes to 
share the economic burdens of the renewed Cold War. At a meeting in Moscow 
in February 1980, the party secretaries of these countries informed their Kremlin 
comrades that they could not afford any reduction of economic and trade 
relations with the West. The economic dependency of Warsaw Pact member 
states on NATO countries, previously the problem of only the GDR, had now 
become the case for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria as well. 
Essentially, the Communist allies told Moscow that plugging the holes in the 
“socialist community” would be exclusively a Soviet expense.547 
 
   The Carter administration thus sowed the seeds of Soviet decline, putting in place 
the policies that would be carried on by Ronald Reagan and which helped bring the 
Cold War to an end. As Odd Arne Westad wrote:  
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The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency of the United States in 1980 
signified a change in method rather than aims in American Third World policies. 
Jimmy Carter’s last two years in office, especially, had pointed directly to the 
key priorities of the new administration – stepping up the pressure against radical 
regimes and gaining new allies among indigenous anti-Communist 
movements.548 
 
   It was Zbigniew Brzezinski who was one of chief strategists to architect the 
downfall of the Soviet Union, as has been proven, and his underappreciated role in 
ending the Cold War has now been given the credit it deserves. Odd Arne Westad 
confirmed that it was indeed Brzezinski who set the stage for the Reagan onslaught. 
He wrote:  
 
The Reagan approach was in many ways a continuation of the policies and 
methods developed by Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski 
and his staff. Already well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Brzezinski 
had, with Carter’s consent – begun implementing what some referred to as a 
“counter-force strategy” in the Third World meaning an emphasis on supporting 
whatever opposition could be mustered to Soviet allies in Africa and Asia.549 
 
   It was therefore really Brzezinski and Carter who put the policies in place which 
began the initial stages of the downfall of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was 
defeated in 1991 however the beginning stage of this downfall was initiated during the 
Carter administration. The period of détente came to an end and Brzezinski reignited a 
period of increased hostility and confrontation between the two superpowers. The 
Carter administration thus sowed the seeds of Soviet decline and this would lead to 
the Second Cold War and the conflict’s final denouement in 1991.  
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